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Abstract 
The quality of 9-1-1 services can mean the difference between life and death.   In 
2015, national 9-1-1 organizations created a minimum standard for Public Safety 
Answering Point (PSAP) comprehensive quality improvement programs, yet there is no 
mandate for PSAPs to adopt such standards.  This study focuses on quality improvement 
perceptions among New York State (NYS) wireless PSAP leaders from an evidence-
based management theory framework.  The study addresses the primary research 
question: How do NYS wireless PSAP leaders support effective implementation of 
quality care?  Using directed content analysis out-transcripts from focus group sessions 
with NYS wireless PSAP leaders, the following themes emerged:  PSAP leaders support 
effective implementation of quality care by achieving buy-in from stakeholders, building 
trust as leaders, and using local data to support their decision-making processes.  While 
participants consistently agreed on general definitions of PSAP quality using a six 
dimensional model, measuring quality was inconsistent from agency to agency.  Time, 
staffing, and funding were largely seen as barriers to effective implementation, while 
other factors such as training and accreditation were viewed positively.  Stakeholder 
engagement and organizational culture were perceived as neutral, yet instrumental, to 
success. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
9-1-1 was designed as a quick way to notify public safety agencies such as police 
departments, fire departments, sheriff’s offices, ambulance companies, or independent 9-
1-1 centers of an emergency.  As public acceptance of 9-1-1 increased, Public Safety 
Answering Points (PSAPs) were created to handle the calls made by people in distress.  
The quality of 9-1-1 services can mean the difference between life and death, especially 
for callers relying on the expertise of PSAP employees (DeLong v. County of Erie, 
1982). 
The demands and duties placed on PSAPs have grown due to technological 
changes, civil cases alleging negligence, and the emergence of national standards of care.  
As standards of care became more refined, states and local governments reacted by 
creating governance structures to reinforce adherence to standards.  Recently, nationally 
recognized 9-1-1 organizations created a minimum standard for PSAP comprehensive 
quality improvement programs (Association of Public Safety Communications Officials 
[APCO], 2015).  This dissertation studies the quality improvement perceptions of PSAP 
leaders from an evidence-based management theoretical framework.  
9-1-1 Standards Influence Model 
To understand the development of nationally accepted 9-1-1 best practices, we 
need to evaluate how different levels of governance, technology, civil cases, critical 
incidents, and accreditation influenced how the 9-1-1 community performed their duties.  
Figure 1.1 depicts a rudimentary model of the interactions among the multiple dynamics.   
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The solid lines represent direct influential relationships, the dashed lines represent 
loose or indirect influential relationships.  The arrows depict the direction of influence.  
One line, between the state government and local PSAPs, is an alternating line because 
the influential relationship depends on the state the PSAP is located within.  Some states 
directly control their PSAPs, whereas most states have an indirect influence on PSAPs.  
Regardless of level of influence, some balance between local implementation and state 
regulation must be achieved to optimize the standards of care adopted by PSAPs.  
Federal, state, and local governance influences are discussed later.   
The three major external influences are 9-1-1 technology, civil cases, and critical 
incidents.  They are external because they are outside the control of the PSAP community 
and may reflect public demands of PSAPs.  No one can predict how technology will 
influence the transport, delivery, and display of 9-1-1 information, or what new 
innovations will come along changing how PSAPs handle that same information.  
Similarly, no one can predict what incident will result in a civil case being brought to 
court nor the level of impact such cases will have on the PSAP community.  Critical 
incidents are unpredictable by nature.  All three external influences will continue to 
impact PSAP standards development as discussed later in this chapter.   
Finally, accreditation influences local PSAP through self-regulation.  Local 
PSAPs must make the conscious decision to seek accreditation.  The level of influence 
depends on the standards of the accrediting authority.    
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Figure 1.1. 9-1-1 Standards Influence Model. 
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9-1-1 History and Development 
The first 9-1-1 call was made in Haleyville, Alabama in 1968 as a proof of 
concept (National Emergency Number Association [NENA], n.d.-a).  Since then, 
communities slowly implemented 9-1-1 technologies, procedures, and best practices for 
collecting information from callers, dispatching public safety agencies, and providing 
critical updates to responders (Athey & Stern, 2002; Ornato, 2013; Shah, Bishop, Lerner, 
Czapranski, & Davis, 2003).  Many of the procedures or practices in use today arose out 
of changes in technology (APCO, 2013; Athey & Stern, 2002; Hevesy, 2004) and tragedy 
(9/11 Commission, 2004; APCO, 2015; DeLong v. County of Erie, 1982).  Both 
technology and tragedy influenced federal, state, and local governments to change 
policies, procedures, and governance models to meet the demands of the public.  The 
emergence of national standards of care and the 2015 adoption of a minimum standard 
for comprehensive quality improvement programs (APCO, 2015) influenced local PSAP 
decisions regarding staffing, policy development, and accreditation.    
Technology and technological change.  The adoption of 9-1-1 as the primary 
emergency contact number progressed during the 1970s to the 1980s as public safety 
agencies established telephone routing agreements with the local telephone carrier.  Basic 
9-1-1 only provided free call routing to the designated PSAP within the community 
(NENA, n.d-a).  Most PSAPs were created within existing local public safety agencies as 
communities transitioned from local seven-digit emergency lines to 9-1-1.   
In the 1980s and 1990s, Enhanced 9-1-1 services provided PSAPs with detailed 
information about the caller’s phone number and the address associated with the phone 
line (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [NHTSA], 2013).  The new 
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technology led agencies to purchase more complex equipment in order to receive the call 
data and enter that information into Computer Aided Dispatch or “CAD” Systems (Athey 
& Stern, 2002).  A CAD system is a networked data management system that allows a 9-
1-1 telecommunicator to type information received from the 9-1-1 call such as location, 
caller name, what type of services were requested, and other narrative entries.  The CAD 
uses the location and the requested services to determine what public safety agencies to 
send, how many of each responder unit type are needed, and if a response plan existed for 
that type of emergency. 
The 1999 Wireless and Public Safety Telecommunications Act established 9-1-1 
as the national emergency number and provided a timeline to adopt changes in wireless 
9-1-1 technology (NHTSA, 2013).  As wireless technology and mobile devices became 
smaller and more popular, PSAPs adopted wireless location technology allowing centers 
to locate cellular phone callers to within 300 meters in any direction, an area 
encompassing approximately 70 acres (NHTSA, 2013).  Although the technology 
provided unique advantages, it also created significant challenges. 
Approximately 70% of all 9-1-1 calls come from wireless devices, many of them 
accidental (NENA, n.d.-b).  PSAPs have to spend time trying to locate the caller within 
that 70-acre footprint, which is roughly the size of three to four city blocks or a small 
college campus.  Considering the phone is mobile, that 70-acre footprint is constantly 
moving, such as a prank call from a student on a school bus.  Additionally, PSAP 
employees, professionally known as telecommunicators, have to stay on the line to 
determine if the caller is deaf, hard of hearing, under duress, or if the caller accidentally 
called 9-1-1. 
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Internet-based callers pose significant challenges as the location information 
provided to PSAPs from voice over Internet providers, such as Vonage or Spectrum 
Cable, is based on the home address the customers enter into their account (Rushnak, 
2007). For example, a student attending college in Kansas uses his or her parent’s 
Vonage account from Massachusetts. A 9-1-1 Internet call from that student in Kansas 
will be routed to the PSAP that services the parent’s home in Massachusetts instead of 
the local PSAP in Kansas. The misrouted call causes confusion and delays as there is 
currently no way to transfer the 9-1- 1 call back to Kansas.  In some instances, the 
consequences are deadly as responders are sent to the incorrect location (Londono, 2006). 
9-1-1 civil cases and liability.  One of the landmark cases taught to many new 
telecommunicators was the 1976 case of DeLong v. County of Erie (APCO, 2005; 
Clawson, Dernocoeur, & Rose, 2012).  In 1976, Amalia DeLong called 9-1-1 telling the 
calltaker there was a burglar trying to break into her house.  She lived approximately 
1,300 feet from the Village of Kenmore Police Department (Roberts, 1983, para. 6).  Her 
9-1-1 call was routed to the Erie County PSAP where the calltaker told her police would 
be sent “right away” (DeLong v. County of Erie, 1982, para. 3).  Unfortunately, the 
calltaker assumed the call came from the City of Buffalo and sent the wrong agency to 
the wrong address.  Amalia died of her stabbing wounds because when Buffalo Police 
determined no such address existed in the City of Buffalo, the dispatchers never took 
further action.  Amalia’s husband sued the County of Erie for wrongful death and won. 
The case became a trigger event resulting in changes in procedure and technology 
within the 911 community.  It established the legal precedent that a municipality could be 
sued for negligence and 9-1-1 telecommunicators had a legal duty to act (DeLong v. 
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County of Erie, 1982).  It also established the critical nature of determining a caller’s 
location.  In 1976, Enhanced 9-1-1 did not exist.  The telecommunicator had no 
geographical reference when Amalia stated her address was 319 Victoria.  The 
telecommunicator assumed she meant Victoria Avenue in the City of Buffalo, not 
Victoria Boulevard in the Village of Kenmore.  The need to accurately locate callers 
became the basis for a majority of 9-1-1 technological advances such as Enhanced 9-1-1 
which could have made the difference in Amalia’s case if the telecommunicator had the 
caller’s community (e.g., the Village of Kenmore) available. 
Despite technological advances, accurately passing location to responders served 
as the focus of another wrongful death case in 2008.  Denise Amber Lee was kidnapped, 
raped, and murdered despite at least five 9-1-1 calls regarding her location, one of which 
Denise made from the cell phone of her captor.  The final call was from a witness who 
called 9-1-1 and gave accurate location information to a telecommunicator as she 
followed Denise and her abductor for “more than nine minutes, identifying cross streets 
as she continued driving” (Denise Amber Lee Foundation [DALF], 2016, para. 1).  
Inefficiencies within the 9-1-1 system, poor training, and gross negligence were key 
allegations in Nathan Lee’s suit settled the day after telecommunicators testified in court 
to agency incompetence (Eckhart, 2012).  Using money from the suit and the national 
attention it garnered, the Denise Amber Lee Foundation partnered with national 
organizations such as the Association of Public Safety Officials (APCO) and the National 
Emergency Number Association (NENA) to establish quality improvement standards for 
all PSAPs in the United States (APCO, 2013a; APCO, 2015; DALF, 2016).  
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Critical incidents and public awareness.  For this dissertation, critical incidents 
are events that overwhelm the coping mechanisms of individuals or response systems 
forcing them into crisis (Everly, Flannery, & Mitchell, 2000).  Critical incidents can 
impact the consciousness of a community at the local, state, national, and international 
level.  International critical incidents such as the September 11, 2001 terror attacks can 
change public safety responder training, protocols, technologies, and funding priorities. 
Emergence of 9-1-1 national standards of care.  Concurrent to civil cases, 
national 9-1-1 associations, vendors, and the 9-1-1 community slowly adopted national 
minimum standards of care based on medical practice, civil case law, federal, and state 
laws.  Jeff Clawson developed the Medical Priority Dispatch System in 1976 to improve 
patient outcomes, specifically by encouraging PSAPs to provide medical instructions 
over the phone to reduce the time from call to interventions such as Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation (National Academy of EMD [NAED], 2012).  The protocols, standards, 
and quality improvement measures collectively became called emergency medical 
dispatch (EMD).  Clawson, later known as “the father of EMD,” worked with states, local 
agencies and public safety attorneys to establish EMD not only as a legally defensible 
protocol, but a legally mandatory duty to act (NAED, 2012, p. xii)     
As the expectations of the public grew thanks to shows like Rescue 911, the duty 
of PSAPs to provide lifesaving instructions also grew (APCO, 2013a; APCO, 2015; 
NAED, 2012).  Civil liability concepts such as negligent retention, failure to train, 
telecommunicator abandonment, and detrimental reliance became part of initial and 
supervisory 9-1-1 courses due to cases where 9-1-1 telecommunicators or the PSAP 
failed to take appropriate action (APCO, 2005; APCO, 2009; APCO, 2011; APCO, 
 9 
2013a; NAED, 2012).  To combat inconsistencies in 9-1-1 operation, national 
organizations published standards and agreed to legally support agencies that adopted 
such standards (APCO, 2011; NAED, 2012).  Some organizations such as NAED and 
Canadian American Law Enforcement Association, or state sheriff’s associations offer 
accreditation to agencies meeting such standards.   
Federal and state agencies looked to nationally adopted standards for consensus 
regarding both 9-1-1 technology and operational standards.  The federal government and 
state governments, such as New York, identified the APCO P25 interoperable radio 
standard as minimum requirements for grant funding (New York State Department of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Services [NYSDHSES], 2016a; United States 
Department of Homeland Security [USDHS], 2016).  The federal government, Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
and states sought both APCO and NENA comments to develop wireless 9-1-1 technology 
standards while drafting the 1999 Wireless and Public Safety Telecommunications Act 
(NENA, n.d.-a; NHTSA, 2013).  As of 2013, APCO (2013b) reported 32 states adopted 
mandatory minimum training standards for new 9-1-1 center telecommunicators, 
including New York State (APCO, 2013b; 21 NYCRR § 5200, n.d.).  However, 
regulations wildly vary from state to state and some states mandate training for only a 
select portion of PSAPs (NHTSA, 2013; NYSDHSES, 2015).      
Growth of statewide 9-1-1 governance structures.  Although there is a 
movement to create standardized protocols and consolidate PSAPs, most centers in the 
United States remain largely decentralized with limited state or federal oversight into 
their daily operations. Development of 9-1-1 systems began primarily as local and state 
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facilitated endeavors, managed at the local level, with little governance regarding 
coordination between municipal or state jurisdictions (NHTSA, 2013; United States 
Department of Transportation [USDOT], 2013).  A 2010 national survey of 1,924 PSAPs 
revealed the average number of dispatchers is 16.37 (SD 21.55, median 10, range 6-16), 
showing most centers remained relatively small (Sutter et al., 2015).  National and state 
laws regarding 9-1-1 funding mechanisms and the emergence of Next Generation 9-1-1 
technological challenges thrust state governments into the forefront of 9-1-1 governance 
structures across the country (NHTSA, 2013; USDOT, 2013). 
Enhanced 9-1-1 and Wireless 9-1-1 location technological advances required 
significant changes to local 9-1-1 system equipment, which many local agencies could 
not afford.  Therefore, states developed funding streams to offset the equipment costs in 
return for some state 9-1-1 governance over local centers (Athey & Stern, 2002; Hevesy, 
2014; NHTSA, 2013; USDOT, 2013).  Federal laws such as the Wireless 
Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, Enhance 911 Act of 2004, and FCC 
regulations reinforced states as the appropriate governing authority, yet did not explicitly 
mandate such governance (NHTSA, 2013).  As a result, states developed uneven 
governance structures across a wide range of oversight.  State laws determined local 
surcharges, excise taxes, or universal service fund revenues remitted to local or state 
agencies, but most state laws “stop short of addressing the full operational scope of 9-1-1 
service” such as minimum training standards, staffing, quality improvement, or other best 
practices (NHTSA, 2013, p. 14). 
In 2013, the USDOT identified seven broad categories defining the level of state 
oversight and categorized a majority (n=31) of states as having “State-level 9-1-1 
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authority with statewide geographic planning, coordination, funding responsibility for 
full scope of 9-1-1” (p. 10).  Most state 9-1-1 governance structures were part of another 
state agency and not a dedicated authority (NHTSA, 2013; USDOT 2013).  Interestingly, 
Georgia’s state 9-1-1 plan was viewed by the federal government as a “good example” 
for other states (NHTSA, 2013, p. 49), but a 2015 telecast showed the Georgia board 
failed to meet for years because there was no one appointed to the board (Keefe & Kish, 
2015).  Even more remarkable, was the fact that five states had little to no state oversight 
of 9-1-1 operations as of 2013 (NHTSA, 2013; USDOT, 2013).  A description depicting 
state 9-1-1 governance is in Appendix A.  
State of New York 9-1-1 governance.  Like many other states, the State of New 
York’s 9-1-1 governance began primarily as a means to fund changes in 9-1-1 
technology.  In 1989, New York passed the Enhanced Emergency Telephone System 
Surcharge Law creating state and county 9-1-1 surcharges to fund wireline services and 
equipment.  In 1991, the State of New York amended the law to establish wireless 9-1-1 
surcharges (Hevesy, 2004).   
In 2002, the State of New York established a State 9-1-1 Board and the Wireless 
Expedited Deployment Funding program to help counties achieve the FCC mandated 
wireless phase II location requirements established in the federal 1999 Wireless and 
Public Safety Telecommunications Act (Hevesy, 2004).  The State 9-1-1 Board created 
the minimum adopted standards covering initial training requirements, minimum staffing, 
continuing education, emergency medical dispatch, and 911 technology required for 
county wireless PSAPs (21 NYCRR § 5200, n.d.).  Adherence to the adopted standards 
was a prerequisite for counties wishing to apply for expedited deployment funds or any 
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state 9-1-1 funding.  The NYS adopted standards (21 NYCRR § 5200, n.d.) referenced 
nationally adopted standards and courses from organizations such as APCO, NAED, and 
the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA). 
Despite formally adopting standards, instituting an inspection regime, and tying 
funding to standards, the NYS standard only applied to counties operating wireless 
PSAPs.  By law, only one wireless PSAP was permitted per county, therefore the 
standards applied to only 56 of the 191 of PSAPs throughout the State of New York (21 
NYCRR § 5200, n.d.; FCC, July 31, 2017).  In 2010, the State of New York abandoned 
its inspection regime and absorbed the function of the 9-1-1 board within the newly 
created State Interoperable and Emergency Communications Board.  In 2015, members 
of the board actively complained that the standards are not applied to all PSAPs and 
expressed a desire to adopt changes to NY standards that aligned with national standards 
such as APCO, NENA, and ANSI (NYSDHSES, 2015).  By November 2016, the state 
failed to make progress on either front citing legal and technological barriers while 
promising to take the board’s concerns “under advisement” (NYSDHSES, 2016b, p. 3).  
Within New York State, the differing applications of standards between wireless PSAPs 
and non-wireless PSAPs combined with the abandonment of the inspection regime led to 
9-1-1 service inconsistencies between communities. 
Problem Statement 
The quality of service provided by PSAPs is inconsistent due to the lack of 
mandatory standards of care at the national, state, and local levels.  This study 
specifically focuses on quality improvement perceptions among New York State (NYS) 
wireless PSAP leaders with regard to evidence-based management theory. As previously 
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discussed, public demands on PSAP quality developed from technological changes, civil 
cases alleging negligence, and the emergence of national recommended standards of care, 
yet governments at all levels have been slow to create governance structures to reinforce 
adherence to standards. Although nationally recognized 9-1- 1 organizations created a 
minimum standard for PSAP comprehensive quality improvement programs (APCO, 
2015) there is no explicit mandate for PSAPs to adopt such national standards. 
Given no there are no universal mandates, there are inconsistencies in how 
different PSAPs approach standards of care.  More importantly, even if universal 
standards of care exist there may be differing interpretations as PSAP leaders apply the 
standards to their local situation. This study discusses how PSAP leaders’ interpretations 
of quality converged while local quality improvement implementations diverged. 
Additionally, there is little scholarly knowledge regarding how PSAP leaders 
adapt national standards of care, evidence-based practices, and evidence-based 
management decision making to their local context.  While the relevant research 
literature will be discussed at length in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, it is important to 
note how little the academic community knows about PSAP quality improvement 
programs, the evidence they use to select, implement, and sustain evidence-based 
programs, and most importantly the factors impacting the decisions PSAP leaders make 
regarding quality improvement and evidence-based management decisions. 
Theoretical Rationale 
Evidence-based management is “the basing of managerial decisions on the best 
available evidence” (Robbins & Judge, 2017, p. 11).  As governments and PSAP leaders 
evaluate which standards to adopt or mandate by law, the evidence decision makers use 
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to justify policy becomes critical to the success or failure of such policies.  This next 
section will briefly cover how proponents describe evidence-based management, critical 
concerns regarding evidence-based theory, empirical support of the theory, and how 
evidence-based management theory may apply to PSAP decision-makers.   
Proponents of evidence-based management encourage leaders to bridge the 
research-practice gap to achieve more desirable results in areas related to quality, 
customer satisfaction, sales, and organizational effectiveness (Glaub, Frese, Fischer, & 
Hoppe, 2014; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006; Rousseau & Olivas-Luján, 2013; Wright et al., 
2016).  As the theory became more refined, the six specific steps of asking, acquiring, 
appraising, aggregating, applying, and assessing became iterative processes for success 
(Briner & Walshe, 2014; Morrell & Learmonth, 2015) despite claims that evidence-based 
management is not a cookbook (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006; Rousseau & Olivas-Luján, 
2013).  More recently, adherents recommended opening the decision-making process to 
more rigorous and contextual evaluation (Briner & Walshe, 2014; Wright et al., 2016).  
Wright et al. (2016) concludes evidence-based management success requires a “more 
balanced view . . . in which managers engage with evidence in context [emphasis added]” 
(p. 175).  Context is provided by situated experience underpinned by personal experience 
and judgement (Wright et al., 2016).  For PSAP leaders, evidence-based management 
may serve as the link between theory and practice. 
In contrast, critics of evidence-based management warn that overreliance on 
certain forms of evidence as a panacea may not be in the public’s best interest (Boyes-
Watson & Pranis, 2012; Morrell et al., 2015).  First, in attempting to remove rubbish and 
other half-truths (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006), evidence-based management theorists 
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denigrate other forms of knowing (Morrell & Learmonth, 2015; Morrell, Learmonth, & 
Heracleous, 2015).  Second, scholars are concerned with “Who decides what constitutes 
evidence?”, “How can we know what we don’t know?”, and the dangers of policy-
makers producing evidence to match the predetermined success of their decisions 
(McMillin, 2012; Morrell & Learmonth, 2015; Russell, 2012). Finally, critics question if 
“Does the solution work?” should be the sole criteria when society decides to adopt a 
solution.  Ethical deliberations of “Should we do this?” need to enter the consciousness of 
decision-makers (Boyes-Watson & Pranis, 2012; McMillin, 2012), especially considering 
PSAP leaders’ ethical responsibilities to the public.    
Although evidence-based management theorists prize randomized experimental 
evidence of “what works,” there are little empirical studies on the effectiveness of EBM 
(Briner & Walshe, 2014; Glaub et al., 2014; Morrell & Learmonth, 2015; Olola et al., 
2016; Wright et al., 2016).  Some empirical studies showed that evidence-based 
management processes may improve the quality of care provided by PSAPs in the areas 
of quality improvement programs (Bhave, 2014), research knowledge (Olola et al., 2016), 
medical protocols (Clawson et al., 2016), community leadership knowledge of evidence-
based practices (Gloppen et al., 2016), and evidence-based practice implementations 
(Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al., 2016).  Interestingly, based on Kepes, Bennett, 
and McDaniel’s (2014) hierarchy of evidence, the studies that best represented evidenced 
based management ideals also fall within the lowest strata of “evidence.”  This cognitive 
dissonance led Wright et al. (2016) to call upon evidence-based management leaders to 
open up the decision-making and evidence valuing process to narrative forms of 
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knowing.  The research studies discussed above support possible application of evidence-
based management process to PSAP leadership decisions. 
Complementing current research into evidence-based management, the adoption 
of national standards of care fall into alignment with the principles of evidence-based 
theory and practice (Olola et al., 2016).  Although limited scholarly study exists on the 
impact of quality management processes in a PSAP environment (Clawson, Cady, 
Martin, & Sinclair, 1998), other studies using evidence-based theory may provide unique 
insights into how the 9-1-1 community may close the research-practice gap to provide 
better quality decision-making and outcomes (Olola et al., 2016).  Furthermore, 
approaching PSAP quality improvement reforms with an expectation that there are 
multiple valid sources of evidence and context may provide the best opportunities for 
organizational success (Briner & Walshe, 2014; Morrell & Learmonth, 2015; Wright et 
al., 2016).  Qualitative research into how PSAP leaders perceive quality improvement 
programs, how they value different forms of evidence, and decision-making processes 
helps us better understand the applicability of evidence-based management to PSAPs.  
Statement of Purpose 
The study explores how NYS wireless PSAP leaders evaluated the quality of 
service telecommunicators provide to the public, what forms of evidence they used to 
justify their quality improvement programs, and whether existing national standards of 
care impacted their decisions.  The study provides insight into what PSAP leaders 
perceived as barriers to achieving quality and what factors they believed contribute to 
quality.  Finally, the study analyzes and discusses the rich content provided by PSAP 
leaders on these topics from an evidence-based management theoretical framework. 
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Research Questions 
The study addresses the primary research question: How do NYS Wireless PSAP 
leaders support effective implementation of quality care?  Four subordinate questions 
provide insights into PSAP leader perceptions regarding the primary question.  (a) How 
do PSAP leaders measure performance based on their definition of quality? (b) How do 
PSAP leaders perceive factors related to quality improvement? (c) When do PSAP 
leaders believe evidence-based management theoretical frameworks, such as national 
standards of care, should supersede local and personal experience frameworks; when do 
they not? (d) How do PSAP leaders’ views align with evidence-based management 
theory?  The researcher performed guided discussions with focus groups consisting of 
former and existing wireless NYS PSAP leaders followed by directed content analysis 
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) to answer these research questions.   This next section briefly 
discusses each question and potential weaknesses that impacted the result of the study. 
Sub-question 1: How do NYS wireless PSAP leaders measure performance 
based on their definition of quality?  The sub-question was primarily aimed at 
determining how PSAP leaders defined quality and what processes they used to measure 
quality at their center.  Some PSAP leaders used quality improvement programs 
developed in accordance with national standards of care, others had a local program, 
whereas many considered the absence of complaints as quality.  Understanding both 
similarities and, more importantly, variances in how PSAP leaders perceived quality help 
researchers understand the thought processes behind decisions regarding PSAP quality 
and inform national standard of care developers on what PSAP leaders believe is 
practical to measure.  Understanding how PSAP leaders define quality also sets 
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boundaries for the primary research question, specifically what could be considered by 
PSAP leaders as “quality care.” 
Sub-question 2: How do NYS wireless PSAP leaders perceive factors related 
to quality improvement?  This sub-question identified which factors PSAP leaders 
believed were necessary for success, which factors were helpful but not necessary, and 
which factors acted as barriers when implementing and sustaining a quality improvement 
program in accordance with national standards of care.  As discussed later in Chapter 2, 
there are some factors previously identified by research findings such as time (Bartlett & 
Francis-Smythe, 2016; Guo, Farnsworth, & Hermanson, 2015), trusted insiders (Walker, 
Whitener, Trupin, & Migliarini, 2015; Wright et al., 2016), or organizational culture 
(Olola et al., 2016; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Telep & Lum, 2014) that may influence the 
success or failure of evidence-based quality improvement programs.  PSAP leader 
responses confirmed some of those same factors were present for PSAP standards 
implementations.  As a result of this study, evidence-based management theorists have 
better evidence to support their theory.  Despite general validation, some of the 
assumptions made by proponents of evidence-based management need rethinking and 
lack practicality given the lack of original research on PSAP operations.  PSAP leader-
identified factors help future researchers better understand the “support” and 
“implementation” portions of the primary research question. 
Sub-question 3: Do PSAP leaders believe evidence-based management 
theoretical frameworks, such as national standards of care, should supersede local 
and personal experience frameworks?  As discussed earlier in the introduction, PSAP 
operations, policies, procedures, and adoption of national standards of care are locally 
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derived decisions with limited influence by state or federal agencies.  National standards 
of care have emerged due to technological changes, civil liabilities, and changing public 
expectations.  This sub-question evaluated whether PSAP leaders perceived national 
standards of care, particularly those associated with quality improvement, as valid 
requirements or measurement instruments.  PSAP leaders believed evidence-based 
national standards of care were relevant, however, if PSAP leaders also shared significant 
barriers such as time and cost preclude implementation.  This study informs decision 
makers on additional actions needed to achieve better PSAP quality.  This sub-question 
was strategically placed later in the focus group discussion to reinforce or break through 
the “quality of care” definitions previously established by PSAP leaders during sub-
question 1. 
Sub-question 4: How do NYS wireless PSAP leaders’ views align with 
evidence-based management theory?  This question identified alignment between what 
PSAP leaders actually believe and what evidence-based management theorists propose.  
Evidence-based management theorists posit the divide between research and practice may 
be overcome through proper training and exposure (Briner & Walshe, 2014; Kepes, 
Bennett, & McDaniel, 2014; Rousseau, 2006).  Some research indicates leaders may 
practice evidence-based management without realizing it or confound previously studied 
research evidence with professional expertise (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016).  The 
answers to this sub-question exposed general agreement between theory and reality.  
PSAP leaders advocated better use of local data and more original research on PSAP 
operations to close the divide between theory and practice.  Their comments revealed that 
gap is not too large to bridge within the current theoretical framework.  Connecting back 
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to the primary research question, PSAP leaders remain central to the implementation of 
programs and also construct what is viewed as “effective” for their organizations. 
Potential Significance of the Study 
There is scant empirical research on evidence-based management decision-
making (Wright et al., 2016), PSAP quality improvement (Clawson et al., 1998), or 
PSAP leaders as a population.  The study provides new insight into how PSAP leaders 
make decisions regarding the quality of service PSAPs provide to the public.  The study 
offers potential solutions to governments regarding which standards of care should be 
adopted, what measures best define quality, and what factors including staffing and 
funding may be necessary for success.  Finally, the study assists our understanding of 
how a relatively new theory, evidence-based management (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006; 
Rousseau, 2006), aligns with PSAP leaders’ reality. 
Definitions of Terms 
For the purpose of this study, a public safety answering point or PSAP is a 
“facility equipped and staffed to receive emergency and non-emergency public safety 
calls for service via telephone and other communication devices (APCO, 2015, p. 16).  
Also, a telecommunicator refers to anyone “whose primary responsibility is to receive, 
process, transmit, and/or dispatch emergency and non-emergency calls for service for . . . 
public safety services” (APCO, 2015, p. 16).  Finally, a quality improvement program is 
defined as an “on-going program providing, at a minimum, the random case review 
evaluating emergency calltaking and dispatch performance, feedback on protocol 
compliance, commendation, retraining and remediation as appropriate, and submission of 
compliance data” to a PSAP (APCO, 2015, p. 17). 
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Chapter 1 Summary 
9-1-1 is designed to preserve life and property.  The PSAPs that answer the call 
have an established duty to provide quality public service, yet the definition of quality 
varies from state to state and community to community.  As national standards of care 
emerged to meet public expectations PSAP decision makers in federal, state, and local 
governments face difficult choices along a continuum between mandating adherence to 
national standards and leaving quality improvement programmatic decisions solely to 
local control.  Evidence-based management theory proposes decisions regarding practice 
are best informed by combining the best available research with local contextual data.  
While some research studies support evidence-based management processes and 
practices leading to better outcomes, there is little known about evidence-based 
management theory applicability to a PSAP environment or the perceptions of PSAP 
leaders regarding evidence-based quality improvement standards.  This study answers 
specific questions about how PSAP leaders measure quality, what factors PSAP leaders 
perceive impact implementation of a quality improvement program, PSAP leader 
receptivity to evidence-based management standards superseding personal experience 
during decision-making processes regarding quality improvement, and how PSAP 
leaders’ beliefs align with evidence-based theory.  
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
Literature Review Introduction and Purpose 
Since its first use in 1968, 9-1-1 grew to be the primary emergency services 
number in the United States of America (NENA, n.d.-a).  As previously discussed in 
Chapter 1, the quality of 9-1-1 services provided by telecommunicators can mean the 
difference between life and death (APCO, 2013a; DeLong v. County of Erie, 1982).  In 
2015, the 9-1-1 community adopted a national minimum standard of care related to 
quality improvement programs for the agencies that answer our 9-1-1 calls (APCO, 
2015).  Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP) are faced with multiple decisions 
regarding whether or not to adopt the national quality improvement standards of care and 
how to implement quality improvement measures within their organization.  The 
information from quality improvement programs can be used as local evidence to 
support, refute, or even act as a research control for evidence-based practice within an 
evidence-based management theoretical framework.  
The purpose of this literature review is to evaluate the current research related to 
evidence-based management implementation and quality improvement within a 9-1-1 
environment.  The review will initially discuss studies related to quality improvement 
programs from an evidence-based practice paradigm, and how researchers linked 
implementation of evidence-based practices to evidence-based management decision 
making.  The review will then analyze significant research findings related to how 
evidence-based management implementation impacted, or was impacted by, individual 
roles and organizational perspectives.  Next the review will discuss research-identified 
barriers to implementation and factors related to implementation success.  The review 
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will close with a brief methodological review, identification of research gaps, and 
recommendations for further study. 
Quality Improvement as Evidence-Based Practice and Management 
Quality improvement can be an evidence-based practice or part of a larger 
evidence-based management implementation (Bhave, 2014; Clawson et al., 1998; 
Russell, 2012; Spector et al., 2015; Taylor & Campbell, 2011).  The germinal study by 
Clawson et al. (1998) showed significant 20% (n= 217, p < .001) increase in evidence-
based telecommunicator protocol compliance after initiation of quality improvement 
feedback sessions and continuing dispatch education (p. 3).  At the time, Clawson et al. 
(1998) was the only peer reviewed study that quantitatively measured the impact of 
quality improvement in a PSAP environment.   
Conducted nearly two decades ago, the 1998 Clawson et al. study served as a 
bedrock assumption for future studies related to evidence-based practices within a PSAP 
environment, such as those developed by the International Academies of Emergency 
Dispatch (IAED) and its precursor the National Academy of Emergency Medical 
Dispatch (Clawson et al., 2012).  Shah, Bishop, Lerner, Czapranski, and Davis (2003) 
researched emergency telecommunicator protocols developed by the National Academy 
of Emergency Medical Dispatch and revealed telecommunicators who complied to 
academy accredited quality standards were able to differentiate between low acuity 
patients (needing less emergency intervention) from more critical patients 94.8% of the 
time thus reducing emergency response costs and reducing risk to the public from 
ambulances needlessly responding with lights and sirens (p. 3). 
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More recent evidence-based practice research on the effectiveness of stroke 
diagnostic tools (Clawson et al., 2016), telecommunicator call processing times for 
structure fire protocols (Dornseif et al., 2016), perceived value of differing PSAP training 
techniques (Sebresos, Olola, Scott, & Clawson, 2016), and effectiveness of 
telecommunicators pre-alerting dispatched agencies to suspected cardiac arrest (Weiser et 
al., 2013) specifically selected PSAPs that achieved, or were about to achieve, Accredited 
Center of Excellence status from the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch.  
The International Academies of Emergency Dispatch certify telecommunicators on the 
use of their evidence-based protocols, and more stringently certify PSAPs’ quality 
improvement programs related to protocol compliance (International Academies of 
Emergency Dispatch [IAED], n.d.).  PSAPs must demonstrate specific quality 
improvement parameters for telecommunicator protocol compliance, quality 
improvement program policies and procedures, and local quality improvement 
governance structures in order to achieve Accredited Center of Excellence status (IAED, 
n.d.; IAED, 2014).  Researchers in the above studies controlled for adherence to the 
intervention or protocol being studied by using accredited PSAPs because researchers, 
and in particular, Dornseif et al. (2016) “didn’t have the resources to review nearly 
24,000 cases individually for compliance” (J. Dornseif, personal communication, March 
15, 2017).  For the researchers, PSAP accreditation and the quality improvement 
programs that justify accreditation increased the validity of their measurement tools for 
the protocols under study. 
Similarly, an Accredited Center of Excellence PSAP served as the sample agency 
for a study investigating changes in telecommunicator interest, understanding, and 
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literacy of evidence-based research before and after watching a research education video 
(Olola et al., 2016).  While the non-randomized cohort study revealed a significant post-
intervention increase (52%, p < .05) in telecommunicators’ abilities to differentiate 
between quantitative and qualitative research, the study also revealed only insignificant 
increases in telecommunicator interest in research participation (Olola et al., 2016, p.24).  
Olola et al. (2016) concluded the lack of increase in research participation was due to the 
fact that the sample had volunteered for research, therefore demonstrating their 
preexisting interest.   Researchers also revealed the PSAP studied recently performed 
quality improvement related research and internal data-gathering for accreditation 
purposes (Olola et al., 2016).  The PSAP’s preexisting organizational commitment to 
quality and evidence-based practice was cited by Olola et al. (2016) as a study limitation 
and may have been linked to evidence based management implementation and interest in 
scholarly research.   
Due to the limited availability of quality improvement and evidence-based 
management research directly tied to the PSAP environment (which is discussed later 
during the research gaps section), the subsequent portions of this review expanded the 
scope of inquiry to other fields of study.  Peer reviewed research studies that specifically 
evaluated evidence-based management, the decision-making processes surrounding 
implementation of evidence-based practice, or management views of evidence-based 
practice were included.  Studies with findings focused solely on the effectiveness of a 
particular evidence-based practice were excluded.  The review also focused on studies 
related to quality improvement programs within call centers, but specifically excluded 
studies related to the quality of language adaptations of non-native call centers servicing 
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North American and United Kingdom based companies.  The next sections will discuss 
how researchers uncovered linkages between evidence-based management and evidence-
based practice, discoveries on how evidence-based management impacted or is impacted 
by differing roles and perspectives, findings concerning barriers to evidence-based 
management, and factors identified as promoting evidence-based management.       
Evidence Based Practice Linkage to Evidence-Based Management 
Researchers found that the decision processes surrounding the implementation of 
evidence-based or science-based practices may be inextricably linked to the evidence-
based management process (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Briner & Walshe, 2014; 
Glaub et al., 2014; Guo et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al., 2016).  
Specifically, Wright et al. (2016) “identified the opportunity” to perform retroactive case 
study on evidence-based management decision-making process as part of a larger 
organizational study regarding the implementation of an evidence-based fast track 
program within the emergency department at a large metropolitan hospital in Australia 
(p. 163).  While a majority of the Wright et al. (2016) case study’s findings are discussed 
elsewhere in this review, the fact that evidence-based management implementation 
themes and factors unintentionally emerged from the study of a different evidence-based 
phenomenon is significant and relevant to how researchers can study evidence-based 
management.   
The apparent link between evidence-based practice and evidence-based 
management was supported in other study findings such as Spiri and MacPhee (2013) in 
which “participants frequently gave examples of EBM [evidence-based management] in 
relation to EBP [evidence-based practice]” (p. 268) and Taylor and Campbell (2011) 
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where 63% of social care workers thought that social care governance, a Northern Ireland 
government sanctioned form of evidence-based management, was a “valuable process to 
ensure quality of service and continuous improvement” (p. 263).  A management student 
participant in Briner and Walshe’s (2014) case study of evidence-based management 
teaching stated, “I’m a lot more aware of the need for me to be quality control for the 
research I use in the course of decision making” (p. 428).  The linkage and overlaps 
described in the above studies may help future researchers or literature reviewers uncover 
evidence-based management when evaluating the decisions surrounding evidence-based 
practice. 
Evidence-Based Management Implementation Findings from Multiple Perspectives 
Research into evidence-based management implementation or decision processes 
surrounding evidence-based practice revealed roles and organizational culture influenced 
whether or not evidence-based management succeeded (Glaub et al., 2014; Wright et al., 
2016), what evidence-based practice was ultimately selected (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 
2016; Telep & Lum, 2014; Walker et al., 2015), and the level of evidence-based practice 
sustainment achieved by such decisions (Crowley, Greenberg, Feinberg, Spoth, & 
Redmond, 2012; Gloppen et al., 2016).  The subsections below discuss what the studies 
found related to senior management and owners, middle management and first-line 
supervisors, trusted insiders, and external facilitators. Another subsection evaluates how 
researchers found organizational culture as a neither a barrier nor a factor for success but 
rather as a decision-making modifier.  
Senior leadership and owners. Senior leadership and owners may have differing 
views or roles in evidence-based management depending on the size of their organization 
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(Crowley et al., 2012; Glaub et al., 2014; Guo et al., 2015; Telep & Lum, 2014).  Senior 
leaders from larger organizations have less time to “keep themselves updated on . . . 
research findings” (Guo et al., 2015, p. 281).  Although time is discussed at greater length 
below, the fact that senior hospital administrators surveyed in Idaho cited lack of time as 
the primary barrier to evidence-based management (Guo et al., 2015) suggested that 
senior leadership in larger organizations may not be directly involved in either evidence-
based management or evidence-based practice implementations, and was reinforced by 
findings from other studies (Crowley et al., 2012; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al., 
2016).  Quotes from senior leaders of larger organizations such as “ask the local school 
counselor” (Crowley et al., 2012, p. 100) or those in middle management looking up 
stating “the leader needs to evaluate all possible actions—not fire off a solution” (Spiri & 
MacPhee, 2013, p. 270) indicated senior management may be aware of evidence-based 
management principles, but not always directly engaged. 
In contrast, smaller organizations with engaged leaders may have greater success 
bridging the research-practice gap and permeating views on evidence-based management 
within their organization (Glaub et al., 2014; Telep & Lum, 2014).  Glaub et al. (2014) 
discovered Ugandan small business owners employing evidence-based management 
showed significant differences in gross sales revenues (Hotelling’s t = 7.20, p < .01, η2 
=.07) and employee growth (Hotelling’s t =7.16, p < .05, η2 =.07) between the randomly 
selected test group and waiting control group (p. 370).  The test group showed increases 
in all measured areas of success during the 12 month longitudinal study, whereas the 
control group had decreases in gross sales and employees with five businesses failing 
(Glaub et al., 2014).   
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Similarly, a survey of officers in three different sized agencies showed greater 
familiarity with the term “evidence-based policing” in the smallest of the agencies 
(48.4%) as opposed to the largest agency (25.1%) surveyed (Telep & Lum 2014, p. 367).  
The researchers concluded that the variance between the agencies may be due to the 
progressive chief of the smaller organization “who actively advocated for crime-analysis 
and evidence-based policing” (Telep & Lum’s 2014, p. 367).  While not conclusive, the 
literature points to differences in organizational size, senior leadership engagement, and 
organizational distance between the decision maker and primary implementer as potential 
factors to evidence-based management success.    
Middle management and first-line supervisors.  Middle managers and first-line 
supervisors serve as the primary implementers, initial quality control, and sustainers of 
evidence-based practices through evidence-based management (Armstrong, 2012; Bhave, 
2014; Spector et al., 2015).  Armstrong (2012) found first-line supervisors were “actively 
involved in leadership activities including strategic planning, data evaluation, making 
decisions from a ‘big picture’ perspective as well as enhanced supervision activities” (p. 
435) while evaluating probation and community supervision personnel’s perceptions on 
span of control or “the number of individuals, or resources, that a person can effectively 
supervise” (p. 429).  Bhave (2014) showed that supervisory use of electronic performance 
monitoring of calls at a U.S. based customer service call center was positively, though 
weakly, related to task performance (r = .18, p < .05) and organizational citizenship 
behaviors (r = .23, p < .05) while the call quality coefficient estimate (b = 2.97, p < .05, β 
= .53) was positive and statistically significant (p. 624).   Likewise, a study on nursing 
transition programs across three states found significant differences (all studies set alpha 
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at 5%) between non-established and established transition programs with dedicated nurse 
preceptors (Spector et al., 2015).  Established programs with dedicated nurse preceptors 
had the lowest patient errors and new nurse turnover, while also having the highest job 
satisfaction over the course of the first year after leaving nursing school (Spector et al., 
2015, pp. 21-22).   
Other research studies reinforced that middle managers and first-line supervisors 
act as both users and creators of evidence critical to evidence-based management and 
quality improvement implementations.  Interestingly, Bhave (2014) found the opposite 
result than expected regarding organizational citizenship behavior. Bhave (2104) 
anticipated a negative relationship between supervisory use of evidence-based quality 
assurance monitoring and employee attitudes regarding work quality.  Instead, use of 
quality assurance monitoring reinforced supervisory perceptions of good employees, 
however Bhave (2014) cautioned this may be halo error where supervisors “assume a 
singular performance dimension to classify subordinates as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’” (p. 
628).  One senior administration participant of the Armstong (2102) study “adamantly 
claimed that the success of the jurisdiction’s probation department was dependent on 
their first-line supervisors” (p. 435), while other participants noted that evidence-based 
practice supervisors focused on “producing quality outcomes” for community supervised 
clients (p. 435).  Wright et al. (2016) described how the primary implementer of a fast-
track program, Dr. Clancy, provided “executive summaries of the literature in pamphlet 
form” to promote evidence-based discussion (p. 169).    
Contrastingly, Russell (2012) found telenursing managers in Australia failed to 
provide clear guidance while creating a false dichotomy between professional experience 
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and using evidence-based computer decision support software.  “It’s almost like they 
contradict themselves and say, ‘Yes use your clinical judgement but then no you’ve got 
to stick to the algorithms’” (Russell, 2012, p. 202).  Russell (2012) found this vacillation 
created opportunities for counterproductive work behaviors where nurses actively 
manipulated the algorithm to achieve the desired clinical outcome.  The studies from 
different scholarly disciplines and multiple populations may denote first-line supervisors 
can have a dramatic impact on evidence-based management implementation. 
Trusted insiders.  Remarkably, the concept of a trusted insider as implementer 
also emerged from the literature with the term specifically used by Wright et al. (2016, p. 
171).  Participants shared that “one of our own people” (Wright et al., 2016, p. 171) or 
someone having “credibility within the tribe” (Walker et al., 2015, p. 33) was necessary 
for evidence-based management success in the former and evidence-based practice 
adoption in the latter studies.  When considering resources for decision-making, hospital 
administrators preferred local organizational data and information from “colleagues and 
peers,” over professional websites, journals, and databases (Guo et al., 2015, p. 279).  
Some organizations may actually exclude the input of others because, as a 
telecommunicator participant in a study related to the emotional labor of PSAP workers 
put it, “not everyone can do our job” (Shuler & Sypher, 2000, p. 75).  
While evidence-based management may be seen as having intrinsic value, the 
decisive factor in implementation may be who is actually promoting the practice.  For 
instance, researchers studying what evidence-based management meant to Brazilian 
senior nurse administrators used the following quote as support a “skilled team leader or 
manager” was necessary for evidence-based management success: “I emphasize that the 
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techniques and methods, such as using sepsis bundles (example of EBP [evidence-based 
practice]), are useful, but the key is the leader who involves her multidisciplinary team” 
(Spiri & MacPhee, 2013, p. 269).  Likewise, trust in the messenger was a major theme of 
the Wright et al. (2016) case study surrounding, Dr. Clancy:  
He blows me away.  He puts up the data and the equations and the mathematics. . 
.  . If he’s put that much thought and that much process and that much passion 
into it then I’d be horrified to think anyone would disagree. (p. 171) 
As shown in the quotes above, trust was earned by the implementer through a 
variety of persuasive methods including empirical, personal, and not yet discussed, 
political.  Going back to Wright et al. (2016), Dr. Clancy was “given the mandate by the 
team” because of the organizational crisis of solving the fast-track problem in the 
emergency department (p.167).  Similarly, a police department with a chief espousing 
evidence-based values showed 81.0% of police officers thought hot spot policing, a 
research proven evidence-based practice, was effective at stopping crime as opposed to 
the 3.5% officer endorsement of hot spot policing from a larger police organization 
without engaged leadership (Telep & Lum, 2014, p. 371).  In each study discussed, the 
trusted insider was imbued with the political power by key stakeholders to enact the 
evidence-based practice.    
External facilitators.  External facilitators, whom for the purpose of this review 
includes consultants, organizational psychologists, technical assistants, or other perceived 
non-member individuals, may have an additional challenge when helping organizations 
implement evidence-based management or a particular evidence-based practice because 
they must overcome the immediate hurdle of trust.  While trust building and brokering 
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trust are not within the scope of this review, it is important to note reactions from leaders 
and stakeholders regarding external facilitators.  Guo et al. (2015) found hospital 
administrators surveyed in Idaho turned to external consultants last when “facing major 
decision-making in their health care organizations” (p. 279).  More poignantly, a senior 
health care executive in Australia bluntly said, “I’m not a big fan of management 
consultants” (Wright et al., 2016, p. 167).   The above sentiments from different studies 
of similar populations on opposite sides of the planet may explain why similar 
organizational changes were rejected when presented formally by external facilitators but 
accepted when proposed by a trusted insider (Guo et al., 2015; Wright et al., 2016).    
External facilitators such as organizational psychologists may even temper their 
recommendations or even the research language used to justify the proposed evidence-
based practice in order to meet client expectations (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016).  
Bartlett and Francis-Smythe (2016) found “concerns around client demands and 
acceptability to the client are more frequently considered than evidence from the 
scientific research literature (p. 621).  While 79.1% of United Kingdom organizational 
psychologist participants encouraged clients to focus on the importance of evidence, 
interestingly “both personal experience and professional expertise also appeared to 
supersede scientific research evidence” (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016, p.622).  While 
initially contradictory, Bartlett and Francis-Smythe’s (2016) interview data indicated that 
their participants may have confounded the differences between previously studied 
scientific research evidence with current personal knowledge and professional 
experience, “it’s like so old and so ingrained now . . . it’s a methodology really” (p. 623).  
The above findings are not surprising considering external facilitators are hired for their 
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subject matter expertise, but the above revelations may reflect areas for further study and 
consideration when evaluating how evidence is perceived.    
The purpose of external facilitators, however, is to impart knowledge and 
expertise on the organization or community so leaders and managers can implement and 
sustain evidence-based management (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Crowley et al., 
2012).  Two separate studies from competing community programs aimed at reducing 
youth substance abuse, PROSPER (Crowley et al., 2012) and Communities that Care 
(Gloppen et al., 2016), evaluated how long-term external facilitators impacted 
community knowledge of evidence based-practices.  Both multiyear longitudinal studies, 
using paired randomized communities, revealed leaders of communities receiving 
external facilitator support had greater evidence-based program adoption and community 
leader knowledge of evidence-based practices than their control community counterparts 
years after external facilitator financial support was withdrawn (Crowley et al., 2012; 
Gloppen et al., 2016).  In the case of the two studies above, long-term support resulted in 
long-term improvements in evidence-based management knowledge and expertise.  Yet, 
looking deeper, future research needs to determine if the two studies described above 
were more than self-congratulatory advertisements as opposed to identifying 
generalizable factors for evidence-based management implementation success.     
Organizational culture.  Organizational culture matters.  Research findings 
indicated organizational culture can be a barrier (Russell, 2012; Taylor & Campbell, 
2011; Telep & Lum, 2014) or facilitator (Olola et al., 2016; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013) 
when implementing evidence-based management.  Organizational culture also 
consistently appeared as a discriminator when evidence-based practices are selected 
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(Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Crowley et al., 2012; Walker et al., 2015).  
Organizational culture may also change as a result of evidence-based management 
(Gloppen et al., 2016; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013).  The next section explores research 
findings in each of these cases and the moderating impact organizational culture plays.  
Organizational culture can be a barrier to evidence-based management.  
Researchers found when leadership fails to guide employees regarding the proper balance 
between evidence-based practice (e.g., using the algorithm) and professional experience 
(e.g., use your clinical judgment), the resulting counterproductive work behaviors may 
confound the decision-making process surrounding the implementation of an evidence-
based practice (Russell, 2012).  Russell (2012) noted how the use of software algorithms 
and focusing on a single chief complaint “militates against the more holistic practices that 
nurses advocate (p.202).  More concerning, if the locally derived data is unsound because 
employees are purposely manipulating the system, the subsequent managerial decisions 
regarding the effectiveness of a particular intervention, algorithm sequencing, or even 
decisions related to which software to select, then become fruit of the poisoned tree.  As 
revealed by the Russell (2012) study, the inability of nurses and mangers to solve this 
incongruence of professional culture and risk management became a self-defeating echo 
chamber of espoused values versus administrative control. 
Likewise, organizational cultures regarding internal subgroups can also act as 
barriers to evidence-based management.  If two internal groups do not trust each other, 
locally derived data used to inform the effectiveness, or more importantly the 
ineffectiveness, of a particular practice may be ignored or disregarded as unreliable.  
Telep and Lum, (2014), specifically cited the “cultural divide” between police officers 
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and their civilian crime analysts as a potential barrier to officer’s receptivity of evidence-
based practice (p. 363).  Guo et al. (2015) also found hospital administrators and doctors 
regularly used in-house hospital librarians to help research clinical approaches to patient 
care but failed to engage hospital librarians’ assistance when making managerial 
decisions.  Guo et al. (2015) represented one of the few reviewed studies where evidence- 
based practice decisions were divorced from evidence-based management decisions 
while simultaneously speaking to how culture defines internal roles within organizations 
and how those roles influence evidence-based management implementation.  
Conversely, organizational culture can facilitate or even accelerate how evidence-
based managers implement and develop evidence-based practice.  Spiri and MacPhee’s 
(2013) phenomenological study revealed when a hospital’s “culture endorses quality and 
safety standards, and the quality / safety culture is reflected in organizational services, 
practices, and policies,” evidence-based management has fertile soil for growth (p. 269).  
Olola et al. (2016) found the culture of an organization that was “already adhering to the 
field’s accepted best practices . . . and regular, standardized review of emergency calls” 
(p. 230) may have contributed to the telecommunicators high interest in PSAP specific 
research prior to the intervention.  Developing a “culture of research” is critical to the 
advancement of new evidence-based practices and management techniques, and 
organizations who come predisposed towards research may have an advantage when it 
comes to implementation (Olola et al., 2016).     
Organizational culture discriminates what evidence-based practices are 
“acceptable” (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016, p. 615).  In their grounded theory study 
with Native American community leaders, Walker, Whitener, Trupin, and Migliarini 
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(2015) found participants strongly favored evidence-based programs “when there was a 
perception that family tradition and culture was valued and could be incorporated into the 
curriculum and implementation process” and when “alignment with cultural values” 
could be achieved (p. 33).  Bartlett and Francis-Smythe (2016) discovered organizational 
psychologists would “fit the research . . . around a consideration of the particular ways in 
which a concept had been theorized (and operationalized) in the research literature vis-à-
vis the way in which it manifested itself in the ‘situated context’ of practice” (p. 624).  
Crowley et al. (2012) revealed community leaders “reported selecting effective programs 
that had adequate organizational or participant fit (‘right program for our kids’) as a 
method believed to maintain program fidelity” (p. 101).  The above studies illustrated 
why matching the correct evidence-based practice to the organizational culture is a core 
function of evidence-based management and may determine success or failure.  
Barriers to Evidence-Based Management Implementation 
Failures occur, despite having the best available evidence to support a decision, 
practice, or organizational change.  Perhaps the research was not the correct fit for the 
organization or the correct research was incorrectly applied (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 
2016; Briner & Walshe, 2014; Crowley et al., 2012; Russell, 2012).  Perhaps the 
incorrect person or agency, who lacked trust and political mandates attempted to force an 
evidence-based solution (Wright et al., 2016).  Or, perhaps senior leadership was 
unconvinced the organizational changes were worth the time and costs associated with 
evidence-based management implementation (Guo et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013).  
The next section will cover specific research-identified barriers to evidence-based 
management implementation.  Barriers such as lack of training, research skills, and 
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access to scholarly research may be overcome with a medium level of effort.  
Contrariwise, barriers such as time and costs may represent significant barriers requiring 
dedicated planning and resources to overcome.  
Lack of evidence-based management training.  Evidence-based management 
requires not only initial awareness but also management support for continuing training.  
Armstrong’s (2012) participants noted that evidence-based management “requires 
significant supervisor–officer interaction, ongoing training, feedback, as well as quality 
assurance to master these skills” (p. 442).  Among hospital administrators, Guo et al. 
(2015) discovered “lack of training” as the second most prevalent barrier to evidence-
based management (p. 280).  Taylor and Campbell (2011) found over 40% of Northern 
Ireland social workers “regarded themselves as having little or no knowledge about SCG 
[social care governance],” the state-sponsored evidence-based model for social work 
(p.262).  As discussed earlier, managers may already be employing evidence-based 
management without realizing they are doing it (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Taylor 
& Campbell, 2011), but specific training is also necessary for proper evidence-based 
management implementation (Briner & Walshe, 2014).    
Lack of training and exposure to evidence-based management may be a common 
barrier to evidence-based management, but it may not require significant effort to 
surmount.  Evidence-based management training can have significant impacts on leaders’ 
long-term evidence-based practice awareness, planning, internal data collection, program 
selection, and program fidelity practices (Briner & Walshe, 2014; Crowley et al., 2012; 
Glaub et al., 2014; Gloppen et al., 2016; Taylor & Campbell, 2011).  More specifically, 
Gloppen et al. (2016) found, in a randomized experiment, community leaders receiving 
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training had a “four times greater odds of reporting a one-stage higher level of adoption 
than control key leaders” (p. 85).  As previously discussed, Glaub et al. (2014) showed 
small business owners who received evidence-based management training had better 
business results as opposed to those in the waiting control group.  The studies highlighted 
not only that training may have a positive impact on outcomes, but training may also be 
the difference between organizational or community leaders’ perceptions of scholarly 
research.   
Lack of research skills.  Evidence-based management theory espouses that the 
best decisions come from the best evidence (Kepes et al., 2014; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006; 
Rousseau, 2006).  The best evidence from research studies means nothing if managers do 
not know the research exists, cannot find it, or evaluate its worth respective to the body of 
knowledge (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Guo et al., 2015; Olola et al., 2016).  Lack 
of research appraisal and search skills was listed by Guo et al. (2015) as the fifth and 
sixth most prevalent barriers respectively to evidence-based management among 
surveyed Idaho hospital administrators (p. 280).  Similarly, difficulty finding relevant 
evidence was the third most prevalent barrier to research study utilization identified by 
interviewed organizational psychologists (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016, p. 625). 
Again, managers can overcome lack of search and appraisal skills with moderate 
effort.  Briner and Walshe (2014) described in great detail how managers successfully 
incorporated rapid evidence assessment into their professional work lives with a 
moderate level of effort over eleven sessions lasting three hours each.  Another research 
identified option was to use people within the organization, such as hospital librarians, 
who had expertise in scholarly database searches to assist in the research process (Guo et 
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al., 2015).  Crowley et al. (2012) found, in a random trial, community leaders who 
received research training had better standards of evidence evaluation skills that those in 
control communities, F (3, 707) =3.12, p <. 05 (p. 103).  Regardless of the methods used 
by managers, being able to successfully find, evaluate, and appropriately apply research 
to the given organizational situation appeared critical to closing the research-practice gap 
(Briner & Walshe, 2014; Glaub et al., 2014; Taylor & Campbell, 2011).    
Lack of access to scholarly research.  Access to research in the information age 
may be not seem like a barrier, but knowledge is not always free (Bartlett & Francis-
Smythe, 2016).  Guo et al. (2015), and, more recently, Bartlett and Francis-Smythe 
(2016) identified lack of access to information as a barrier to evidence-based 
management implementation.  Bartlett & Francis-Smythe (2016) specifically cited “full 
access to the research literature is usually via gate-keepered, subscription-based services” 
(p. 625).  Managers seeking research related to their organizational decisions may reach 
such gates, find them locked, and either seek counsel elsewhere or give up the inquiry 
entirely.     
Once more again, this barrier may be overcome by managers with a moderate 
level of effort.  Researchers discovered managers accessed research literature using 
public or education-based library services (Briner & Walshe, 2014) and in house 
organizational staff with professional subscriptions (Guo et al., 2015).  Bartlett and 
Francis-Smythe (2016) indicated managers can overcome lack of access by just asking 
for help from peers or contacts with access.  All the above methods overcame short-term 
access requirements to research the literature.  If there was a longstanding need for 
continual access, managers also subscribed to field specific web services providing 
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access to peer review or programmatically vetted research materials (Crowley et al., 
2012; Gloppen et al., 2016).  The studies above showed how resilient managers worked 
around the access barrier. 
Time as a barrier.  Time is a non-renewable resource.  For managers, once it is 
expended, it can never be recovered.  This may be the reason why researchers found lack 
of time among the top barriers or concerns for evidence-based management 
implementation (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Guo et al., 2015).  It takes time to find 
and evaluate the research literature (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Briner & Walshe, 
2014; Guo et al., 2015; Taylor & Campbell, 2011).  It takes time to convince senior 
leadership and key stakeholders to adopt a particular evidence-based practice (Spiri & 
MacPhee, 2013; Taylor & Campbell, 2011; Wright et al., 2016) and then implement a 
given evidence-based program (Walker et al., 2015).  It takes time to perform (Spiri & 
MacPhee, 2013), evaluate performance (Bhave, 2014), or supervise evidence-based 
practices (Armstrong, 2012; Taylor & Campbell, 2011).  Most importantly, it takes a 
longer time, and with that patience, to study and understand the long-term benefits of 
such evidence-based management decisions (Crowley et al., 2012; Glaub et al., 2014; 
Gloppen et al., 2016; Spector et al., 2015). 
Time is not a barrier that managers overcame with little effort; rather, research 
showed effective evidence-based management implementations required planning for the 
time commitments inherent to the evidence-based process (Armstrong, 2012; Bhave, 
2014).  More specifically, Armstrong (2012) found participants believed first-line 
supervisors needed more time for direct observation, data entry, data analysis, and quality 
improvement assessments as part of a larger evidence-based management model.  To 
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account for the increased demand on supervisors’ time, organizations needed to closely 
evaluate the proper span of control, or ratio, of first-line supervisors to probation officers 
or community supervision staff (Armstrong; 2012).    
Similarly, Bhave (2014) showed time between electronic performance monitoring 
assessments was “negatively related to task performance, b = –.04, p < .05, β = –.04” 
when controlled for the initial levels of customer service representative performance at 
the previous assessment period (p. 616).  Bhave (2014) and Armstrong (2012) suggested 
supervisors needed more frequent meetings with subordinates to discuss assessments if 
they wanted task performance improvement, thus supporting the view that evidence-
based management necessitated strategic planning for time requirements.  For the studies 
above, time translated to a human resource capital expenditure. 
Cost as a barrier.  The primary goal of evidence-based management is to make 
better decisions consequently improving quality, reducing waste, avoiding costly 
mistakes, and capitalizing on opportunities (Rousseau, 2006).  However, there are costs 
associated with evidence-based management in terms of fiscal (Crowley et al., 2012; 
Gloppen et al., 2016), human (Armstrong, 2012; Briner & Walshe, 2014; Guo et al., 
2015), and political capital (Taylor & Campbell, 2011; Wright et al., 2016).  For both 
PROSPER (Crowley et al., 2012) and Communities that Care (Gloppen et al., 2016) 
programs, communities received grant funding to pay technical assistants to administer 
the evidence-based youth substance abuse programs and assist leaders in their evidence-
based training.  Once grant funding ended, communities had to find other sources of 
revenue to sustain the program such as other grants or raised the funds locally (Crowley 
et al., 2012).  As previously mentioned in the section above, evidence-based practice 
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seemingly required more time and attention from first-line supervisors to sustain and 
effectively monitor performance which may translate to greater human capital needs 
(Armstrong, 2012).  There is also political risk and cost associated with implementing 
evidence-based management, especially if one particular individual is given the mandate 
to fix the problem as was the situation described in the Wright et al. (2016) study. 
 Not all costs associated with evidence-based management decisions translated to 
immediate returns on investment.  While Ugandan small business owners saw fiscal 
returns on their investment in the relatively short period of 12 months (Glaub et al., 
2014), it took years for the benefits of youth substance abuse programs to be known 
(Crowley et al., 2012; Gloppen et al., 2016).  Some studies showed no fiscal returns at all 
due the public service nature of the subjects or participants studied such as social work 
(Taylor & Campbell, 2011), police services (Telep & Lum, 2014), or PSAP services 
(Clawson et al., 1998; Weiser et al., 2013). 
More importantly, managers who incorrectly apply evidence-based measures, 
such as medical algorithm software for telenursing call centers, can have the opposite in 
intended consequences (Russell, 2012).  The long-term costs and commitments required 
may cause leaders to shy away from particular evidence-based management interventions 
(Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Guo et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2015).  Evidence-based 
leaders, therefore, must build consensus that the researched and identified costs 
associated with evidence-based management are worth the benefit to the organization. 
Factors of Successful Evidence-Based Management Implementation 
Evidence-based management success not only requires managers to overcome 
barriers, but managers and leaders must also engage in some proactive ventures.  Studies 
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showed successful evidence-based management implementations had managers or 
leaders that took the current empirical research and adapted the findings to their unique 
situation (Glaub et al., 2014; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al., 2016).  The studies 
also highlighted the need for stakeholder engagement (Russell, 2012; Spiri & MacPhee, 
2013).  Another factor studies considered was the impact of accreditation as a positive 
modifier for evidence-based management success (Clawson et al., 1998; Olola et al., 
2016; Spector et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013).  The next section will discuss some 
of the factors identified within the available research literature that may facilitate 
successful evidence-based management implementation.    
Local adaptation.  Evidence-based management theory encourages managers 
and leaders to close the research –practice gap (Rousseau, 2006), yet the research may 
not directly align to the current local context or problem set (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 
2016; Briner & Walshe, 2014; Guo et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013).  Lack of 
research skills was previously identified as a barrier for managers (Briner & Walshe, 
2014; Guo et al., 2015), but sometimes the relevant research either does not exist (Bartlett 
& Francis-Smythe, 2016) or time constraints prevent its discovery (Telep & Lum, 2014).  
Sometimes the available research in a given field, such as law enforcement, was so 
overwhelming leaders had difficulty sorting through the findings and appropriately 
applying the research to their local context (Taylor & Campbell, 2011; Telep & Lum, 
2014).   
Across different continents, cultures, languages, and scholarly disciplines, study 
findings highlighted the importance of local adaptation for evidence-based management.  
Managers and leaders who translated the best available research to their situation 
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perceived a greater sense of self-efficacy and confidence in their approach to evidence-
based management implementation (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Walker et al., 
2015; Wright et al., 2016).  A senior nurse administrator in Brazil described “what 
facilitates the management process is to relate scientific evidence with the institutional 
reality” (Spiri & MacPhee, 2013, p. 268).  More recently, Walker et al. (2015) Native 
American participants specifically cited “flexibility for individual adaptation was the 
most viable strategy” for evidence-based implementation success (p. 34).   
Likewise, according to one United Kingdom organizational psychologist 
participant “what occupational psychologists get is really good quality supervision so that 
they understand this whole, how you do evidence-based practice in situ” (Bartlett & 
Francis-Smythe, 2016, p. 624).  More explicitly, the primary subject of the Wright et al. 
(2016) study, Dr. Clancy, stated “I was also quick to acknowledge the fact that I had 
adapted a lot of other people’s ideas just to develop an understanding of why it hadn’t 
worked the first time.” (p.166).  Adaptability consistently emerged as a major theme for 
the studies above, leading researchers to surmise local adaptation was a major factor in 
evidence-based management success. 
Key stakeholder engagement.  Evidence-based management theory explicitly 
identifies key stakeholder participation as a major component for success (Rousseau, 
2006; Rousseau & Olivas-Luján, 2013; Minjina, 2015).  Researchers found leaders and 
managers who actively engage key stakeholders within the organization may have a 
better chance at successfully implementing organizational changes (Armstrong, 2012; 
Gloppen et al., 2016; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Telep & Lum, 2014; Walker et al., 2015; 
Wright et al., 2016).  Whether engaging senior leadership or building impetus from the 
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ground up, studies showed garnering support was a necessary process for evidence-based 
implementation, especially when overcoming, or more pronouncedly failing to overcome, 
resistance to change (Russell, 2012; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al., 2016).  The 
next section will briefly cover engagement of employees who are expected to perform the 
changes and senior leaders who make decisions regarding organizational change. 
Leaders need followers; otherwise they are not leaders but lone actors with a 
message no one is listening to.  Studies specifically distinguished the importance of 
engaging and educating front line personnel in order to implement evidence-based 
management decisions including but not limited to: law enforcement officers (Armstrong, 
2012; Telep & Lum, 2014), social workers (Taylor & Campbell, 2011), medical 
professionals (Russell, 2012; Spector et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al., 
2016), call center employees (Bhave, 2014), and more specifically tailored to the PSAP 
community, telecommunicators (Clawson et al., 1998; Olola et al., 2016; Weiser et al., 
2013).  In their rich depiction of evidence-based management in action, Wright et al. 
(2016) offered multiple participant examples of stakeholder engagement including 
accounts such as: “Clancy didn’t just come to us with an idea. He came to us with an idea 
and all the data that supported it.” and “Clancy had the input of nursing staff and had to 
engage them because it made a difference to how they practised” (p. 166).  In this way, 
those impacted by evidence-based management have the power to accept or sometime 
subvert (Russell, 2012) the process.     
Just as important as followers, if senior leadership does not trust the messenger or 
is not convinced of the cost-benefit argument, both internal and external advocates will 
not receive the approval to move forward (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016; Crowley et 
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al., 2012; Gloppen et al., 2016; Taylor & Campbell, 2011; Telep & Lum, 2014; Walker et 
al., 2015).  As previously discussed, senior leadership can either act as a hindrance 
(Russell, 2012; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013) or a facilitator (Glaub et al., 2014; Telep & Lum, 
2014) for evidence-based management.  The research literature indicated senior 
leadership may be more neutral in their views of evidence-based management than 
particularly skewed either positively or negatively (Crowley et al., 2012; Gloppen et al., 
2016; Guo et al., 2015), however such conclusions require additional studies into the 
baseline or pre-implementation viewpoint of senior leaders without the potential conflict 
of promoting a particular program.   
Accreditation as a moderator.  As previously discussed at length, PSAP 
accreditation seemed to positively moderate acceptance or implementation of evidence-
based management (Clawson et al., 2016; Dornseif et al., 2016; Sebresos et al., 2016; 
Shah et al., 2003; Weiser et al., 2013).  Studies from other fields also suggested the 
importance of accreditation or membership in a professional association (Armstrong, 
2012; Spector et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Taylor & Campbell, 2011).  One of 
the most explicit, non-PSAP, contributions came from Spiri and MacPhee (2013) whose 
study specifically evaluated the impact of accreditation on evidence-based management 
implementation among hospitals in Brazil.  More specifically, a senior nurse participant 
stated:  
EBP [evidence-based practice] is facilitated within an accredited institution 
because of the accreditation process—this means that leaders must seek new 
knowledge and collaborate with professionals, such as multidisciplinary team 
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interactions, to address policy related to patient safety care. (Spiri & MacPhee, 
2013, p. 269)  
Research to date has not identified accreditation as an indicator or prerequisite of 
evidence-based management, but research appeared to support accreditation as a positive 
moderator. 
Methodological Review 
 The literature reviewed was overwhelmingly quantitative, nearly two to one, 
which is not surprising given the influence of empiricist and positivist paradigms on 
evidence-based management theory that both proponents and critics agree on (Kepes et 
al., 2014; Morrell et al., 2015; Rousseau & Olivas-Luján, 2013).  The quantitative studies 
focused largely on the effectiveness of a given evidence-based approach, such as the 
Clawson et al. (1998) germinal study, or the depth of evidence-based understanding 
among their studied populations, such as Taylor and Campbell (2011) and Telep and Lum 
(2014).  Complementarily, the qualitative and mixed method studies, particularly those of 
Bartlett and Francis-Smythe (2016), Spiri and MacPhee (2013), and Wright et al. (2016), 
provided rich insights into both barriers and factors of evidence-based management 
implementation using the words of their participants.  The next sections will briefly 
describe the strategies of inquiry used by researchers within their chosen methodologies 
and analyze their contribution to the overall understanding of evidence-based 
management implementation. 
Quantitative strategies of inquiry.  As stated above, a majority of the reviewed 
studies utilized quantitative methodologies to answer their research questions.  
Hypothesis regarding the effectiveness of specific evidence-based practices were tested 
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primarily using either correlations (Bhave, 2014; Clawson et al., 2016; Shah et al., 2003; 
Spector et al., 2015) or comparisons of means after experimental interventions (Clawson 
et al., 1998; Glaub et al., 2014; Gloppen et al., 2016; Olola et al., 2016).  The randomized 
studies performed by Glaub et al. (2014), and Gloppen et al. (2016) deserve greater 
emphasis as they specifically showed positive results, thus establishing cause and effect, 
due to evidence-based management interventions.  Although discussed later in the mixed 
method section below, the quantitative portion of the Crowley et al. (2012) study also 
used randomized test and control communities to highlight the significant differences 
between communities using evidence-based management and those which did not.  For 
proponents of evidence-based management theory, randomized experiments represent the 
gold standard of evidence for managers to use when making decisions.  A concrete 
example of this positivist pyramid of evidence can be found in Kepes et al. (2014, p. 
454).  
To a lesser extent, researchers tested hypothesis, specifically those concerned with 
telecommunicator processing times, with median tests (Dornseif et al., 2016; Weiser et 
al., 2013).  Prevalence studies categorized qualitative survey responses regarding 
perceptions of evidence-based management into quantifiable metrics focused on topics 
such as types of evidence and barriers (Guo et al., 2015), training techniques (Sebresos et 
al., 2016), or receptivity of first-line practitioners (Taylor & Campbell, 2011; Telep & 
Lum, 2014).  Overall the literature was well balanced across quantitative strategies of 
inquiry.   
Qualitative strategies of inquiry.  Interestingly, the most convincing evidence 
regarding how evidence-based management implementation developed within observed 
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contexts came from qualitative studies.  Spiri and MacPhee, (2013) cited Brazilian 
phenomenologist Martins’ (1992) coding approach with “three main research 
components: description, reduction, and comprehension” to assign “units of meaning to 
subthemes and themes” (p. 267).  Although the only phenomenological study reviewed, it 
contained some of the richest content among the purely qualitative studies.  Case studies 
represented about half of the qualitative strategies of inquires reviewed (Briner & 
Walshe, 2014; Russell, 2012; Shuler & Sypher, 2000), with Wright et al. (2016) 
deserving special mention for its detailed description of cross-checking informants, 
triangulation using archival documents, and the multiple iterative waves of open coding 
followed by recoding “related to the importance of a ‘fit’ between the organizational 
context of the decision process and the decision-maker’s personal characteristics” (p. 
165).  Finally, grounded theory accounted for half of the strategies of inquiry used 
(Armstrong, 2012; Walker et al., 2015) when also including the qualitative portions of the 
mixed method studies discussed in the next section.  While Armstrong (2012) provided 
no insight into how analysis was performed, Walker et al. (2015) described in great detail 
how researchers utilized both open and axial coding followed by participant review for 
accuracy.  
Mixed method strategies of inquiry.  As previously discussed, the qualitative 
portions of both mixed method studies utilized grounded theory as the chosen strategy of 
inquiry but differed in both the order of when quantitative analysis was applied and what 
quantitative strategies were used.  Crowley et al. (2012) performed the qualitative 
analysis to establish four quantifiable domains for further multi-level ANOVA means 
testing between randomized control and test communities.  Conversely, Bartlett and 
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Francis-Smythe (2016) performed the quantitative prevalence survey analysis regarding 
types of evidence used, then interviewed participants for further clarification and 
exploration on codes initially developed form the survey data.  After interviews, Bartlett 
and Francis-Smythe, (2016) described an exhaustive and methodologically rigorous 
coding process to develop three abstract “parent nodes” (p. 619).  Both studies provided 
detailed accounts of their analysis processes and interrater reliability, and both 
contributed significant findings as part of this review. 
Substantive Gaps and Recommendations for Further Research 
 There is a paucity of empirical research on evidence-based management 
implementation which is one of the few areas where proponents (Kepes et al., 2014; 
Minjina, 2015), critics (Morrell et al., 2015), and researchers (Glaub et al., 2014; Spiri & 
MacPhee, 2013; Wright et al., 2016) agree.  A majority of empirical studies focus 
primarily on the effectiveness of a particular evidence-based practice making it difficult 
for researchers to locate and find literature directly related to evidence-based 
management decisions.  The linkage between practice and decision-making may be 
partially documented by the literature, but the linkage is rarely studied independently 
causing researchers to sift through haystacks of evidence-based studies in the hopes of 
finding the needles that describe evidence-based management decision-making processes.     
PSAPs as a population for evidence-based practice and management.  
Funneling further down into the narrower, yet multidisciplinary, field of PSAPs and the 
overall 9-1-1 community, there are even less empirical studies related to evidence-based 
management decision making (Gardett et al., 2016).  Again, most empirical studies 
discuss the effectiveness evidence-based practices such as telephonic cardiopulmonary 
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resuscitation (Sasson et al., 2013; Sutter et al., 2015), medical protocols (Clawson et al., 
2016; Shah et al., 2003; Weiser et al., 2013), fire sciences (Dornseif et al., 2016), or 
information technology usage (Athey & Stern, 2002).  Diving even narrower and deeper, 
there is one study related to quality improvement programs in a PSAP environment that is 
nearly 20 years old (Clawson et al., 1998).  Confounding efforts to locate relevant 
research is the fact that “quality of service” is a PSAP specific technological term that has 
nothing to do with quality improvement. 
PSAP leaders’ perceptions of evidence-based quality improvement.  Finally, 
there is no research into how PSAP leaders make decisions related to evidence-based 
practices.  The closest corollary is the Sutter et al. (2015) national survey which studied 
the prevalence of one evidence-based practice with no details on the decision-making 
processes behind the use of such practice.  Extant qualitative research seemingly centers 
on front line telecommunicators such as Tracy and Tracy’s (1998) case study of three rare 
instances of open rudeness, or Shuler & Sypher’s (2000) case study regarding 
telecommunicators as emotional laborers. Studying PSAP leaders as participants and 
their views on evidence-based management decisions regarding quality improvement 
adds to the current dearth of knowledge. 
 
Literature Review Summary 
Evidence-based management theory may offer potential solutions to PSAP quality 
inconsistencies and inform further research related to development of national standards 
of care.  The current quantitative and mixed methods literature supports evidence-based 
management proponents’ claims that better evidence leads to better decision making and 
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programmatic outcomes with some studies using the positivist gold standard of 
randomized, longitudinal trials (Crowley et al., 2012; Glaub et al., 2014).  Other 
qualitative literature discusses practitioner (Bartlett & Francis-Smythe, 2016), first-line 
supervisor (Armstrong, 2012), and limited leadership (Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; Walker et 
al., 2015) views on evidence-based practice or the decision-making processes 
surrounding adoption of evidence-based practice.   
This dissertation study closes a research gap by targeting PSAP leaders’ 
perceptions, specifically those leading designated wireless PSAPs in New York State 
(NYS), regarding the primary question: How do NYS wireless PSAP leaders support 
effective implementations of quality care?  Four subordinate research questions further 
refine specific elements of the primary question, specifically:   (a) How do PSAP leaders 
measure performance based on their definition of quality? (b) How do PSAP leaders 
perceive factors related to quality improvement? (c) When do PSAP leaders believe 
evidence-based management theoretical frameworks, such as national standards of care, 
should supersede local and personal experience frameworks; when do they not? (d) How 
do PSAP leaders’ views align with evidence-based management theory?   The study 
performed guided discussions with focus groups consisting of former and existing 
wireless NYS PSAP leaders followed by directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005) to answer these research questions as discussed fully in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3: Research Design Methodology 
Introduction 
In Chapters 1 and 2, research and experience showed the quality of 9-1-1 services 
can mean the difference between life and death (APCO, 2013a; DeLong v. County of 
Erie, 1982).   APCO (2015) along with other nationally recognized 9-1-1 organizations 
created a minimum standard for PSAP comprehensive quality improvement programs, 
yet there is no mandate for PSAPs to adopt such a standard (USDOT, 2013).  This study 
specifically focuses on quality improvement perceptions among New York State (NYS) 
wireless PSAP leaders from an evidence-based management theoretical framework.  This 
study uses a qualitative method of inquiry called directed content analysis (Jiggins 
Colorafi & Evans, 2016; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  The next few sections will briefly 
review elements from Chapters 1 and 2 relevant to the methodology before delving into a 
more detailed description of the study.   
General Perspective 
With the advent of the 2015 standard, PSAP leaders must evaluate which 
standards to adopt or even mandate by law.  As stated in previous chapters, the evidence 
decision makers use to justify policy becomes critical to the success or failure of such 
policies.  Evidence-based management is “the basing of managerial decisions on the best 
available evidence” (Robbins & Judge, 2017, p. 11).  Some empirical studies show 
evidence-based management processes may improve the quality of care provided by 
PSAPs in the areas of medical protocols (Clawson et al., 2016), quality improvement 
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programs (Bhave, 2014), research knowledge (Olola et al., 2016), and community 
leadership knowledge of evidence-based practices (Gloppen et al., 2016).  Yet critics 
warn that overreliance on certain forms of evidence as a panacea may not be in the 
public’s best interest (Boyes-Watson & Pranis, 2012; Morrell et al., 2015; Russell, 2012).  
There is little empirical research on evidence-based management decision-making 
(Wright et al., 2016), PSAP quality improvement (Clawson et al., 1998), or PSAP leaders 
as a population.  This study provides new insight into how PSAP leaders make decisions 
regarding the quality of service they provide to the public.  The study assists our 
understanding of how evidence-based management theory (Rousseau, 2006) aligns with 
PSAP leaders’ reality.     
Problem Statement 
The quality of service provided by PSAPs is inconsistent due to the lack of 
mandatory standards of care at the national, state, and local levels (APCO, 2103b; 
NHTSA, 2013; USDOT, 2013).  Public demands and duties placed on PSAPs have 
grown due to technological changes, civil cases alleging negligence, and the emergence 
of national recommended standards of care (APCO, 2013a; Clawson et al., 2012; DeLong 
v. County of Erie, 1982), yet governments at all levels have been slow to create 
governance structures to reinforce adherence to standards (NHTSA, 2013; USDOT, 
2013).  Despite 9-1-1 being established as the national emergency number in 1999 
(Hevesi, 2004), states and local municipalities provide most of the funding and oversight 
to PSAP operations (NHTSA, 2013; USDOT, 2013).  States regulated local surcharges, 
excise taxes, or universal service fund revenues, but most state laws “stop short of 
addressing the full operational scope of 9-1-1 service” such as minimum training 
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standards, staffing, quality improvement, or other best practices (NHTSA, 2013, p. 14).  
This study offers possible solutions to governments regarding which standards of care 
should be adopted, what measures best define quality, and what factors including staffing 
and funding may be necessary for success.   
Research Context 
There are currently 6,359 primary PSAPs in the United States of which 191 
primary PSAPs operate in the State of New York (FCC, July 31, 2017).  Most of the 
PSAPs operating in NYS are locally operated and controlled, however NYS established 
laws governing local and state surcharges as early as 1989 (Hevesi, 2004).  In 2002, NYS 
updated surcharge laws and established a statewide governance board to develop 
“minimum standards for public safety answering points” (Hevesi, 2004, p. 3).   
The NYS minimum standards only apply to those PSAPs receiving wireless 
surcharge funds.  Recently, NY Statewide Interoperability and Emergency 
Communications Board members stipulated the standards should apply to all PSAPs to 
ensure a minimum quality of service throughout the state (New York State Department of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Services [NYSDHSES], 2015; NYSDHSES, 2016).  
Currently, only 56 county PSAPs (excluding the City of New York) accept wireless 9-1-1 
surcharges and are therefore required to meet the minimum adopted standards 
(NYSDHSES, in press).  While the NYS adopted minimum standards address matters 
such as wireless 9-1-1 equipment capabilities, staffing, and training, there are no 
standards governing NYS PSAP quality improvement programs (21 NYCRR § 5200 
n.d.).   
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The advent of the APCO (2015) national standard has the potential to alter which 
quality improvement standards are adopted, which PSAPs must follow those standards, 
what funding mechanisms will be in place to support PSAP quality improvement, and 
how NYS PSAPs operate in the future.  Since New York is a large state and one of the 
few states to adopt minimum 9-1-1 standards (USDOT, 2013), understanding how NYS 
handles these questions may provide guidance to the nation as a whole.  To gain insight 
on these potential changes, the study elicited former and current NYS wireless PSAP 
leaders’ perceptions regarding quality improvement. 
Research Questions 
This study explores how NYS wireless PSAP leaders evaluated the quality of 
service PSAP employees provide to the public, what forms of evidence they used to 
justify their quality improvement programs, and whether existing national standards of 
care impacted their programmatic decisions.  The study also identifies what PSAP leaders 
perceive as barriers to achieving quality and what factors they believe contribute to 
quality.  Finally, the study analyzes and discusses the rich content provided by PSAP 
leaders on these topics with regard to evidence-based management and evidence-based 
practices. 
As characterized in Chapter 1, the study addresses the primary research question: 
How do NYS Wireless PSAP leaders support effective implementation of quality care?  
Four subordinate questions provide insights into PSAP leader perceptions regarding the 
primary question.  (a) How do PSAP leaders measure performance based on their 
definition of quality? (b) How do PSAP leaders perceive factors related to quality 
improvement? (c) When do PSAP leaders believe evidence-based management 
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theoretical frameworks, such as national standards of care, should supersede local and 
personal experience frameworks; when do they not?  (d) How do PSAP leaders’ views 
align with evidence-based management theory?       
Research Design Based on Focus Groups 
The study used a qualitative method of inquiry called directed content analysis 
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Jiggins Colorafi & Evans, 2016). The study purposefully 
sampled former and existing NYS wireless PSAP leaders as participants (Creswell & 
Poth, 2018; Hickey & Kipping, 1996). Participants were invited to focus groups and 
semi-structured interviews were conducted for data collection (Jiggins Colorafi & Evans, 
2016; Moretti et al., 2011).  Following data collection, the researcher performed directed 
content analysis of the interview narratives.   The analysis employed a priori coding 
schema (see Appendix B) for alignment with evidence-based management theory 
regarding quality improvement while allowing for new codes or themes to emerge as part 
of the iterative process (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine‐Donnerstein, 1999).   
This qualitative methodology has its roots in a deductive form of content analysis 
where existing theory is used to inform the interview questions followed by a data 
analysis process to test theory assumptions (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine‐
Donnerstein, 1999).  While other qualitative designs such as grounded theory or inductive 
content analysis may also help inform the answers to the research questions (Creswell & 
Poth 2018; Sandelowski, 2002), the presence of an existing theory, evidence-based 
management, assisted in creating a priori codes to inform the process (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005; Potter & Levine‐Donnerstein, 1999).   
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The selection of this methodological research design does have limitations.  
Specifically, the existence of pre-determined codes may blind researchers from 
identifying other emerging categories and themes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter & 
Levine‐Donnerstein, 1999).  Additionally, researchers may seek only to reinforce their 
preconceived notions regarding the theory rather than look for disconcerting data (Hsieh 
& Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine‐Donnerstein, 1999; Saldana, 2013).  These limitations 
are inherent within qualitative analysis (Hickey & Kipping, 1996) where the researcher is 
the instrument (Creswell & Poth 2018; Saldana, 2013; Sandelowski, 2002).  Yet, 
evidence-based management theory suggests it is local leaders adapting research to their 
individual context that closes the research-practice gap (Rousseau, 2006), and thus the 
decision to use directed content analysis serves as the best fit to the proposed study. 
Research Participants 
The study purposefully sampled former and current PSAP leaders who were 
employed at the designated wireless PSAPs for each of the 56 counties (excluding the 
City of New York) within the State of New York.  A purposive sample is a non-
representative subset of a larger population specifically chosen due to their unique 
experiences or expertise on the study’s subject matter (Creswell & Poth, 2018). For the 
purposes of this study, PSAP leaders were defined as individuals whose job descriptions 
included, but are not limited to, primary supervision of all PSAP personnel; development 
and implementation of PSAP policies and procedures; PSAP staffing and scheduling; 
PSAP training or quality improvement; and PSAP budgeting.  To ensure a breadth of 
ideas and experience throughout NYS, only one participant from each county was invited 
to each of the focus group sessions.  This prevented a single agency with multiple PSAP 
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leaders from dominating the sessions, or worse, suppressing participation in focus group 
discussions due to internal agency relationships (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Esterberg, 
2002).  Since multiple members from one county may potentially be identified as PSAP 
leaders, a review of publicly available job descriptions using county human resource 
websites determined which employee best fit the study definition of a PSAP leader.  The 
researcher is a member of the NYS 911 Coordinators Association, a professional non-
profit organization.  The researcher provided a brief presentation of the study at one of 
the semiannual 911 Coordinators Association conferences to encourage interest in the 
study. 
Recruitment Procedure 
  Following St. John Fisher Institutional Review Board approval, the researcher 
generated a list of potential participants from the publicly available member list on the 
association website.  As stated above, a review of job descriptions determined which 
employee from each county was invited to the focus group sessions.  A list of alternate 
names was also created in case participation attrition exceeds initial expectations or if a 
PSAP leader elects to send an alternate due to PSAP operational considerations 
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Moretti et al., 2011; Saldana, 2013). 
The researcher used existing PSAP leader contacts through the association to set 
up geographically convenient host sites to conduct the focus group sessions.  The 
researcher contacted potential applicants via e-mail and phone to determine their initial 
interest in the study.  Once participants expressed initial interest in the study, the 
researcher coordinated the best location, dates, and times to conduct the focus group 
sessions.  Participants were sent electronic calendar invitations to attend sessions based 
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on their geography and previously indicated availability.  Since the researcher is also a 
PSAP leader, the researcher’s county was not invited to the focus group sessions for 
ethical reasons.    
Four sessions consisting of three participants each were conducted for a total of 
12 participants.  The overall intent of the study was to interview between 10 to 12 total 
participants or until data saturation is reached (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Esterberg, 
2002).  At least four to six participants were invited to each focus group with the 
anticipation of having three to five attend each session and allowing for attrition 
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Moretti et al., 2011; Saldana, 2013).  Hosting four focus 
group sessions on different dates at regionally based locations provided participants 
multiple opportunities to attend interviews based on their individual schedules and 
proximity to host sites (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Saldana, 2013). 
Upon arrival, each participant was provided an informed consent form approved 
by the St. John Fisher Institutional Review Board (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Creswell 
& Poth, 2018).  After participants consented, they were permitted to attend the focus 
group session.  The next three sections: Instrumentation, Data Collection, and Data 
Analysis Focus will discuss the remainder of the procedure. 
Instrumentation Procedure 
The researcher conducted focus group interviews using a semi-structured 
interview format.  The researcher asked open-ended questions developed to answer the 
research questions and ensure the purpose of the focus group is fulfilled (Charmaz, 
2002).  Pilot testing of the questions was conducted with the first of four focus groups 
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015).  Questions were divided into three major categories:  main 
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questions directly related to the research questions; probing questions designed to elicit 
more detail; and cross-talk questions designed to encourage alternate opinions or greater 
participation (Charmaz, 2002).   
Main questions.  There were six main questions designed to specifically answer 
the study research questions.  The main questions begin with the phrase “Please give me 
an example or describe a time . . . ” 
1A. That you knew you did a good job.   
• How did you know?  
• How should performance be measured? 
1B. That things did not go correctly, in terms of performance.   
• What went wrong? 
• What came as a result? 
Interview questions 1A and 1B were designed to answer research sub-question 1 by 
eliciting operationalized definitions of quality and how PSAP leaders measure quality. 
2A. That you tried to implement a change in standards or procedure and were 
successful.   
• What made you try to implement the change? 
• What made you determine which standards / procedure to follow? 
2B. That you tried to implement a change in standards or procedure and failed. 
• What do you think contributed to the failure? 
The PSAP leader answers to interview questions 2A and 2B directly related to participant 
perceptions regarding quality improvement factors from research sub-question 2. 
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3A. When you know that following certain standards or procedures ensured better 
quality care.   
• What were the standards and how did you know it was “better”? 
3B. When you think following certain standards or procedures do not help, and 
may cause problems.   
• What are the standards or procedures? 
• Why do you think following them may have been problematic? 
Interview questions 3A and 3B were designed for participant reflection on standards 
development and validity in relation to sub-question 3. 
 PSAP leader discussions and examples provided in reply to the six main questions 
informed research question 4 regarding alignment to current evidence-based management 
theory.  The use of the a priori codebook allowed the researcher to evaluate if topics 
previously identified in the literature were appearing in participant discussions.  While 
the answers to the six main questions provided generally sufficient information related to 
research sub-question 4, the following interview questions were used to elicit more direct 
responses: 
4A. How do you know standards are good and effective? 
• What should be the minimum standards of care? 
• What is the best way to improve? 
4B. What is your view of evidence-based standards or procedures?   
• What are the pros and cons? 
• Can you ever over-rely on evidence-based management? 
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 Probing and cross talk.  During the focus group discussions, additional 
information or topics were introduced but not fully explored by the participants.  Probes 
such as silence, clarifying, validating, or seeking meaning prompted deeper discussion 
that was both relevant to the conversation and necessary to answer the research question 
(Charmaz, 2002; Saldana, 2013).  As stated above, cross talk within focus groups is 
critical to uncovering minority opinions or encouraging full participation, therefore the 
researcher encouraged cross talk or specifically called upon less active participants to 
ensure multiple viewpoints were discussed (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015).  
Bracketing.  The researcher’s professional position provides both access and an 
immediate familiarity with the social, political, and professional contexts of the study.  
However, the researcher was very cognizant to approach focus group interviews and 
follow-on analysis with a deliberate naiveté (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015).  Deliberate 
naiveté allows the researcher to exhibit “openness to new and unexpected phenomena  . . 
. and a bracketing of presuppositions” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, pp. 33-34).   
Data Collection Procedure 
Each focus group session last approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes each and 
commenced with an opening statement (see Appendix C).  Participants were placed in an 
open circle or around a table (depending on host facilities) to facilitate cross discussion 
among participants.  The researcher allowed willing participants to maintain the session 
for a longer period than the originally intended hour session.  Interviews were audio and 
video recorded ensuring verbal and non-verbal communications were captured 
(Sandelowski, 2002).  Field notes describing location characteristics, interpersonal 
exchanges, and “gut” feelings were also recorded (Sandelowski, 2002).  Participants 
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completed a short organizational form (Appendix D) at the end of each session.  The 
form was not used for this study but will serve as a pilot test for follow-on quantitative 
prevalence surveys.  As a thank you, participants were provided a meal or gift cards 
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015). 
Data Analysis Procedure 
Interviews were transcribed and entered via rich text format into a coding 
software database for analysis.  Video recordings were utilized during the transcription 
process to properly identify speakers and serve as a backup to audio recordings.  All data 
and backups were stored on password protected drives and maintained solely by the 
researcher after transcription.  Video recordings were not specifically coded but were 
used as a reference by the researcher to determine the level of agreement with a speaker 
or for triangulation of data (Moretti et al., 2011).  
The researcher was the lens through which the collected data is interpreted 
(Creswell & Poth 2018; Hickey & Kipping, 1996; Saldana, 2013; Sandelowski, 2010).  
Bracketing was essential during both the data collection and analysis processes since an a 
priori codebook will exist, thus introducing a preexisting mindset to interpreting the data 
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Saldana, 2013).  Member checking transcripts and triangulating 
using information from multiple participants helped the researcher determine the true 
intent behind texts (Saldana, 2013).  Analytic memos, detailing the researcher’s decision 
processes behind coding served as reflective guideposts during the iterative cycles of 
coding (Esterberg, 2002; Hickey & Kipping, 1996; Jiggins Colorafi & Evans, 2016; 
Saldana, 2013; Sandelowski, 2010).  Analytic memos also helped the researcher 
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determine whether coding will “attend to the surface of words, or, read into, between, and 
over the lines” (Sandelowski, 2002, p. 107).   
As previously noted, the directed content analysis approach utilized a priori codes 
as identified by preexisting research and literature from an evidence-based management 
theoretical framework (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Jiggins Colorafi & Evans, 2016; Potter 
& Levine‐Donnerstein, 1999).    Specifically, the multi-step process as identified in 
Jiggins Colorafi and Evans (2016) was used with adaptations for electronic versus 
manual coding.  The iterative process allowed for both alignment with preexisting 
categories and the emergence of additional categories.  As codes coalesced into 
categories, analysis developed more abstract forms of broader categories resulting in 
overall themes aimed at answering the research questions (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; 
Jiggins Colorafi & Evans, 2016).  A summarized list of the steps from Jiggins Colorafi 
and Evans (2016) is below: 
1. Create an a priori coding manual derived from the theoretical framework and 
literature before data collection, organized by domains or thematic groupings. 
2. Transcribe the interview texts and document pre-analytic remarks in memos. 
3. Perform first level coding by dividing sentences or paragraphs into meaning 
units.  First level codes are gerund verbs with an “ing” ending to “denote 
action” (p. 21). 
4. Similar codes organized into more abstract categories. 
5. Pattern codes revised and redefined, exemplars used for clarification. 
6. Revisit analytical memos to aid data reduction into more concise conceptual 
clusters. 
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7. Data displays or visual representations are created to assist organization, 
categorization, and triangulation of data. 
8. Data is re-presented after analysis to fit the findings. 
Validity 
For qualitative methods of inquiry, validity is not a statistical term but rather a 
measure of “trustworthiness and authenticity” (Jiggins Colorafi & Evans, 2016, p.23).  
The validity of the data and subsequent analysis heavily depends on the primary 
instrument, the researcher (Hickey & Kipping, 1996; Saldana, 2013).  Although 
instrumentation threats and mitigations have been discussed previously, it also important 
to note the participants may also introduce threats to the study’s validity by not being 
truthful, seeking to please the researcher, or suppressing the opinions of others 
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2013).  Member checking transcripts after the focus group sessions 
served as one mitigation to these threats (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2013).  Triangulation of 
data across multiple sessions served as another mitigation for participant threats to 
validity, provided the researcher ensured disparate or non-conforming perceptions 
emerge during analysis (Saldana, 2013).     
Research Methods Summary 
Developing standards of care within PSAPs may improve quality for all users.  
Directed content analysis used a priori theory-based codes to evaluate NYS PSAP leader 
perceptions of evidence-based standards.  Local PSAP leaders at NYS county wireless 
centers were a purposive, non-representative, sample of subject matter experts.  PSAP 
leader focus groups with open-ended semi-structured interview questions served as the 
primary data collection method.   Following directed content analysis, the resulting NYS 
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PSAP leaders’ perceptions identified quality improvement obstacles and accelerators for 
consideration as the NYS PSAP community makes critical decisions regarding future 
funding and policy.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
Research Questions 
This study addressed the following research question: How do NYS wireless 
PSAP leaders support effective implementation of quality care?  Four sub-questions were 
used to elicit PSAP leader perceptions regarding the primary question.  (a) How do PSAP 
leaders measure performance based on their definition of quality? (b) How do PSAP 
leaders perceive factors related to quality improvement? (c) When do PSAP leaders 
believe evidence-based management theoretical frameworks, such as national standards 
of care, should supersede local and personal experience frameworks; when do they not?  
(d) How do PSAP leaders’ views align with evidence-based management theory?       
Methodological Overview 
There are currently 56 county-designated wireless PSAPs in the State of New 
York.  Twelve PSAP leaders (three former and nine current) participated in four focus 
group sessions of three persons each to discuss how they supported effective 
implementation of quality.  PSAP leaders answered open ended questions regarding the 
four subordinate questions previously described in Chapter 3.  Participants engaged in 
discussions averaging 90 minutes in length.  Participants provided pseudonyms to protect 
their confidentiality.   
Interviews were coded using a priori codes based on existing evidence-based 
management literature regarding standards implementation.  Unless otherwise noted, 
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italicized text represented the original emphasis of the participant.  In the following 
sections, there is a brief introduction of the responses to the four sub-questions.  Results 
are then presented in greater detail in segments organized by theme.     
PSAP Leaders Defining and Measuring Quality 
When questioned about how they defined or measured quality in response to sub-
question 1: “How do PSAP leaders measure performance based on their definition of 
quality?”, PSAP leaders often referenced standards or protocols.  PSAP leaders wanted to 
understand or evaluate the purpose of a standard before implementation.  One quote from 
Cliff, a former PSAP leader, set the tone of the entire study: “I don't necessarily know 
that procedures or standards that exist outside your agency are bad or good, right? It's 
how and why you chose to implement them” (1:142).  Said slightly differently by the 
same participant, “The best way to improve is to always be: ‘What are we trying to 
accomplish?’ ‘What tools do we have in our toolbox today to do this job better than we 
did it yesterday?’” (1:153). As we discussed each of the sub-questions, PSAP leaders 
described how they tried to improve the standards of care they provide. 
PSAP leaders were consistently concerned with both the accuracy and speed at 
which telecommunicators (sometimes referred to as dispatchers or call takers by 
participants) gathered and retransmitted information to responders.  While there was 
general agreement about quality expectations, the application or measurement of those 
quality expectations was inconsistent across sessions.  Participants regularly referenced 
feedback from senior leaders, responders, coworkers, and callers when discussing quality 
measures.  PSAP leaders stated reviews of calls, radio transmissions, and data entry logs 
were important, however inconsistencies were impacted by staffing as discussed in 
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greater detail in sub-question 2.  In the next sections, the themes which emerged in 
response to sub-question 1 are described in greater detail.   
“Fast, accurate.”   PSAP leaders described that they measure quality using two 
criteria, speed and accuracy, which are sometimes in conflict with each other.  Cliff 
stated, “What's the minimum standard of care?  In the 911 world, the specific [policy] is 
up to the agency, but it really boils down to two things: fast, accurate” (1:15). Ensuring 
help arrives to the correct location without delay during emergencies was important to 
participants, especially during high call volumes.  This can cause some tension for PSAP 
telecommunicators because often PSAP have multiple emergencies occurring at the same 
time.  In a different session, Siobhan, a current female PSAP leader from a large agency, 
relayed her response to a complaining citizen who felt the telecommunicator took too 
long to handle the citizen’s request, “She got her help as quickly as she could, so she 
could go on to the next [9-1-1] call.” (2:109).  Another participant from a large PSAP, 
Byron, described how he felt PSAPs performance should be measured:  
How should a PSAP's performance be measured? By efficiency, professionalism, 
the ability to get the job entered quickly, dispatched quickly. Mitigate problems   
that we can for the road [law enforcement patrol cars], so that as things are 
developing, we're already on top of fill-ins [fire department requests for additional 
apparatus], and staging [location for equipment waiting to respond]. (3:6) 
Participants regularly referenced “times” when defining quality whether it was “time to 
dispatch” (time it takes from the initial 9-1-1 call to the dispatching of emergency 
responders), “arrival time” (time from dispatch to responders arriving on-scene of an 
incident), or even a “20-minute timer” for fire responses.  Danisha who currently leads 
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her small PSAP stated, “I knew they did a good job based on the timeline” (4:1).  
Danisha then described the complexities of 9-1-1 calls, discussed in another segment. 
Equally, PSAP leaders wanted to avoid delays in the process caused by 
telecommunicator errors.  Participants focused on the accuracy of the information 
telecommunicators were collecting such as the location of the incident and people 
involved or how they made decisions based on that information.  Lillian, another former 
PSAP leader, told a story about a telecommunicator that forwarded a 9-1-1 call to the 
incorrect agency, she recalled admonishing the telecommunicator:  
Well, if you get them to the wrong dispatcher, you're not making it [the 
emergency response to an incident] happen any faster, you're actually in fact 
delaying the response rather than taking those few seconds to do it right. I used to 
tell them it's not always good to do it quick, it's better to do it right. (1:56) 
During an active shooter incident, another telecommunicator sent officers to the incorrect 
location for a business that had two stores on the same road, miles apart.  Siobhan 
recounted how it impacted the call, “And she knew that she had messed up. And all the 
officers were screaming, ‘It's not at this plaza!’ And then she was like, ‘Oh.’ And there 
could've been like an 8-minute delay" (2:15).  Siobhan later related how police officers 
were passing by the active shooter scene on the way to the incorrect location putting both 
responders and the public at risk.  Larry, who recently retired from a medium sized PSAP 
frankly stated, “Finding people is a critical part of the job” (1:30), establishing how 
gathering accurate information was a standard measure of quality. 
“It’s arbitrary.” When asked how PSAP leaders measured quality, the responses 
were mixed with quality being based on general feedback in some agencies to formalized 
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quality reviews with programmatic timelines.  George, a longtime employee yet a 
relatively new PSAP leader from a medium sized agency said, “To know whether they're 
[agency policies] good and effective? It's your delivery to your customer, to your 
customer base, I think. However, based on what your standards are, . . . it's all arbitrary” 
(2:85).  George went on to advocate that mandatory standards apply to all PSAPs within 
NYS, as opposed to only county-designated wireless PSAPs, to combat the seemingly 
arbitrary levels of quality provided by various PSAPs.  This will be discussed later in this 
chapter under NYS governance. 
 Other participants relayed how performance was difficult to measure; Danisha 
specifically cited the complexity of telecommunicator’s jobs, 
So, in regards to how should PSAP performance be measured? There's a lot of 
different variables because there's a lot of times where there is a big incident and 
they do an excellent job, but there might be 99 tasks that need to be done and one 
of them was done incorrectly. For some reasons that's always the one highlighted.  
So, I mean I measure it based on the big picture. I certainly don't pick out one or 
two things that were done incorrectly if the other 88 [sic] were done right. It's a 
good job. (4:2) 
Another participant, Cliff, described how PSAP telecommunicators seem to shine during 
stressful events, but fail to perform during routine calls “because they've done it 1,000 
times. They're just rattling off the top of their head, not really following the protocol” 
(1:18).  This apparent lack of consistency, the inability to always measure quality, and the 
skewed focus on Danisha’s “1 of 99” things done incorrectly frustrated participants.  
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PSAP leaders believed the feedback was good, but the same feedback often discounted 
the good jobs their employees do more often than not. 
“Feedback.” Feedback was consistently cited by multiple participants across all 
sessions as a primary means of determining the standard of care provided.  Clark, a leader 
of a medium sized PSAP, bluntly joked, “Well, tongue in cheek, I'll answer that. How do 
we know our standards are good and effective?  No one calls and bitches on Monday 
morning about something that happened” (3:92).    Larry, a former PSAP leader, said,  
I call it customer feedback.  I mean we all have customers from the EMS side, the 
fire side, and our police that “Oh my God, Wendy's working today? Oh God, she 
drives me insane, right?” And we have the same customers go, “Man, when Mike, 
or Joe's working, they always get it right, and they're professional.” (1:47) 
Byron stated, “We are fortunate in that we do get feedback from our user agencies; we, 
from time to time, will get feedback from citizens” (3:3).  
In the same session, Monte, a female leader from a mid-sized PSAP, raised a 
concern about feedback, “I just do not think performance should be measured by negative 
feedback. I mean, often with the public, you don't get to hear a lot, unless you're sending 
out surveys, or doing things like that” (3:8).  Chris, a current leader of a large PSAP, 
described how repeated errors, especially when they are the same errors, get the attention 
of PSAP leaders, “Their name has passed across the desk [before] because you were 
getting, ‘Yeah here's a potential liability because a call didn't go in. . . . Well this is the 
third time I've seen this’” (4:34).   
Feedback, whether it was positive or negative, was described as spurious, or in the 
moment, by most participants.  Clark explained, 
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We're reliant on our supervisors to advise us about, "Hey, just so you know, on 
the overnight shift we had this really good call. The dispatcher did this," or, "The 
team did this." Or, we get an email, which is probably the lesser of the two 
examples, from a fire chief, or a police officer, [or an] EMS provider saying, 
"Hey, just so you guys know, or just so you know, your guys did a really good job 
last night, day before yesterday." (3:1)   
Some participants did have formal survey programs, but that was not common across all 
sessions or participants.  Going back to George, when discussing how his employees 
received recognition based on feedback, “arbitrary” comes up again: 
It's [measuring quality] an arbitrary thing. It’s not, I don't think it's set in stone, at 
least in my center. Typically, it's . . . doing their job, you know. Delivering a 
baby, technically, is doing their job. But that's a good thing. Doing the EMD 
correctly and deliver, you know, childbirth, or a save [of a person’s life] or 
something like that. (2:6) 
   Reviews. The combination of inconsistent (or arbitrary) feedback and expectations 
that quality work is just “doing their job” often accompanied PSAP leaders’ advocacy for 
formalized reviews, although many participants admitted they were not doing enough 
reviews.  Chris described how reviews are so important to both quality assurance and the 
agency’s training program: 
 That's a measurement. Evaluation, employee evaluations. How are they doing 
individually? The quality assurance reviews. How is each person doing, but that 
also measures us as a PSAP and how are we doing overall in our training process? 
[Trainees perform] reviews on our CTOs [Communications Training Officers] 
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when [they] get done training and we review them. How have they done? And we 
take those reviews. We review every class after we get done. “What are the good? 
What's the bad? What do we need to make changes on?” (4:8) 
While training is discussed later under sub-question 2 as an implementation factor, this 
particular quotation reinforced the theme that formalized reviews were used as quality 
measurements. 
Having a formalized plan for reviews came up multiple times.  Cliff stated, “Well 
you really do need, and this is difficult in most people's instances [emphasis added], you 
really do need a formalized plan of reviewing a certain number of calls” (1:43).  Siobhan 
discussed how her agency had a plan, but the agency’s goals were not always met: 
We do a lot of QA/QI [quality assurance / quality improvement reviews] at my 
place. Last year, we implemented, we were going to do 20 QA/QI per staff 
member a month. And it's been working out fairly well. With all the training 
we've been doing, we've had a hard time keeping that number. But we have done 
at least 10 a month per person. But it's subjective. (2:91A)    
Conversely, Cliff’s agency was able to reduce the on-air time (time spent talking 
on the radio) for fire dispatches using reviews and reinforcement: 
And eventually, with constant reinforcement, and constant review, and a little bit 
of allowance for some flexibility . . . that [time spent transmitting information] got 
down so that they [transmitted]: the fire department, type of call, address, very 
short complaint [description of the emergency]. Done. (1:99)   
Similarly, Byron expressed that formalized reviews help PSAP leaders catch performance 
issues before they become problems,  
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In our department, all employees get five call reviews a month, on top of their QI 
reviews from the medical priorities [emergency medical dispatch review] folks.  
So, you can see when somebody is not up to par and doing as they should be 
doing. You can hear that. (3:12B -3:13B)    
While acknowledging reviews were important, PSAP leaders also raised concerns 
about inconsistencies across members of the quality improvement team during the 
grading process.  Siobhan stated, 
Two of my people can listen to the exact same call, and we're going to have a 
different outcome. Somebody's going to give them an A and somebody's going to 
give them a D, just because they hear a little something different in the tone of the 
voice. (2:91B)  
Tyler, a current leader of a small PSAP, echoed those same concerns in a different 
session, “It was a struggle because initially we didn't have all our graders being consistent 
across the board. So, one guy would do it one way, one guy was doing it another way. . . . 
That’s not objective” (4:105B – 4:106A).  Despite these concerns, participants felt 
reviews, even with inconsistences, were worthwhile, especially when trying to “catch” 
her employees doing their job well.  Returning to Siobhan: 
So that's something that we're working on, but we do a lot of QA/QI at my place. I 
think it's important. I think it's important not just to find the bad calls, but I want 
to find those good calls, too. Or, I want to find those rare calls where maybe we 
can learn something from it. So that's been pretty important to us. (2:91C) 
Although participants judged reviews were critical to providing quality, they also 
confessed that quality improvement reviews were not always their top priority.  George 
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expressed a common PSAP leader reality, “Unfortunately, QA/QI takes a back burner to 
other projects” (2:90).  When confronted with other priorities, PSAP leaders 
acknowledged how reviewing calls requires a great deal of time and may lead to conflict 
with employees depending on how the feedback is presented.  These sentiments are 
discussed in greater detail below which leads us directly into the next section covering 
implementation factors.   
PSAP Leaders’ Implementation Factors 
Sub-question 2 asked: “How do PSAP leaders perceive factors related to quality 
improvement?”  Implementation factors centered primarily around achieving “buy-in” 
from multiple stakeholders including senior leaders (internal and external), middle 
managers, supervisors, and employees.  Other factors included training, staffing, and 
having time to perform QA/QI reviews of telephone calls, radio transmissions, and 
Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) data entries.  Finally, participants identified 
accreditation as a positive reinforcement to standards adoption across all sessions despite 
some of the participants’ agencies not being accredited.  Below we will discuss each of 
these themes in greater detail.    
“Buy-in.” PSAP leaders are not always the chief executive of their organizations 
but are often the primary person responsible for maintaining standards, implementing 
new programs, and held responsible for the performance of PSAP telecommunicators.  
PSAP leaders serve as brokers for multiple stakeholders from their internal senior 
leadership, senior leaders of responder agencies, their employees, and the public.  When 
trying to implement standards of care, PSAP leaders described the requirement to get 
“buy-in” from those multiple stakeholder groups. “Buy-in” was described by PSAP 
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leaders as a neutral indicator, if the PSAP leader was able to achieve buy-in from their 
stakeholders, the implementation succeeded.  However, when PSAP leaders failed to 
achieve buy-in, implementations either failed dramatically or slowly faded away.  
Tyler described how a good standard failed to get implemented when the PSAP 
leader does not get buy-in, “It was a great idea and I would have probably got full buy-in 
except I approached it wrong” (4:61).  Chris experienced the same phenomenon “There 
was just some issues on the fire side we needed [to fix] and it really, it just failed. And I 
think part of that was buy-in because we didn't get enough buy-in from the people that 
were doing it” (4:59).  Monte gives a vivid description of how a bad idea without buy-in 
can create havoc in a PSAP: 
There was no buy-in from the supervisors, the employees, from anybody, except 
this [9-1-1 operations] board that supported this one person. . . . Well, just making 
that little change made them [PSAP telecommunicators] feel like bumbling 
baboons, and really made the field providers say, ‘What in the world is going on 
up there?’  And there was no ability to explain. I mean, an email was sent out and 
things like that, but it really was a failure. We went back [to the previous 
procedure] pretty quickly, actually, because it was just crazy. (3:77) 
Over the next few sub-sections we will discuss examples of both negative and positive 
buy-in involving different stakeholder groups such as senior leaders, middle managers 
and supervisors, employees, and finally from the PSAP leaders’ perspective of being a 
trusted insider. 
Buy-in involving senior leaders. As stated earlier, PSAP leaders are not always 
the chief executive of their agency.  PSAP leaders identified both internal and external 
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senior leaders that needed to be convinced if they wanted to successfully implement 
standards of care.  When describing how his agency first implemented emergency 
medical dispatch (EMD) protocols almost two decades earlier, Larry flatly stated “The 
hard sell was the administrators” (1:76).  EMD is an evidence-based process where 
telecommunicators ask protocol-defined questions and provide medical interventions to 
improve patient outcomes.  The concept behind EMD was the idea that 
telecommunicators were the “first” of the first responders by being “on scene” (although 
remotely through the phone) before ambulances arrived.  We will discuss PSAP leaders’ 
perceptions of EMD later during sub-question 3; however Larry’s depiction of senior 
leaders’ perceptions demonstrated how he had to work through his supervisor’s ignorance 
regarding the benefit of having telecommunicators give life-saving medical instructions 
over the phone:    
All that took a toll, and the administrators . . . said, "Why aren't we just sending 
an ambulance?” . . . That was the mentality.  . . . Our PSAP is controlled by a 
sheriff's office. They're cops, they think like cops, they were trained as cops, they 
came up through the ranks, and it's no bad reflection on them, it's just their 
training and background was all law enforcement.  They don't see the medical 
side of it. (1:86B) 
In the end, Larry did succeed in implementing the EMD program, along with its higher 
standard of care, primarily because his senior leadership trusted his judgement as 
addressed further on when we discuss PSAP leaders as trusted insiders. 
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Participants described senior leaders as both supportive and destructive when 
implementing evidence-based standards of care.  As an example of being supportive, 
George admired how his senior leadership created an environment that fosters quality:  
Oh, it's huge as far as I'm concerned. I mean, I'm in a fortunate position . . . since 
I've been in my current position, I have [had] a very progressive boss, that's 
extremely supportive of the division. But I could see where if you had a 
department head who was not in support of communications [PSAP 
telecommunicators], that it could be very difficult. (2:83) 
Siobhan echoed George’s sentiment, “My boss has been very good at pushing us forward, 
pushing everyone forward, and getting our good name out there. So, I'm pretty lucky, and 
he's really supportive of me” (2:84A).  Likewise, Clark described the process he used to 
convince members of his county legislative body to invest in additional staff to meet 
standards of care,  
Our [county] board of supervisors and our administration has been very 
supportive. . . . But, what we had to do was literally bring them in. Bring in a 
[county board] supervisor who may question what the need is and explain how 
operations work.  And show them that there literally is a need to have a supervisor 
available when somebody snaps their fingers, activates their red light on their 
consoles, which is basically [saying], “I need a supervisor. I need help." (3:60)  
Tyler told how senior leaders led the change process from the top, laterally, and down the 
hierarchical chain,  
We worked a lot with Bureau of Fire and said okay, get them to buy into this and 
they did presentations to our dispatchers. Then they went out and did all of the 
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fire departments and then they, came back to us and said, okay this is some of the 
feedback from the fire departments, what's your feedback? And now our 
dispatchers actually love it. There's no guesswork. (4:77)   
Conversely, participants also described the destructive influence senior leaders 
can have when they issue commands or initiate programs without engaging others.  
Casper, a longtime PSAP leader of a small agency, describes how senior leaders can 
overreact to bad incident, such as a fatal accident, by instituting a policy without 
consulting a PSAP leader, “It wasn't like I had any input in it [the new policy]. It was 
just, ‘Here it is!’ . . . What are we supposed to tell them [telecommunicators]? It just was 
a poorly thought out edict” (2:48).  Tyler illustrated how senior leaders can put PSAP 
leaders in a difficult spot, “You have no control. . . you can't fully undermine that either 
and go, ‘Well I don't agree with this!’ It doesn't matter whether we agree or not. The guy 
who's writing your paycheck is . . . implementing it [the policy]” (4:83).  Returning to 
Monte’s example of not having buy-in, she depicted out how a senior leader initiated the 
failed program described earlier “We were directed at a [9-1-1 advisory board] meeting . . 
. to make that change right then” (3:76).  
PSAP leaders described how both senior leaders and supervisors, according to 
Lillian, are “the two biggest obstacles” to policy implementation (1:121).  Cliff followed 
up Lillian’s comment by describing how he as a PSAP leader got in his own way, “It's 
related to senior leadership not having buy in. Sometimes you are the person who isn't 
giving the buy in, right? Yourself, in person, in your own head” (1:122).  Based on the 
evidence above, failure to achieve buy-in from senior leaders or PSAP leaders themselves 
often led to disastrous or ineffective implantations whereas successful implementations 
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stemmed from convincing senior leaders that change is necessary. As noted above, a 
PSAP leader may be a considered middle management depending on their placement on 
the PSAP’s organizational chart.  Next, we will discuss middle managers and supervisors.   
Buy-in from middle managers and supervisors. PSAP leaders referenced the 
importance of having middle managers and first-line supervisors buy-in to the logic 
behind any evidence-based change.  Like Cliff, Casper detailed how his people had to 
convince him that an evidence-based standard, such as informing fire responders that 20 
minutes had elapsed since the start of a fire, was necessary to implement,  
I wasn't really too fond of it. It was keeping track of 20 minute from [the start of] 
fires. And I didn't like it when it was first approached to me, because I felt that it 
was one more thing being dumped onto us. . . . Other dispatchers, who were more 
in favor of it, they finally kind of lured me to understand that it is our [PSAP 
telecommunicators’] responsibility. (2:37) 
Returning to Cliff, he related how his PSAP supervisors participated in selecting the 
vendor for their agency’s EMD implementation “They were engaged, a couple of the   
senior people [in the PSAP] were engaged in choosing the program between the 
competitors at the time” (1:79). George described that he gets “buy-in and feedback from 
other participants, minimally, [from] other supervision” (2:53).  Similarly, Siobhan stated 
that “I get a lot of feedback from my senior [telecommunicators]” before implementing 
changes at her PSAP (2:56).   
PSAP leaders also described how supervisors can stop evidence-based standards 
of care before implementation can even occur.  Monte told how her supervisors refused 
to adopt new 9-1-1 call distribution policies and how she engaged them,  
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The pushback has been unbelievable from the supervisors to the point where, 
now, I'm having one-on-one meetings with them.  Because as things get going 
with any subgroup, whether it be a certain platoon or group of supervisors, or 
things like that, they get talking amongst themselves and we have those who can 
make things a lot worse, or a lot more dire sounding. (3:51) 
Byron, however, received buy-in from his supervisors and saw success, “We vetted that. 
We rolled it out to some of our key staff to take a look how they felt it was going to work. 
We had folks that jumped in and started utilizing the change . . . very quickly” (3:68A). 
Chris illustrated the dual nature of supervisors and how they can either kill or promote an 
idea: 
They're the ones working the [PSAP] operations floor and of course management 
can't be out on the floor all the time . . . and you can't control them. You can think 
you can control them and you can't.  In reality, they're the ones that are going to 
show and push for the better items that they're supportive of. They're gonna be 
like, ‘Oh yeah, this is a great idea.’ They're gonna push it, they're gonna talk it up 
and people are gonna see that and go, ‘Wow it must be good’. If it's something 
negative and your supervisors are talking it down, you can control that as best as 
you can, but sometimes you hear about it, sometimes you don't. People on the 
floor are going to be negative too. And so, I think supervisor support is very 
important. (4:55) 
Danisha also revealed how getting buy-in from her supervisors was critical to success, 
Well something happened with one policy that it just went awry and again I can't 
think of the example. But what it led to was, any policies or procedures now go to 
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the supervisors. They review them . . . because they're the ones doing the jobs, so 
I could easily miss something. So, they come from admin, they go to supervisors, 
they review them very thoroughly before they go to the [PSAP operations] floor 
from now on. (4:63)   
Clark described that he seeks input from both supervisors and informal leaders within his 
PSAP: 
You may have an idea, you may fashion something that you think is going to 
work, and is going to streamline your process, but as the director, I'm not the 
boots on the ground guy that's doing this every day. If I don't ask my staff, if I 
don't roll it out to folks and we pick it apart, I don't know where the failures are 
going to be. . . . We should trust our people to give us good feedback. We should 
pick their brains. Because, that some folks have chosen not to become 
supervisors, doesn't mean that they're not a key part of your operation. (3:71) 
Clark’s depiction of how some employees are leaders within the center, without having a 
supervisory title, leads us to the next group of stakeholders, the front-line employees. 
Buy-in from employees. PSAP leaders were mixed on how they handled front-
line staff although a majority of PSAP leaders expressed a desire to positively engage 
their staff.  Siobhan spoke flippantly when she described opposition at her PSAP,  
The younger staff will do it, but the older staff will just whine and moan and 
complain continuously. And it'll just bring down morale a little bit. But the 
younger staff will do it. Over half my staff is new. So, I don't have a lot of trouble 
like that. But the few that are there are the loudest. (2:46) 
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Byron took the opposite approach “If you don't get buy-in from the folks that are going to 
be doing this on a daily basis, you are not going to be successful, in my opinion” (3:70).  
He went on to further explain, “Well, if you don't have an information exchange with 
your staff  . . . you are not going to get your troops behind you. It's simply not going to 
happen” (3:79).  Monte echoed Byron’s sentiment, “You know, getting that buy-in . . . so 
many things go so much better” (3:78). Danisha plainly put it this way “If your staff is 
happy, you're happy. And that's really kind of I think the way we live by. If they're 
happy, they're performing better and ultimately you're happy” (4:56B). 
PSAP leader as trusted insider. PSAP leaders expressed how building, 
maintaining, or failing to be trusted impacted their ability to implement evidence-based 
change.  Monte described how a consultant was needed to add credibility to her data 
indicating additional staff was required to achieve quality, “We had to bring in a 
consultant because the numbers [weren’t] enough to be able to justify [the additional 
staff] . . . after some, I won't say complaints, but concerns [were] raised by the public 
safety agencies” (3:65).  George, on the other hand, enjoyed the support of his leadership 
and was trusted to present information in a public setting: 
I was fortunate enough after the wind storm, to be able to present to our county 
legislature the statistics from that event as I did [when] we had a large fire a year 
and a half ago. And [I] was able to get the forum to present to the county 
legislators to promote the [PSAP] division.  (2:111)  
Siobhan, talking again about her supervisor said,  
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He'll listen to all my reasons for why I want to do something, or why I don't want 
to do something. And let me know what he thinks. But, he's super supportive. 
And I've been pushing for more training, and he's like, "Yeah, let's do it." (2:84B) 
Clark depicted how he was trusted to make most decisions and how he worked with 
others to build consensus, 
I don't want to bother them [senior leadership] with little changes and procedures, 
but when we do a major upgrade, or a major change, especially on the law 
enforcement side, since we are a law enforcement agency, I have to be able to 
communicate with them. But, yeah, they put a lot of trust in me, because they 
know it's not a unilateral decision. (3:110)   
Chris described how he has built trust across stakeholder groups over the years, “I've 
been a trainer, I've been . . . the shift supervisor out on the floor going through everything 
and then in the last 7 years into my current position” (4:42B).   Larry established how his 
professional journey prepared him for PSAP leadership and qualified him as a NYS 9-1-1 
standards developer,  
I had an EMS [emergency medical service] background. I had a fire service 
background. I have a police background, and I have a dispatcher background. I 
used to say that I was the only one that had all four disciplines. (1:69A) 
Interestingly, Larry introduced an unforeseen theme regarding the rise of PSAP 
operations as a public safety discipline worthy of equal treatment and scholarly study.  
This theme is addressed more directly in the responses to sub-question 4. 
Training. PSAP leaders cited providing training in association with reinforcing 
quality and setting quality expectations.  Lillian recalled how telecommunicators used 
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their training to find an injured driver who did not know where he was after overturning 
his all-terrain vehicle, “So this is where the staff tends to step up . . . they used their 
training, and other people got involved, and worked as a team, they used his cell phone 
technology to map where he was” (1:26).  Former PSAP leaders, such as Larry 
acknowledged training was not originally a formal process “You learned from the older 
guy in the room” (1:89), whereas current PSAP leaders, like Clark, used retention rates of 
new trainees as a measure of quality,  
About 50% make it through the training program, 50% do not. And it would be 
easy for me to say, "Well, it's just the people. They can't do the job. They can't 
multitask. They don't have enough technology background." But that would be 
very narrow minded of me to think that. Yes, that's a possibility. But now I have 
to say to myself, and this is a goal for next year, let's revamp our training 
program. Let's try to make it more successful.  So how do we know our standards 
are good? Well, if we see more people who are getting through the training 
program and being more successful, maybe that's a way to gauge that we're doing 
a good job. (3:94)   
Similarly, Chris stated that his agency is updating their training to meet current 
Association of Public Safety Communications Officer (APCO) standards and the needs 
of individual trainees, specifically millennials,  
All of our trainers have to be CTO certified through APCO. . . . We have changed 
everything and looked at all sorts of stuff on how to train somebody because it has 
changed so much.  Because the people that we're even getting in now, the younger 
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[generation] will ask so many different questions. So, it's, “Alright how do we 
handle them?”  So, we definitely have to change for each person (4:43A) 
Chris, Tyler, and Danisha spent a considerable time discussing training during 
their session.  Danisha described how she initially reacted and then paused to reflect in 
response to a telecommunicator “freezing” during a large fire, 
My initial reaction was, "What the hell." But then you gotta really look at it, the 
big picture, and go “Okay, how often does she sit in that seat [fire dispatch 
position]? How often is she working this position? How much training has she 
been given? Were you aware that she wasn't comfortable? And if you were, did 
you do anything about it?” (4:17B)  
Danisha then went on to describe her interaction with the employee and how she resolved 
to give the telecommunicator refresher training rather than pursuing disciplinary actions, 
She knew exactly what went wrong. She didn't hide it. She didn't sugar coat it. 
She knew. So, I said, “What can we do in the future to make it better? What can I 
do to make you more comfortable?”  . . . So, bottom line, we came up with a 
training plan for her to move forward so that she can become more comfortable 
and perform better.” (4:19) 
Going back to Chris, he expressed how PSAPs can provide better standards of care by 
providing better training and better policies:  
Okay what can we do better? How can we prevent this [poor performance] from 
happening again and make changes? We made changes in our training to where 
we're making sure that we're covering in service refresher [training] every year . . 
. [and] making sure policies are getting designed better.  (4:23)   
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Tyler echoed how he was also making changes to his PSAP’s training program, 
We're trying to empower our trainers . . . but we're redoing our entire training 
program. We didn't throw it out and start all over again. There was nothing wrong 
with the actual training piece of it, we were just training people badly. . . . We've   
sectioned it off into pieces and [now] there's benchmarks. (4:39) 
Returning to Danisha, she described that supporting quality required a continuous effort 
on behalf of PSAP leaders, even though their employees may not always appreciate the 
effort, 
[The] best way to improve is just . . . continuous training. They [employees] like 
to have training. I mean they'll complain about, "Oh you have training again." But 
then they come back and they're like, "Oh yeah we should have been doing this.” 
And it refreshes them. (4:88)  
From a different session, Byron detailed how long it takes to train a quality employee 
using a mix of nationally certified and local training programs, 
Our training, and we have modified our training over the years, is . . . 20 days in 
class, 160 hours we'll call it. And part of that is learning the APCO [certified 
course material], that’s the first 40 hours. And then also, the EMD [24 hours of 
certified training].  And then the balance of it is for [local] call taking, and 
policies procedures, and CAD [Computer Aided Dispatch training] and telephone 
use. And then they're on the operations floor with a trainer.  If you're a call taker, 
you're on the operations floor until you're certified. That could be three, four 
months. (3:100) 
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PSAP leaders often used refresher training in response to poor performance, as 
alluded to earlier with Danisha; sometimes retraining occurred after disciplinary action 
was taken.  In some cases, employees failed to respond to these opportunities by 
improving performance.  Chris explained how even seasoned employees could fall 
behind on performance,  
I've had 25-year employees that have gone back into remedial training because 
we're catching issues and go, "This is not right."   I have somebody out right now 
that's had some issues that it's not safe for them to answer a phone call, so we 
have to figure out what our next steps are right now because we're not sure what's 
going on. (4:33) 
Lillian described her frustration with the same employee making the same mistakes “over 
and over again, and we would try to do remedial things, counseling and retraining” 
(1:58).  Casper relayed a detailed account of how he and his supervisors went to great 
lengths to correct an employee’s sub-par performance, 
I actually switched shifts for a month to work with this person one-on-one. . . . 
And the employee knew that mistakes were being made. The person was upset at 
their performance. And my idea was, "Okay. Let's try to do this. Maybe not re-
train but re-emphasize some things."   And at the end of the month-long period . . 
.  if the person fell into the same kind of rut, it would not be sensible to try to do 
any more training [the employee would be fired]. The person has been a 
dispatcher for long enough that they should know the basics. And some things 
they were really dropping the ball on [were] little things; basic, basic things. 
(2:22)  
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Casper’s story along with the other previously discussed experiences of PSAP 
leaders highlighted the concern that training PSAP telecommunicators requires 
significant resources in terms of both funding and time.  Larry recalled that “re-
certification was again a financial concern” when considering implementation of his 
agency’s EMD program (1:86).  The time and effort required to train, recertify, and 
sometimes retrain employees also impacted PSAP leaders’ ability to perform other 
quality improvement tasks such as reviews, which is discussed in our next section. 
“Staffing and time.” Participants consistently cited lack of staffing and time as 
the primary barrier to performing quality improvement tasks (such as reviews) and 
reinforcing standards of care within their agencies.  George detailed how he had to make 
the difficult choice between performing quality improvement reviews or training new 
employees, 
I'm in a difficult position, at least in my county, where we do some QA/QI but, I'll 
admit, we don't do it enough. And we don't do it enough because they don't have 
the staffing to do it. . . .We've been in a unique situation with hiring. We've put on 
eight people in the last 12 months. I have one supervisor that can't even work a 
shift because he's doing nothing but training. (2:89) 
Cliff, a former PSAP leader, relayed how “we were all in the [PSAP] business before any 
kind of formalized plans [for quality improvement reviews] were in place. Formalized 
plans, and the time to do them are a luxury, and particularly in New York State because 
of funding [emphasis added]” (1:44). Later in the same session, Cliff described how the 
costs to implement newer technology, such as Next Generation 9-1-1, will create even 
more pressure on PSAP leaders to prioritize scarce resources, 
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It [Next Generation 9-1-1 technology] will only exacerbate the problem of not 
being able to have the resources to be able to have the quality review. So, there's a 
lot of dynamics going on that make the QA piece be something that is always 
going to be a struggle, not because people don't want to do it, but because there 
just isn't the financial incentive, or the commitment to put the resources in place 
to do it correctly. (1:178) 
Casper lamented how he had no resources to perform quality improvement reviews, 
We basically have no QA/QI at all. I tried doing it when we first went to EMD, 
but I was having to come in umpteen [an excessive amount] hours a week. And at 
that time, we had an antiquated recorder system, which made it even worse. Just, 
if my position was different where I could do things like that, I probably could 
implement it, but we just don't have it.  Staffing. We just don't have anybody to do 
that. (2:96) 
Casper then illustrated the sense of despair some PSAP leaders, particularly those from 
smaller agencies, encountered knowing they could provide higher standards of care if 
only given the resources, 
I've worked my department for 25 years, and the staffing level has never changed. 
Two per shift [2 telecommunicators covering 9-11- and dispatch services for an 
entire NYS county]. Period. It's never changed. And I don't foresee it changing by 
the time I retire. I can see your reactions, and it is dumbfounding that in 2018, 
we're at the same staffing level we were before I started. . . . I don't know whether 
we do, per se, a good enough job that people are okay with it, or everybody higher 
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up just doesn't see the reasoning behind increasing the staffing. But we're very, 
very backwards in that sense. (2:97) 
In an earlier session, Lillian recalled her exasperation when confronted with having too 
much to do and not enough time or resources to do things like quality improvement 
reviews correctly, 
A lot of that comes back to like Larry said, the budget thing, who does that 
[perform quality improvement reviews]? Who has the time to do that? You know? 
Your supervisors are acting as call takers [front-line telecommunicators], your 
managers are doing all the things the manager's do, who has the time? It really 
should be another whole person dedicated to that in your PSAP to just do it 
[quality improvement reviews] right? (1:175)  
As an example of how much time is required to implement new standards of care, Clark 
shared how his agency took 18 months to create, update, and implement new police 
standards of care while negotiating with differing stakeholder groups to accomplish the 
intended goal of improving PSAP quality, 
You also should try to work with the field providers [emergency response 
agencies, in this example law enforcement agencies]. However, be cautious. We 
implemented police protocols. We were looking to do this for a long time, back to 
QA, and tried to standardize how we do things. And this was an 18-month 
process. It took that long. (3:73)  
Chris revealed how staffing issues, such as needing to train new supervisors, interfered 
with performing reviews and how agencies required a dedicated quality improvement 
position to achieve a higher standard of care, 
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Our quality assurance program has declined . . . over the years because of trying 
to get supervisors [trained] and we're actually putting a full-time person in to that 
spot [quality improvement position] and changing around the procedures and stuff 
so we can do that, which will make that a more consistent program . . . a lot of our 
supervisors are very much in support of that. (4:54) 
Across all sessions and PSAP agency sizes, PSAP leaders identified staffing and time as 
the primary obstacle to providing quality or achieving higher standards of care.  PSAP 
leaders advocated for PSAP positions dedicated to performing quality improvement 
reviews but confessed the ability to secure funding for such positions was highly 
unlikely.  Interestingly, PSAP leaders often advocated for increased supervision of PSAP 
operations at the same time as advocating for more quality reviews, a sub-theme 
discussed next. 
PSAP first-line supervisors as distinct role.  The need for dedicated PSAP 
supervision was not an a priori code but emerged during coding.  PSAP leaders felt 
strongly that PSAP supervisors should not be performing the work of front-line 
telecommunicators such as answering phones or handling radio traffic.  Instead, PSAP 
leaders stated that supervisors should be available to answer telecommunicator questions, 
troubleshoot technology issues, or provide immediate feedback to employees.   
Some PSAP agencies, most of them larger in size, have their supervisors review 
calls as part of their duties.  Byron stated his “supervisors listen to and review the call, 
and [then] pass them back to the employee for their comments and feedback” (3:12A). 
Likewise, Siobhan used her supervisors to perform quality improvement reviews due to 
lack of a dedicated reviewer.  Supervisors reviewed calls for employees they supervised 
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and two supervisors “from a different shift platoon” (2:93A).  Siobhan revealed how the 
process completely broke down when one of her supervisors could no longer keep up, “I 
had a guy that was a CTO, who had a little hissy fit, and he has now stepped down from 
being a senior [supervisor] and went to a [front-line telecommunicator position] and 
resigned his CTO position. (2:92). 
PSAP leaders wanted a clear separation of duties for their supervisors.  Lillian 
adamantly exclaimed, “Dispatchers [telecommunicators] need supervisors, not standing 
over top of them all the time, but they need somebody in the room to defer a quick policy 
question . . . and typically [they] don't have that.  Again, a funding situation” (1:109).  
Lillian then described how “because of staffing levels, and call volume” her supervisors 
were required to act as front-line telecommunicators “pretty much all of the time, rather 
than just be a supervisor” (1:112A).  She then explained why it was so important to have 
supervisors unfettered by front-line telecommunicator duties using what seems like 
hyperbole yet represented an all too often occurrence, “If that supervisor's in the middle 
of a [9-1-1] call themselves, they just can't say, ‘Hold on, I know you're having difficulty 
breathing, let me put you on hold while I answer this [telecommunicator’s] question on [a 
different] call’” (1:112).  If supervisors are tied down by front-line telecommunicator 
duties, they don’t have time to supervise and help their subordinates.   
PSAP leaders from later sessions spent considerable time discussing the role of a 
PSAP supervisor and how important the supervisor role plays in promoting quality within 
a PSAP.  Monte “worried” that her employees would not spend “one-on-one time with 
the supervisor for these reviews . . . to discuss, especially, anything that stuck out, or 
anything that has a lot of comments in the [quality improvement] system” (3:26).  Earlier, 
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in the senior leadership section, we discussed how Clark engaged his county board to 
demonstrate how he needed dedicated supervisors available to help front-line employees.  
Like Clark, Monte also went to her county leadership to advocate for additional 
supervisory staff, 
We went to our legislature proposing a change in staffing, which everyone here at 
the table understands that it's very difficult to get positions added to your 
department in this time, date, and age. With the goal of having the supervisors 
supervise. To not just be the glorified break-giver and things, but to actually 
supervise. To do QA, to work on other things. To listen and join [active 9-1-1 
calls] and catch things before they did become an issue. (3:49)  
Byron revealed “from a supervisory standpoint, we are observing our staff on a   
somewhat regular basis, especially with escalating incidents” (3:5) to help front-line 
employees with additional task such as “phone pings [locating a cellular phone location] 
for extenuating missing persons . . . managing a large event . . . and make their way 
around to answer questions and help procedurally” (3:56B).  Later Byron commented,  
So, I, like Clark, don't want the supervisors committed to a 911 phone, or a   
dispatch channel, unless we get into a situation where we're all hands-on deck.  
And from time to time they may pick up that one or two calls that are in queue.  
But typically, we try and discourage that. (3:56D) 
PSAP leaders also discussed how supervisors who refuse to monitor employees or 
employees ignoring their supervisors created quality issues.  Chris admitted that an 
administrative policy that was meant to help clarify the chain of command when two or 
more supervisors was working backfired because “we kind of took power away from 
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other supervisors and gave it to one when they all should have the same power” (4:58B).  
Chris then had to go back to his supervisors and remind them, “no matter where you're   
working, you're a supervisor. You should be monitoring things going on” (4:58D).  Larry 
commented how he often had to react to complaints from the public regarding poor 
telecommunicator performance, 
It's reported that a dispatcher was curt to a caller.  You vox [review] the call, and 
you find out yeah, that's the case. And some progressive discipline may be in 
order, which leads to the whole supervisory function in 911. We don't have   
enough. (1:108)   
Unlike Larry’s relatively mild example of poor performance, Monte detailed how a 
telecommunicator, for no valid reason, delayed an emergency response for an elderly 
female that needed and ambulance, 
An employee who [handled a] 911 call [and] was given the street, the cross 
streets, and approximate house number, what color the house was, how many 
houses on what side of the street from the nearest intersection the house was, and 
an owner's name of the house. And [the telecommunicator] refused to send an 
ambulance until she got better information. (3:28) 
Given the life or death implications of errors in a PSAP environment, PSAP leaders 
believed good supervisors were the primary promoters of quality within their 
organizations.  PSAP leaders also believed that organizational culture could either 
reinforce or inhibit quality as discussed below.   
Organizational culture. PSAP leaders gave examples of both good and bad 
organizational cultures within PSAPs.  Generally, participants enjoyed their workplace, 
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the freedom given to them by their supervisors, and gave concrete examples of how their 
employees rose to meet challenges.  Larry started his session by praising his former 
PSAP’s culture.  He told a story about how telecommunicators responded to a 9-1-1 
system failure after a lightning strike on a holiday weekend “when people would rather 
be out picnicking and being with their families” (1:15A),  
They [telecommunicators] sit home sometimes and listen to the monitor [radio 
system]. And they knew we were in trouble, so my cell phone rang, "Hey do you 
need any help?"  And we called in additional staffing. . . . Then people that were 
on shift when that happened offered to stay. I mean the normal person would say, 
"Hey, my shift is over, I'm out of here. I can't take this anymore." That didn't 
happen . . . it's like when dispatchers work at a 9-1-1 center, and their geographic 
area is underwater, and they don't know if they have a house to go home to, but 
they're willing to stay. And that's the kind of people that work for us. That's the 
credit I would give to them. (1:14B and 1:15B)  
Lillian also described how her team used “their training . . . technology . . . and that little 
bit of thinking outside the box” to make a “big difference” and achieve a “happy ending” 
when locating a man in a remote area trapped with a mangled limb (1:27 – 1:29).  
Siobhan related how her supervisor gave her the support needed to improve training and 
she sincerely stated, “I'm probably the luckiest girl in the world” (2:84C). 
In the later sessions, PSAP leaders described the “team” atmosphere in PSAP and 
how the team can overcome challenges.  Chris spoke about how his telecommunicators 
responded to a difficult CAD transition in the middle of summer because their old system 
“was about to fail”:  
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They worked together . . . throughout the year, they stayed positive. Got through 
it as a team and then continued to work as a team to make changes . . .  you can 
get through those things and that shows how well a PSAP can actually work 
together (4:3B) 
Byron relayed how he tried to instill a culture that everyone in the PSAP succeeds 
together or fails together, 
If you can convince your staff that successes are celebrated by all, and so are 
failures. Because when something bad happens, nobody says, "Clark, you 
screwed that up." [Instead] it's like, "I can't believe 9-1-1 made that mistake." The 
term is collective. And people refer to the 9-11- center, or the dispatch center, and 
everybody that sits under that roof feels that pain when something bad happens. 
(3:113)    
PSAP leaders also gave examples of how complacency can set in, administration 
can allow problems to fester, or how civil service and union due process can impact their 
ability to reinforce standards of care.  Tyler, when discussing employee resistance to 
quality assurance feedback, shared “It’s a whole lot easier with some people than others. 
Some are not into self-reflection. Some just could care less” (4:32).  Casper described 
how inaction by administrators can create a negative culture, 
The previous administration tended not to want to make waves with employees.  . 
. . People knew, "Okay, what are they going to do to me? Probably nothing." So, 
because there was never really any hardline discipline, I think that aggravated the 
situation in general. So, people either felt resigned that nothing was going to 
happen, or they didn't even bother to make some complaints. (2:21)   
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Mirroring Tyler, yet in a different session, Clark’s vehemently argued that quality 
improvement “isn’t about discipline . . . so it’s unfortunate that we have people who 
always go on the defensive . . . there’s no quality improvement or quality assurance in 
their mind” (3:35).  He further expressed how PSAP leaders and their employees 
sometimes have diametrically opposing ideas about quality improvement standards of 
care, 
QA is punitive in their opinion, when they get an EMD review, when they get a 
fire review, and it's bad by definition, they go, "Oh, here we go. Somebody's 
picking on me." That's not at all what QA is supposed to be about. It's supposed to 
identify some weaknesses, give them the tools to change, and improve. (3:36) 
Clark then went on to describe how relying solely on feedback can lead to complacency, 
“If we're not getting a lot of complaints, I think we're doing an okay job. However, that   
can make you complacent. You continually have to look at how to improve” (3:93).  
When describing negative cultures such as complacency, resistance to change, or even 
disciplinary measures, PSAP leaders often commented on their sense of powerlessness 
when dealing with NYS civil service due process and unions. 
NYS civil service. PSAP leaders felt that NYS civil service process not only 
prevented them from hiring good candidates, but also made it nearly impossible to 
remove poor performers. Byron described how the local civil service exam, a test that 
applicants must take prior to hiring, doesn’t always meet the needs of his PSAP, 
“unfortunately, we have never hired a full complement of vacancies [because] we just 
haven't had the candidates” (3:99). Lillian also described how NYS civil service rules 
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hurt her transition into PSAP leadership because civil service does not allow two people 
to temporarily hold the same position, 
When I first became a manager in the PSAP, the old manager was gone, and I 
mean he was gone, so I didn't have that because with civil service, you can't 
double fill, you can't keep that person around to kind of train you a little bit. 
(1:116A) 
Unions. PSAP leaders were especially exasperated by their inability to remove 
poor performers, especially when unions became involved.  Siobhan excitedly 
complained how an employee with multiple disciplinary citations persisted at her PSAP: 
I have an employee that is horrible. She is so rude to callers that, I can't even 
control her. I actually put her through APCO's customer service class. And in the 
last six months, she's had three records of counseling . . . and we just denied her 
raise. . . . And she is pissed. And she's not mad at herself for doing the job 
improperly. She's mad because she got caught. And it wasn't me who found it. It 
wasn't a supervisor who found it. These were calls from the public. Somebody 
actually called [an elected official’s office] to complain about her 9-1-1 call. And 
[we] can't get rid of her. She's protected, between civil service and the union. 
(2:29) 
Similarly, George told his story about an employee who personally received counseling 
from the PSAP’s chief executive often repeated “small mistakes . . . not following the 
correct policy” (2:19B).  When George’s leadership team looked deeper they found “that 
almost every year, and almost their entire career, this person has had minor mistakes” 
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(2:19D). George later lamented, “You have to put so much paper [written documentation 
for poor performance] on top of everything . . . it takes forever” (2:30).  
While some participants acknowledged unions have a good purpose, they often 
get abused by poor performers.  Clark discussed both the good and bad side of union 
representation; he defended unions stating, 
New York State has civil service protection, has unions. Almost every 911 center 
[in NYS] has a union and that's good for people. I truly believe that it is. It should 
be that insurance you hope you never need. (3:34B) 
In the same session, Monte commented, “one of our biggest challenges is that the 
supervisors and the dispatchers are both in the same union” (3:24).  Monte explained how 
her supervisors struggled to give adequate feedback to their subordinates because they 
feared backlash, “it is tough for some people, even when they work in a supervisory role, 
to be honest with other people” (3:25).  Monte then told her story about how she was 
investigating a complaint and her employee overreacted: 
 [While] just asking for “your [telecommunicator’s] side of the story”, my door 
was slammed twice. I was told I was making them nervous. They demanded 
union representation. It just went wrong. Everything went wrong with this . . . 2 
years later [the union] are threatening me with the way I handled the “asking” for 
“their side of the story”. . . . And now I'm being threatened, because they got a 
lawyer.  (3:31-3:32) 
After defending the purpose of the union (described above), Clark commiserated with 
Monte, “Monte gave an example of somebody who used their union in an incorrect way . 
. . they would rather waive the union flag . . . [when] I just need to get ‘your side of the 
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story’ to do an investigation” (3:34D).  Monte’s poignant example demonstrated how 
PSAP leaders are often caught in the middle between upholding standards of care and 
facing emotionally exhaustive and lengthy legal battles just for doing their job. 
Accreditation. In each of the sessions, participants identified accreditation as an 
impetus to either meet or maintain standards of care within their agencies.  In one of the 
earlier sessions with former PSAP leaders, they told how PSAP accreditation was born in 
NYS, primarily through the New York State Sheriff’s Association.  Larry humorously 
walked us through the logic at the time “One of our goals as an agency was to become 
accredited, so to become accredited, let me think, there must be standards” (1:90 – 1:91).  
Larry then described how he, Cliff and “a room of other people started sitting down, and 
making the standards for the State of New York. And I think originally we came up with 
21 different standards that we had to meet” (1:92).  We will discuss both standards 
development and peers later on, but it is interesting to learn how and why organizations 
create accreditation processes that other organizations subsequently adopt. 
Cliff described how his agency struggled to meet accreditation, even though he 
was one of the standard makers and assessors, and that the process a PSAP went through 
to get accreditation was as important as the accreditation itself,  
My own PSAP hadn't gone through the process yet, because . . . the procedures 
were in place, but the documentation wasn't all in place, and we were changing 
some things, and had to finish dotting all the ‘i's’ and crossing all the ‘t's’. (1:124) 
George, in a different session mirrored a similar sentiment, “As an accredited agency, 
those big aspects [of quality assurance / quality improvement] are there, forced by the 
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standards. And it's not a bad force, it's a good force [for] subtle changes to try to improve 
quality” (2:36).  
Some agencies sought accreditation not only at the state level, but also at the 
national and international level with organizations such as the Commission on 
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) or APCO 33 (a PSAP training 
accreditation program).  Chris stated, “Our training program, because of our accreditation 
with CALEA, is pretty thoroughly standardized . . . hopefully the first quarter of this 
year, we'll have everything sent in for APCO 33” (4:53).  Byron, who also runs a CALEA 
accredited PSAP stated, “Because we are a CALEA accredited center, we send out 
monthly surveys to the citizens” (3:4).  We will cover how PSAP leaders used local data 
during the discussion on sub-question 4.  
PSAP leaders acknowledged that accreditation was valuable in promoting better 
standards of care, but reminded us that accreditation only works if the standards mean 
something.  Larry recalled what he believed was the original motive behind accreditation, 
“Accreditation, I think initially when it started out was more about the free press” 
(1:127).  Larry went on to state that accreditation only means something when assessors 
are willing to deny accreditation if the standards are not met and tell PSAPs, “We'll come 
back next year [indicating accreditation failure]” (1:128). Going back to Cliff, the 
political aspect of early NYS Sheriff’s PSAP accreditation processes led him to throw out 
the good with the bad,  
I never realized it until many years later that I sabotaged myself . . . because I no 
longer saw the value in it. Because another county went through and didn't really 
do it, so what value is there? Now that's not really the case. . . . There is a lot of 
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value to going through the process and making sure that you meet all those 
standards [emphasis added]. (1:126)  
This leads us to our next section where we discuss PSAP leader perceptions of standards. 
PSAP Leaders’ Beliefs Regarding National Standards of Care 
Sub-question 3 queried: “When do PSAP leaders believe evidence-based 
management theoretical frameworks, such as national standards of care, should supersede 
local and personal experience frameworks; when do they not?”.  Participants believed 
national standards of care, such as EMD, helped PSAPs provide quality care.  Another 
major theme participants expressed was standards must be adapted to the local PSAP 
environment to accomplish the desired outcomes.  Participants also described how 
standards develop through local experimentation, discussion with peers (a separate, 
though interconnected theme), regionalization, then national acceptance.   
National standards of care as quality care. For many PSAP leaders, having a 
nationally certified protocol to follow led to a better standard of care.  Chris commented 
on how his agency used the certification process through the National Center of Missing 
and Exploited Children (NCEMC) to improve quality care, 
We got certified with NCMEC. . . . They want us to ask all these questions, but in 
reality we are definitely providing better care because if it comes that there is an 
abduction . . . we are going through the guidelines. (4:76) 
PSAP leaders across all session cited EMD as proof that national standards of care 
provided better quality care.  Danisha, when asked for examples of good national 
standards, she stated, 
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For us it was EMD. I mean hands down. We know that providing that service 
makes a big difference in calls. How do we know? Because we save lives, and 
we've seen it happen. We've had a couple situations where compressions and 
mouth-to-mouth has truly saved a life. Delivering a baby, we've had two of those 
since we've gone online with EMD. So, I think those end results there definitely 
show staff. And you know, when something like that happens, we highlight it. 
(4:75) 
Similarly, George stated seeing good outcomes while using national standard of care 
reinforced belief in the standards:  
That's one of my best examples . . . [was] going to an official EMD program. And 
it was all part of our accreditation process. But I think following [EMD] standards 
. . . really sticks out. When you have a save of a cardiac arrest, a save of a choking 
victim, [or] childbirth, all by pre-arrival instructions, I think that's why it stands 
out, because those [example incidents] are the wow factor. And that's why we're 
in the business. (2:59) 
Cliff relayed how EMD was viewed so positively, implementation received buy-in from 
all the stakeholders, 
I don't know if we're a rarity, but when EMD went in at our county, the funding 
was given pretty quickly. The dispatchers were completely on board with it. . . . I 
know there's been counties where the union said, "Nope, we're not doing it until 
you pay us more money."  That didn't happen. They embraced it completely. 
(1:77 – 1:78) 
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At a different session, Clark admitted before EMD telecommunicators had to “hope they 
had some medical experience to help somebody with choking or CPR” (3:82B).  He then 
declared, “EMD is obviously a perfect example of implementing something that has 
obviously had better results, and better quality care for the caller” (3:82D) . 
“It’s a template.” Although PSAP leaders acknowledged the importance and 
effectiveness of national standards of care, they also cautioned that those same standards 
of care should be adapted for local implementation.  Returning to Clark, “APCO and 
NENA [National Emergency Number Association] have great standards to go on. I think 
though, remember, that's a template that they give you, and you have to modify it based 
on the needs of your own agency” (3:95B).  Likewise, Cliff stated, “The standard isn't 
going to tell you exactly how to do ‘x’. It's going to give you a guideline on how to do ‘x’ 
in your environment. And then your own internal stuff is going to be there” (1:96).  In a 
later session, Danisha reflected, “As far as what the minimum standards of care are, it's 
hard . . . because we all operate differently” (4:87a).  Finally, George explained, “You 
have standards and policies, but I think, in most cases, that standard of policy may not be 
verbatim because it needs to have that local twist” (2:100).  Next, we will discuss how 
PSAP leaders perceive how standards should be developed and why standards 
development was so important to them. 
Standards development. PSAP leaders felt that standards should always be 
under review and tested for validity.  Former PSAP Leaders, like Larry, recalled “When I 
came in, there were no standards. Nothing was written anywhere. . . . Standards are good, 
because you create your standards, they're in writing, there's no question.” (1:148).  In the 
same session, Cliff described how standards emerge, 
 109 
I think it's important to understand [that] when it comes to standards, procedures, 
and best practices . . . at some point in the past, it started out as somebody was 
doing it “that” [a new] way, and someone talked to their neighbor and said, "How 
are you doing it?" And they talked, and they said, "That's a great idea."  So, now 
two people became “in” [on the new standard]. Pretty soon, instead of just being a 
practice, it became a best practice.  And then eventually those people got together 
to create standards, because they're well respected. And they created the standards 
based on their own best practices, by hashing around to say, "Well, your best 
practice is a little different than my best practice, but this standard is loose enough 
that it lets us both play in a sandbox without offending anybody." So the standard 
then gets put in place. (1:95) 
In a different session, Casper described how emerging standards, such as notifying fire 
responders that 20 minutes had elapsed since the time of call, gained momentum, “It’s 
becoming a national standard that a lot of other agencies are using. We should join the 
crowd [emphasis added] . . . because other agencies are having success with it” (2:38). 
PSAP leaders confessed that standards sometimes arise due to tragedy.  Larry 
described a particular case from early in his career, 
[Standards] change quickly . . . usually due to a national outcry.  The Eddie Polec 
story [Philadelphia, 1994]. Eddie was killed on the steps of St. Sicilia's church, 
there was more than a dozen calls to 9-1-1 of a large crowd gathering with bats, 
the dispatchers were curt and rude, Eddie's laying bleeding on the steps of St. 
Sicilia's church. The PSAP has no commonplace file [listing of business names] 
to figure out where the church is, and nobody can say that it's on the corner of 
 110 
“walk and don't walk”. . . . That raised the standards in 911. . . . I used to tell 
dispatchers when we were training, the one thing you do not want in your career, 
is to have Dateline come walking through the front door and want to interview 
you. (1:135)  
Danisha, reflected on more recent incidents receiving national attention, 
So, things like an active shooter incident, you know we've seen them across the 
country.  So, what do we all do? Jump on board, “Hey, what's our active shooter 
policy? Where are we with this because it could be us?” We've got a large city 
school. Definitely it could be us. So, we looked at our policy, it was weak. We 
developed a new policy. [We practiced] an active shooter incident. Did a full 
scale [exercise]; brought all the agencies in. (4:107) 
PSAP leaders warned that standards can become skewed, especially when 
overreacting to critical incidents.  Tyler stated, “Sometimes we over regulate, you know.  
We try to fix a problem with a policy or whatever when we could have solved it another 
way sometimes” (4:86).  In a different session, Casper struck a similar tone, “We've had a 
knee jerk reaction from . . . [an incident] that may never be repeated in 25 years, all of a 
sudden something happened, something went wrong, now we've got to change the 
procedure for this extreme type situation” (2:47).  Cliff warned that larger agencies may 
have an advantage when creating or updating standards: 
You talk about standards being obsolete, and this is a huge problem, and the 
national standards require people to volunteer their time at NENA or APCO, and 
there's a very strong possibility sometime those standards can be skewed in a 
particular way, because only particular agencies have the wherewithal and the 
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resources to allow their people to be involved in creating those standards. So they 
could be skewed to larger agencies that might have those resources, and neglect 
the agencies that are smaller. (1:156)  
Lillian joined in on the comment, “smaller agencies might not have the budget to send 
somebody to a particular [conference], or take them off the [PSAP operations] floor to 
allow them time to even just get on a conference call” (1:158).   
PSAP leaders also warned that standards quickly become obsolete and must be 
reviewed regularly.  Chris stated, “You have to review them. . . . We review our 
standards every year and they go out to the floor for a review. . . . You need to cover 
everything” (4:89).  Larry commented, “Standards in 911, they'll change slowly at a 
snail's pace” (1:135A).  Larry continued later in his session, “a standard can sit in a three-
ring binder for years, and it never even be an issue.  And when you go back and read the 
standards, maybe a lot's changed” (1:149).  The constant need to keep up with changes in 
standards, sometimes driven by technology (discussed below), forced PSAP leaders to 
become self-taught experts, a theme discussed more thoroughly in the next section.  
PSAP Leaders’ Alignment with Evidence-Based Management 
 Sub-question 4 asked: “How do PSAP leaders’ views align with evidence-based 
management theory?”  Evidence-based management theorists posited the best decisions 
are made using the best available evidence.  Participants routinely discussed the use of 
local data collected to justify decisions, measure success, or advocate changes to policy.  
PSAP leaders perceived adaptation of standards with local data was critical to local 
success.  Original research was rarely mention or used, but an underlying theme 
describing the lack of 9-1-1 operational research or the inappropriate application of other 
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public safety disciplines (law, fire, or medical) to the PSAP environment was consistent 
across all sessions. 
Local data. PSAP leaders advocated the use of local data including, but not 
limited to, call statistics, quality improvement reviews, and dispatch time benchmarks to 
improve the performance of their telecommunicators and make decisions regarding 
standards of care, policies, and staffing.  Chris recounted how he used multiple 
measurements to evaluate performance, 
There are so many different things that you are measuring your performance by; 
looking at your statistics that you use. As you measure your reviews, your 
evaluations, you're measuring everything, you have to take each thing and put it 
together as a whole package and see “What's our weak points? What's our strong 
points?” . . . I think there is not one item at all that is going to take and measure 
any PSAP.  And you have to use multiple tools. If you don't use multiple tools, 
then you're not taking and measuring it right. (4:4) 
In a different session, Byron’s agency performed an internal study to test and invalidate a 
long-standing PSAP standard regarding verifying addresses twice, “We eliminated the 
piece where we're re-verifying the address, we didn't see any increase in address errors . . 
. and we saw a decrease in our call processing time” (3:68B).  By eliminating those extra 
seconds, Byron’s PSAP saved hours of call processing time over the course of a year 
allowing for reallocation of scarce resources, “That's beneficial to the agencies, it's 
beneficial to us, it's beneficial to the citizens” (3:68C).  Later, Byron went on to say,  
You have to use the evidence and the data that is attached to your demographics. 
It's not always prudent to look at what's happening in another state, even another 
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county that borders you, because situations are different, demographics are 
different. Your fire service, your EMS service, they operate differently. (3:106) 
 In yet another session, George used the same argument about demographics, but also 
pointed to geography as a local concern along with call numbers driving staffing: 
You have to understand what's going on locally because [of] your demographics. . 
. . As an example the county we're sitting in right now has little or no water. I 
come from a county that I'm virtually a peninsula. . . . People laugh when I say 
that . . . [but] that changes how you're going to deal with stuff, and what [fire 
apparatus resources] you're looking for because your situations are always 
different, and you may respond to things differently. Your interaction with other 
agencies, I think, is always different. And then you look at your numbers, your 
staffing. Everyone's going to be different. (2:101) 
After George’s comment, Siobhan and George turned to Casper and asked him if he ever 
used his call volume data to justify additional staff at his center considering his pitiable 
comments earlier (see “Staffing and time” above).  Below is how the exchange 
proceeded: 
Siobhan: What's your call volume, though? I mean, can you drive for more 
staffing by call volume?  
Casper: I don't know. I've never done one of those.  
Siobhan: Because, I mean, that would evidence based, to get you more staffing. 
Casper: And I've never really looked. I've considered it, but I've never really 
looked into it to say, okay, in terms of either phone calls received or complaints 
processed. (2:103) 
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Finally, Cliff stated effective implementation of quality care “is taking standards from 
multiple places, and saying, ‘How do these all play together in our [local] environment to 
achieve our goal?’” (1:100).  
9-1-1 as a unique discipline. During the post-interview coding process, a new 
theme emerged regarding 9-1-1 as an expertise, unique from other public safety 
disciplines, which was not an a priori element.  Larry put it candidly, “You have people 
making decisions about 9-1-1 that don't have a clue what 9-1-1's all about” (1:63).  Larry 
followed up his statement a little later, 
Most [other] disciplines only think there [are] three: police, fire, and EMS. They 
forget that there's a 9-1-1 dispatcher, and those people have to know it all. They 
have to know police, fire, and EMS, and they have to know the dispatch 
operations in a 911 center. (1:69 - 1:70) 
PSAP leaders also confessed that they did not read original research on PSAP operations 
because it did not exist.  Most of the secondary research PSAP leaders used were from 
other disciplines such as the fire, emergency medical, or police sciences. Cliff reflected, 
I don't know if I've ever read original research, and then based any kind of 
decision on it. . . . Yeah, and I also think that the place that you [the researcher] 
are now, right? The place that the 9-1-1 world is now is different than it was when 
I was active . . . I think if you would have said, "Hey, go find somebody that has a 
PHD in 911 call taking”, right? [Larry interjects] They didn’t exist! [Cliff] Even 
today. (1:163 - 1:164) 
In a different session, Byron, stated “We can look at something and have it mean 
something much differently than the fire service could” (3:106A).  In yet another session, 
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George discussed how 9-1-1 has transitioned into a separate and distinct profession, 
“When I started 20 years ago, road patrol [law enforcement] people were working inside 
communications, so they understood the flow. Now a new person never sees 
communications and they don't understand it” (2:72).  Going back to Larry, he bemusedly 
put it this way, “As soon as we went from three-by-five cards and crayons to real live 
computers, it became a profession, because the computer programming was very specific 
to the dispatch function” (1:170).  PSAP leaders identified themselves as different from 
the other professions, and actually welcomed participating in original research in order to 
promote 9-1-1 as an emerging scholarly discipline, something that will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5. 
Other Findings 
Participant deliberations did not remain within the neat confines of the research 
questions.  While some of the themes discussed below were partially identified as a priori 
elements, the themes largely emerged through the iterative cycles of coding leading to 
new codes and lenses to view them through.  Below, we will delve deeper into each new 
theme with the understanding that some analysis and evaluation of broader meanings will 
occur in Chapter 5. 
Peers. Surprisingly, participants identified peers as a primary resource to create, 
validate, or update standards of care.  Larry recalled how it all started in the late 1990s in 
NYS,   
I think one of the best things that ever happened in the state was the formation of 
the [New York] State 911 Coordinators Association, because it opened that door 
to the sharing of knowledge, and typically any time the coordinators got together, 
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there was the local tour offered of: “Come see my center”. And without a doubt, 
everybody that went on a tour took something back to their agency that, “Hey, we 
can use that”. (1:107) 
Byron boldly admitted, “We look at best practices. We use input that we get from other 
9-1-1 centers, because we're all in this together, so we should probably be sharing and 
stealing from each other” (3:67).  In her session, Danisha profoundly expressed how 
other PSAP leaders were not only a resource, but also a community, 
I used to joke that the best thing about Coordinator conferences was dinner 
because we're all BS'ing [bull-shitting] about what we do every day and our staff 
and what goes on. That's how we work. And we also feel like we're not alone. 
(4:94) 
Earlier in the discussion regarding standards, both Cliff and Casper (from different 
sessions) illustrated how peers help promote standard adoption.  Here again, is Cliff, 
I think it's absolutely vital. Absolutely vital for anybody that's in a leadership role 
in a 911 center to not only talk to their neighbors regularly, but to be involved in 
at least regional and state organizations to share ideas. . . . And not only just go, 
but participate. (1:104)  
Larry, Cliff, and Casper described agencies that did not follow standards or participate in 
the state 9-1-1 association as “backwards”, Casper elucidated further, 
I'll get something on the listserv [NYS 911 coordinators list server e-mail group], 
and somebody asks a question, and “Okay, maybe that is something to think 
about”. Or, help them, give an answer of what we do, and then see what other 
responses somebody gives, and see how ours compares. Because we may, we may 
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[sic], be doing something in good faith, only to find out that everybody else who 
answered that same question is saying “No”. Or it reinforces when it's “Yeah, 
we're kind of normal . . . Okay, we are doing like others.” (2:55) 
Tyler shared, “In reality, we think we're so different and we're not . . . we shoot stuff off 
of each other using our email groups and things like that” (4:91).  When discussing 
troubling employees, George commented that, “everybody has them” and how he can 
pick out the same “personality” while visiting another PSAP (2:26). 
 Participants enjoyed sharing their stories and experiences with each other.  In one 
session, the term “group therapy” was jokingly alluded to, but there was a palpable 
feeling of comradery at each of the sessions.  As stories were told, participants jumped in 
claiming they had the “same” situation, questioned fellow PSAP leaders on policy details, 
and offered advice or resources to help solve their fellow participant’s problems.  
Interestingly, for all the talk surrounding applying national standards to their local 
resources and data, PSAP leaders generally agreed that “the state” should do more to 
standardize the quality of service all NYS PSAPs provide to the public. 
New York State governance.  PSAP leaders felt strongly that the State of New 
York should take a more active role promoting standardization, providing funding, and 
leading the state to develop solutions to technical challenges.  Cliff advocated for state 
leadership since NYS had many peculiarities not found in other regions: 
In New York State, we face so many more challenges that people in other states 
don't, between civil service, and lack of funding, and all those types of things. 
People in other states don't really face those same challenges, so I think it's really 
important to share that knowledge within the state. (1:114)   
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Participants felt that the state had a fundamental role in establishing standards of 
care.  Danisha commented how state requirements for EMD finally forced her agency to 
adopt national standards of care, “It's [EMD] becoming a standard. We want to make sure 
that we are up to date with the processes that are in other 911 centers. The state could do 
an audit at any time” (4:57A). George firmly believed all PSAP in NYS should meet the 
same standards of care: 
That's why it's important to have standards at higher levels, if you will. State 
standards [sic]. And New York State's a perfect example. Having a set of 
standards that county wireless PSAPs have to meet, that every other PSAP doesn't 
have to meet, there's a perfect example of [why] everything's so diverse. . . . 
When you hear stories of 9-1-1 centers that don't have to fall under that state 
standard with one person in a [PSAP operations] room. So, if that person leaves 
the room, who's covering [the 9-1-1 calls]? Not delivering EMD. We discussed 
earlier how important EMD was. So that center doesn't have to deliver EMD? 
(2:86 – 2:87) 
Clark recalled how his agency was “getting our standards from what the state says that 
we should get” (3:95A) as well as other national organizations previously discussed.  
 PSAP leaders, especially county PSAPs, did not always agree the state should 
have a leadership role.  Cliff remarked, 
 15 years ago . . . 57 [county] 9-1-1 coordinators in New York state [would] say, 
“We don't need a state 9-1-1 coordinator, we can do it ourselves. We don't need 
the state telling us what to do. . . . Now it’s completely opposite, because we need 
to have coordination.  (1:179) 
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One of the primary reasons behind that shift from local to state governance was the 
pressing technological needs and costs associated with next-generation 9-1-1.  While 
next-generation 9-1-1 is not within the scope of this study, technology and how it 
influenced PSAP leader decision-making came up frequently, and not always in a 
positive way. 
Technology. PSAP leaders felt technology was helpful, especially when trying to 
locate callers (as previously discussed), however participants more often than not 
described technology as a hurdle or a crutch.  Revisiting Chris’s cultural story about his 
center coming together as a team during a CAD upgrade, the team persevered in spite of 
the technological “bumps and bruises” the team endured (4:3A).  Larry recalled how it 
was technology challenges that gave birth to the NYS 9-1-1 Coordinators Association, 
We had issues with vendors not giving us proper data information on 9-1-1 
landline calls.  Cellular [phones] hadn't even been thought of yet. . . . This county 
would fix issues in the database, and then all of a sudden a year later, the issues 
rose up again, because they [telephone providers] didn't update the database, and 
they corrupted it with the issues that were corrected in the previous year. That was 
a huge issue. And when one county's talking to a vendor, it's not a big deal. When 
you have 62 counties talking to one vendor, that's a big deal, and they listened. 
And those issues went away, because we had strength in numbers. (1:120) 
One of the association’s founding members, Roy Althiser, “figured out that we all have   
the same problems, we all have the same issues [and said] ‘Let's get together and figure 
out the same solution” (1:119).  
 Other PSAP leaders were critical of telecommunicators over-relying on 
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technologies such as CAD or not verifying the 9-1-1 data they were getting.  Lillian 
posited, “And the technology aspect comes in, and it's great. It's huge. . . . But I think 
sometimes they depend too much on the technology, and don't listen to the caller . . . and 
the technology isn’t always 100%” (1:52).  Clark warned,  
I think this is an important point to make too, as far as performance. We have 
such great technology now. We have Computer Aided Dispatch. We have 
computers that literally tell us our job. What happens when the computers fail? 
(3:42) 
Clark then elaborated how a CAD failure during a fire “with a person trapped” caused a 
telecommunicator to panic.  He happened to be walking by, heard the concern, and then 
instructed his employee to “Go old school” (3:43).  Clark felt one measure of a 
telecommunicator’s performance is how well they react “when something they're using 
every single day to do their job fails, like a computer” (3:45).    
Recent changes in technology and the forecast of more changes to come, worried 
participants.  Tyler complained, “A text-to-911 call takes forever, you know, I mean 
there's a lot of work in that” (4:114). Lillian commented that national standards of care 
move slower than technology advancement: 
The technology changes so fast, and the standards, because of the research, and 
the time put into them don't, especially coming from the national organizations 
with all the review process, and all that. By the time a standard's written, 
sometimes it's almost obsolete. (1:155) 
PSAP leaders viewed technology as a never-ending challenge with both risk and reward. 
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Primary Research Question and Summary of Results 
Coming back to the primary research question: How do NYS wireless PSAP 
leaders support effective implementation of quality care?  The revelations from each sub-
question in part, informed the whole.  Participant definitions and measurements of quality 
care centered on PSAP telecommunicators’ abilities to quickly and accurately get 
responders to the appropriate location, sometimes in spite of technology failures.  PSAP 
leaders felt that factors such as buy-in from multiple stakeholder groups and 
organizational culture were neutral factors (could be either good or bad), whereas factors 
such as proper training and accreditation were primarily positive.  Participants cited lack 
of funding, time, quality improvement staffing, and dedicated supervisors as the primary 
obstacles (negative factors) for quality improvement in their PSAP.   
PSAP leaders advocated for national standards of care and proposed the State of 
New York mandate universal standards for all PSAPs, provided PSAP were able to adapt 
those standards to their unique resources and the state assist with funding.  Participant 
views on using the best available evidence, largely in the form of local data and policy 
experimentation, aligned with evidence-based theory, but the lack of original scholarly 
research on PSAP operations highlighted a major gap in academia, especially considering 
the life and death consequences of failure.  
Other findings included the importance of peers to not only reinforce adoption of 
standards, but also to serve as sounding boards and confidants during challenging times 
which resonated with the researcher.  The importance of both the NYS 9-1-1 Coordinator 
Association and their call for a state 9-1-1 coordinator is discussed more in Chapter 5, but 
cannot be understated, especially considering the looming technology changes ahead.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 Across New York State, whether you are a traveler on the Thruway, attending a 
football game in Buffalo, a NASCAR race in Watkins Glen, camping in the Adirondacks, 
a show on Broadway, or at night in your home, there is an expectation that you will 
receive quality care when you call 9-1-1.  As detailed in Chapter 1, PSAP quality can 
have life or death implications.  Emergencies occur regardless of response agency 
boundaries, the technical capabilities of the PSAP alerted, or the standards of care 
employed by the responsible PSAP.  According to the results previously discussed in 
Chapter 4 and incidents discussed in Chapter 1, PSAP quality improvement standards of 
care can be as random as the incidents that require emergency intervention.     
For many who call 9-1-1, it is their first time asking for help from strangers.  It 
can be the worst day of your life and the stranger on the other end of that 9-1-1 
connection can make life-altering decisions on your behalf.  Perhaps the reason PSAPs 
and their quality improvement programs have not received a great deal of scholarly 
attention is because PSAPs, their leaders, and front-line telecommunicators handle a 
majority of the 240 million 9-1-1 calls that occur annually in the United States of 
America without complaint (NENA, n.d.-b).  Unfortunately, we have no data to either 
support or refute the previous sentence due to the lack of original research on PSAP 
operations.  This study evaluated PSAP leader perceptions of quality improvement from 
an evidence-based management theoretical framework while answering the primary 
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research question: How do NYS wireless PSAP leaders support effective implementation 
of quality care?   
Implications of Findings 
The study revealed PSAP leaders consistently defined quality as achieving 
balance across multiple variables, PSAP quality improvement required staff, time, and 
relationships where PSAP leaders emerge as scholar practitioners of evidence-based 
management, and PSAP standards of care developed through peer engagement and 
consensus at the local, state, and federal levels.  The next few subsections will discuss 
specific key findings and how they related to the literature and what the findings meant 
within the larger scope of PSAP quality and NYS PSAP governance.  Each subsection 
discusses the highlights of the four sub-question findings.  In future sections we will 
discuss limitations and recommendations based on the key finding s of the study. 
PSAP quality consistently defined as balance of variables. Throughout Chapter 
4, PSAP leaders defined quality in very demanding terms.  Participants defined PSAP 
quality as achieving balance across a continuum of nuanced variables because a single 9-
1-1 call may have “99 tasks that need to be done.”  Telecommunicators must: (a) Be fast 
AND accurate, (b) Use their judgement AND follow the protocol, and (c) Utilize all 
available technology AND prepare for that same technology to fail.  Figure 5.1 
graphically represents how PSAP leaders reject the notion that their demands represent 
mutually exclusive dichotomies, but rather, characterize a target along three continua to 
reach optimum quality.  The circle in the middle of the diagram characterizes a range of 
acceptability where quality can be still achieved while allowing for the variable nature of 
emergencies.  
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Figure 5.1. PSAP Quality Model. 
Interestingly, NYS Wireless PSAP leaders advocated similar definitions of quality 
offered by telenursing managers in Australia.  In both locations and industries, employees 
viewed leadership instructions as inconsistent demands.  For instance, in Chapter 2, we 
heard a frustrated nurse complain that her managers offered two discordant quality 
definitions, “Yes, use your clinical judgement but then no, you’ve got to stick to the 
algorithms” (Russell, 2012, p. 202).  Likewise, in Chapter 4, a telecommunicator 
forwarded a 9-1-1 call to the wrong location because she wanted it to get done quickly, 
sacrificing accuracy.  However, PSAP leaders felt that balance, not dichotomies, 
represented quality.  In both industries, leaders should explicitly explain to employees the 
need for balance with PSAP leaders using the model described above. 
PSAP leaders regularly interchanged terms such as standards, protocols, and 
policies while defining quality.  Considering there is very little literature on PSAP 
operations, part of this study was to help future researchers learn how PSAP leaders 
operationalize these terms.  For future studies, as discussed in the recommendations 
section, terms should be defined for participants (qualitative) or subjects (quantitative) 
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using the definitions provided in the APCO/NENA American National Standards (ANS) 
documents. 
PSAP quality was inconsistently measured.  Participants confirmed both PSAP 
and telecommunicator performance was not consistently measured from county to 
county.  PSAP leaders admitted that quality improvement reviews “take a back burner” to 
other pressing needs such as training new employees.  PSAP leaders valued having a 
formalized plan for reviews but clearly identified the lack of staffing and time as barriers 
to fulfilling those plans, something discussed in subsequent sections.  PSAP leader 
sentiments affirmed existing literature claims that good training, constant reinforcement, 
and constant review were necessary to ensure compliance to national standards of care 
(APCO, 2013a; APCO, 2015; Clawson et al., 1998; Clawson et al., 2012).  PSAP leaders’ 
recognition that the standards are appropriate, yet sometimes ineffectively applied, will 
be discussed in the next section regarding implementation factors and in the 
recommendations section.  
PSAP quality implementation required time, staff, culture, and relationships. 
Participant discussions revealed that evidence-based quality improvement requires time, 
appropriate staffing of both supervisory and quality improvement positions, a positive 
organizational culture, and trust-based relationships with stakeholders.  As previously 
discussed in Chapter 2, both time and human resources were identified as costs and as 
potential barriers to evidence-based management implementations (Crowley et al., 2012; 
Glaub et al., 2014; Gloppen et al., 2016; Spector et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee, 2013; 
Taylor & Campbell, 2011; Wright et al., 2016).  PSAP leaders mirrored the literature 
citing both time and lack of dedicated resources as barriers to effective implementations. 
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Participants felt strongly that supervisors should be a separate role unfettered by 
front line telecommunicator duties.  Similar to the literature, PSAP leaders highlighted 
how supervisors play a critical role when reinforcing evidence-based standards of care 
(Armstrong, 2012; Bhave, 2014; Russell, 2012; Spector et al., 2015; Taylor & Campbell, 
2011).  Particularly in Bhave (2014), the frequency of supervisory reviews and 
discussions with employees resulted in better protocol compliance and reduced 
counterproductive work behaviors.  We previously discussed Russell (2012) above, but it 
bears reminding that supervisors should be available to help employees achieve balance.  
Participants described organizational culture as being both positive and negative 
indicating that culture was neutral factor, yet critical for successful implementation of 
evidence-based quality improvement. The literature described accreditation as a positive 
cultural factor for evidence-based management (Dorseif et al., 2016; Olola et al., 2016; 
Spiri & MacPhee, 2013).  Remarkably, PSAP leaders did not see accreditation as a 
prerequisite for achieving quality, but rather a helpful process to building the 
organizational culture to support and sustain evidence-based quality improvement.   
PSAP leaders believed building trusting relationships with multiple stakeholders 
was essential to leverage resources and achieve buy-in, described in the literature as 
stakeholder engagement.  As seen in the literature, PSAP leaders had to engage with 
senior leaders (Guo et al., 2015; Spiri & MacPhee; 2013; Telep & Lum, 2014) and 
middle management (Armstrong, 2012; Bhave, 2014; Russell, 2012; Spector et al., 2015; 
Taylor & Campbell, 2011) in order to succeed.  Unlike the literature, PSAP leaders also 
focused on achieving buy-in from front-line employees.  Participants believed being 
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viewed as a trusted insider was important which was eloquently discussed in Wright et al. 
(2016).  A table depicting implementation factors is in Appendix E.        
PSAP leader practices aligned with evidence-based management theory. 
Participant findings added support to the current literature regarding evidence-based 
management theory.   PSAP leaders adamantly believed local adaptations to standards 
using local data helped build trust and justify evidence-based standards of care, as seen 
above in Wright et al. (2016) and advocated by evidence-based management theorists 
(Briner & Walshe, 2014; Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006, Rousseau & Olivas-Luján, 2013).  
PSAP leaders did not always acknowledge their data-driven action research as evidence-
based management which was reminiscent of Bartlett and Francis-Smythe’s (2016) 
findings regarding organizational psychologists using evidence-based principles without 
conscious recognition of theory in practice. 
The State of New York should promote PSAP quality. Participant discussions 
uncovered a shift from local governance to more reliance on NYS for PSAP standards of 
care improvement.  PSAP leaders also affirmed the 9-1-1 standards influence model 
presented in Chapter 1 with a slight modification: a dashed arrow indicating “PSAP 
leader peer acceptance” was added after the study based on the Chapter 4 findings.  PSAP 
leaders discussed how the NYS 9-1-1 Coordinators Association, NYS Sheriffs’ 
Association PSAP accreditation standards, NYS county laws, and NYS wireless PSAP 
regulations successfully led to better standards of care throughout the state, especially 
evidence-based practices such as emergency medical dispatching (EMD).  Participants 
repeatedly advocated that all PSAPs in NYS, not just county-identified wireless PSAPs, 
be held to the same standard.   
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That said, PSAP leaders simultaneously called for the State of New York to help 
county PSAPs with funding to meet such standards.  Recently, the FCC identified that 
“sufficient public record information exists to support a finding that New York diverted 
funds for non-public safety uses” as a key finding in its report to Congress regarding 
abuses of 9-1-1 funding (FCC, December 29, 2017, p. 3).  More specifically, the FCC 
found, “State tax records indicate that in 2016, New York collected approximately 
$185,344,986 from the Public Safety Surcharge. During the annual 2016 period, the state 
awarded approximately $10 million in grants to counties to support PSAP related costs” 
(FCC, December 29, 2017, p. 47), meaning the State of New York misallocated over 
94.6% of its surcharge revenues.  While some of the misallocated revenues did support 
other public safety programs such as statewide interoperable communications grants, the 
paltry sharing of state resources, specifically designated for 9-1-1, with the PSAPs that 
provided such services is beyond alarming and represented an incredulous 
misrepresentation to taxpayers.  We will discuss possible remedies in the 
recommendations section. 
Limitations 
 Limitations of this study included social desirability factors common to focus 
groups, perhaps exacerbated by the recent dismissal of a well-known PSAP leader and 
the fact that the researcher was a peer.  The transcripts did show some minor social 
desirability impacts at the beginning of some focus groups, but barriers quickly broke 
down as PSAP leaders shared their experiences.  The focus group atmosphere may have 
mitigated social desirability impacts by ensuring participants did “not feel like we’re 
alone.” 
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Recommendations 
The following section will cover recommendations for policy, academic 
disciplines, and future studies.  For policy, we will begin locally and expand outwardly 
towards federal governance in keeping with the 9-1-1 standards development model.  We 
will discuss how PSAP operations should become a new public safety scholarly 
discipline without losing its multidisciplinary roots and how future studies may build 
upon the lessons from this dissertation. 
Local PSAP leader recommendations. Local PSAP leaders should continue 
using local data and experimentation to improve quality care.  Local data such as call 
volumes, on-air times, and address verification errors can help leaders make more 
informed decisions regarding policies, procedures, and how best to adapt national 
standards of care to their local resources.  PSAP leaders should use both quantitative and 
qualitative data to help decision makers. 
Evidence-based management is not a panacea and requires a great deal of time to 
collect, analyze, and present data in a way that is meaningful and enlightening to 
stakeholders.  More importantly, building trustful relationships with stakeholders is 
critical to implementing any standard of care.  While stakeholders may not always 
understand the data, or even agree with the decisions, they must be able to trust the PSAP 
leader’s intentions.  PSAP leaders should continue to loudly advocate for PSAP 
supervisors and quality improvement staffing through state organizations such as the 
NYS 9-1-1 Coordinators Association or the local chapters of APCO and NENA.  It is by 
“strength in numbers” and challenging other PSAP leaders to “join the crowd” that our 
voices may be heard. 
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State of New York recommendations. The State of New York should review its 
policy of diverting 9-1-1 revenues to the state general fund.  Beginning December 1, 
2017, the state is collecting 9-1-1 surcharges on pre-paid cellular devices which will 
increase the revenues beyond the $185 million collected in 2016 (NYS Department of 
Taxation and Finance, n.d.; FCC, December 29, 2017).  Raising the percentage of 
revenues shared with county PSAPs to represent only 10% of the revenue collected 
would double the current funding allowing PSAPs to add the additional supervisors and 
quality improvement staff needed to meet national standards of care.  Along with the 
increased funding, the State of New York could require adherence to national standards 
of care, such as the 2015 APCO/NENA/ANSI comprehensive quality improvement 
standard, without creating yet another unfunded mandate.  The State of New York should 
fund PSAP operational research and reinstate the PSAP inspection regime it abandoned 
in 2010 to properly measure the impact of such funding and ensure the counties are 
complying with the adopted standards.  Additional studies, discussed in the following 
recommendations would build on this study with the benefit of more robust resources. 
Federal government recommendations. The FCC should continue providing 
reports to Congress and publicly criticize states that divert 9-1-1 funding away from 
PSAPs.  The FCC and the executive branch should classify PSAP professionals as 
protective services in its Standard Occupational Classification (APCO, n.d.) and classify 
PSAPs as both national security and national transportation interests (the National 9-1-1 
Program Office is already a part of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration).  
Doing so would allow the executive branch and Congress to withhold grant funds related 
to the Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation from states that divert 9-1-1 
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revenues.  Currently, the State of New York has little incentive to give up $175 million 
(or greater) in annual revenue when faced with no loss in federal revenue for its 
misallocation of funds.  Finally, the National 9-1-1 Program Office should expand its 
current research activities to PSAP operations with researchers who have experience in 
both qualitative and mixed method methodologies.  The current focus of national 
organizations on technological issues is critically important, however, if the 
telecommunicators using the technology are inept, poorly trained, or are not properly 
informed of performance deficiencies, technology becomes a useless or a malignant tool.  
PSAP operations emerging as a scholarly discipline. PSAP operations, 
leadership, and scholarship are emerging as a separate and distinct discipline deserving of 
research.  In 2013, Gardett et al. (2016) found only 114 original research papers related to 
PSAP operational research, most of which were focused on medical protocols and not on 
dispatch operations such as quality improvement.  We applaud the Annals of Emergency 
Dispatch and Response for beginning this venture with the first peer-reviewed and 
original research volume in 2013.  Unfortunately, the publication is inextricably linked 
with the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch which represents a conflict of 
interest considering its vendor partner, Priority Dispatch Corporation, is one of the largest 
providers of software and card-based protocols sold to PSAPs worldwide (Sutter et al, 
2015).  Similarly, APCO and NENA also sell services to PSAPs.  Academic journals 
should create (if they do not exist) and strictly enforce conflict of interest and disclosure 
policies.  An independent research arm consisting of 9-1-1 scholar practitioners, as 
mentioned above, is sorely needed to ensure PSAPs have access to independent, original, 
 132 
and peer-reviewed research to promote future evidence-based improvements and critical 
inquiry regarding their merits.   
Future studies. As a more concrete and achievable recommendation, this study 
should be built upon by NYS DHSES researchers, other states, and PSAP scholar 
practitioners such as those currently enrolled in the APCO Registered Public Safety 
Leader (RPL) program or the IAED Communications Center Manager program.  Within 
the State of New York, studies regarding supervisory and quality improvement staffing 
among NYS PSAPs is sorely needed to identify potential gaps and ensure 9-1-1 funding 
is adequately meeting quality improvement needs.   
Conclusion 
PSAP leader participants’ perceptions of evidence-based quality improvement 
programs provided a unique insight into the current state of the 9-1-1 profession.  PSAP 
leaders support effective implementation of quality care by achieving buy-in from 
stakeholders, building trust as leaders, and using local data to support their decision-
making processes.  While participants consistently agreed on general definitions of PSAP 
quality, measuring quality was inconsistent from agency to agency.  Time, staffing, and 
funding were largely seen as barriers to effective implementation, while other factors 
such as training, reviews, and accreditation were viewed positively.  Stakeholder 
engagement and organizational culture were perceived as neutral, yet instrumental, to 
success. PSAP leader peer organizations at the state and national levels provided the 
impetus for change for many participants.  Current PSAP leaders are making the 
transition from personally held beliefs to locally adapted national standards of care, yet 
that transition needs continued support and funding from state 9-1-1 revenues.
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Appendix A 
State 9-1-1 Governance Levels of Authority (NHTSA, 2013) 
 
States Description Characteristics 
DC State-level 911 authority owns 
or operates a single statewide 
system with a single, state-
operated PSAP 
Washington, DC, is the only independent 
entity and is counted as a “state” for the 
purpose of categorization. In New 
Hampshire and Rhode Island, the 911 
authority is part of another state agency. 
CT, DE, 
MA, ME, 
NJ, VT, 
State-level 911 authority 
owns/operates a single 
statewide system, and funds 
and operationally supports 
PSAPs 
Vermont operates independently. In 
Maine, Massachusetts, Delaware, 
Connecticut, and New Jersey, the 911 
authority is part of another state agency. 
AL, AK, 
AZ, CA, 
FL, GA, 
HI, ID, 
IL, IN, 
KS, MD, 
MI, MN, 
MT, NH, 
NM, NY, 
NC, OK, 
OR, PA, 
RI, SC, 
SD, TN, 
UT, VA, 
WA, 
WV, WY 
State-level 911 authority with 
statewide geographic planning, 
coordination, and funding 
responsibility for full scope of 
911 
Only one of the 31 state 911 programs in 
this category operates as a completely 
independent state agency or function. 
The remainder all are part of another 
state agency, though beyond that there is 
a great deal of diversity. For most states 
in this category, the 911 function is a 
full-fledged organizational component of 
another state agency, and works within 
the context and authority of that agency. 
However, a few state programs are 
simply attached to another state agency 
for administrative support, and otherwise 
operate independently. In some cases 
there is also a separate board or 
commission that sets policy and exerts 
decision authority. 
TX State-level 911 authority with less 
than statewide geographic 
planning, coordination, and 
funding responsibility for full 
scope of 911  
 
Texas is the only state in this category, 
and operates as an independent state 
agency. In those parts of Texas outside 
of the state program’s geographic 
responsibility, regional and/or local 911 
authorities have independent 
responsibility. 
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AR, IA, 
KY, MS, 
NE, OH, 
WI  
State-level agency or board 
with statewide responsibility 
for a limited aspect of 911 
(generally wireless) 
Mississippi and Arkansas reflect 
independent agencies or boards of this 
sort; while Nebraska, Ohio, Iowa, 
Kentucky and Wisconsin are part of a 
larger state agency. 
CO, ND  
 
Informal state-level 911 focus or 
coordination mechanism  
Two states fall into this category. North 
Dakota and Colorado.  
LA, MO, 
NV  
No state-level 911 focus or 
coordination mechanism  
Three states fall into this category: Missouri, 
Louisiana and Nevada.  
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Appendix B 
PSAP Leader Perceptions A Priori Code Book 
Domain Code Description Examples 
9-1-1 
Technology 
ADV-911-TECH 9-1-1 Technology as 
an impetus to 
changing operations 
Adoption of 
Enhanced 911, 
Wireless 9-1-1, 
Next Generation 
9-1-1 
9-1-1 
Technology 
AVOID-TECH-
CHG 
Purposefully avoiding 
upcoming 
technological changes 
Delaying 
implementation, 
waiting for 
guidance, waiting 
for funding 
Accreditation ADV-ACR Advocating 
Accreditation 
Advocating 
Accreditation 
Accreditation ASS-ACR Assessing Other 
Agencies 
Assessing other 
agencies for 
compliance to 
accreditation 
standards 
Accreditation DEV-ACR Developing 
Accreditation 
Standards 
Developing 
accreditation 
standards 
Accreditation MEET-ACR Meeting Accreditation 
Standards 
Meeting 
Accreditation 
Standards 
Accreditation MNT-ACR Maintaining 
Accreditation 
Maintaining 
Accreditation 
Accreditation MOD-ACR Moderating 
Organizational Culture 
Accreditation as 
moderating the 
organizational 
culture, typically 
in a positive way 
to reduce 
resistance to 
evidence-based 
practices or 
management 
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Accreditation REJ-ACR Rejecting 
Accreditation 
Standards 
Rejecting 
Accreditation 
Standards 
Accreditation SE-ACR Seeking Accreditation Seeking 
Accreditation 
Accreditation VALU-ACR Valuing 
Accreditations 
Standards 
Valuing 
Accreditations 
Standards 
Civil Litigation ADV-P-STA Advocating 9-1-1 
standards 
Political activity, 
lobbying , internal 
discussions 
advocating 
standard adoption / 
compliance 
Civil Litigation ALL-NEGL Alleging Negligence Reports of PSAP 
staff misconduct 
Civil Litigation INS-LITI Insulating from 
Litigation 
Policy statements, 
procedures for 
handling 
complaints 
Civil Litigation LIT-P-STA Litigating 9-1-1 
standards 
Civil or criminal 
cases related to 
PSAP policies, 
procedures, or 
standards 
Civil Litigation REA-ACCU Reacting to 
Accusations 
Complaint 
investigations, 
responses to 
allegations 
Costs COST-CAP Costing Capital 
Investment 
Costing Capital 
Investment 
Costs COST-HR Costing Human 
Resources 
Costing Human 
Resources 
Costs COST-POL Costing Political 
Capital 
Costing Political 
Capital 
Costs COST-PRI Prioritizing Costs Prioritizing Costs 
Costs COST-TIME Costing Time Costing Time 
Costs EV-BEN Evaluating Benefit Evaluating Benefit 
Costs EV-COST Evaluating Cost Evaluating Cost 
Critical Incidents AT-TO MED Attending to Media / 
Public Inquiry 
Press releases, 
media briefings 
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Critical Incidents DEF-CR-INC Defining Critical 
Incidents 
Mention of 
"critical incident", 
mention of 
"defining 
moment" 
Critical Incidents INV-INC Investigating Incidents Internal 
investigations, 
external 
investigations 
Critical Incidents LEARN-P-INC Learning from past 
incidents 
After-action 
reports, self-
initiated rather 
than reactionary 
Critical Incidents OVER-P-INC Overreacting to 
incidents 
Major changes to 
policy in response 
to rare incident, 
"punishing" all 
PSAP employees 
for action for one 
employee 
Critical Incidents REP-ERR Repeating Errors Repeated errors, 
multiple 
complaints for 
same issue 
Employees BE-EMP Being Employees Participant 
describes or relates 
experiences as a 
employee 
Employees CONV-EMP Convincing 
Employees 
Attempts to 
persuade 
employees 
Employees CRIT-EMP Criticizing Employees Criticizing middle 
employees 
Employees DIS-EMP Disobeying 
Employees 
Disobeying or 
undermining 
employees 
Employees ENG-EMP Engaging Employees Contacting, 
meeting with, or 
seeking input from 
employees 
Employees FLW-EMP Following Employees Following 
decisions of 
employees 
Employees PRA-EMP Praising Employees Praising middle 
managers 
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Evidence-Based 
Management 
ADP-RES Adapting Research Adapting existing 
research to current 
problem or issue 
Evidence-Based 
Management 
COL-EV Collecting Evidence Collecting local 
data, collecting 
research 
Evidence-Based 
Management 
CRE-EVID Creating Evidence Creating local data 
collection 
processes 
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Evidence-Based 
Management 
EVA-EV Evaluating Evidence Evaluating 
evidence including 
but not limited to 
local data, 
research findings, 
or anecdotal 
experiences.  Not 
mutually 
exclusive.  
Evidence-Based 
Management 
EVA-RES Evaluating Research Evaluating 
applicability of 
research to current 
problem or issue.  
Evaluating 
research 
methodology 
Evidence-Based 
Management 
LOC-RES Localizing  Research Conducting 
research or 
replicating 
research at local 
agency. 
Evidence-Based 
Management 
MAK-DECSIO Making Decisions Making a decision 
based on evidence 
or research 
External 
Facilitators 
ACC-EF-FIND Accepting EF 
Findings 
Accepting external 
facilitator findings 
a as valid or 
necessary 
External 
Facilitators 
ADP-EF-FIND Adapting EF Findings Adapting external 
facilitator findings 
to organizational 
needs or culture 
External 
Facilitators 
BU-TR-EF Building Trust as EF Building trust with 
organizations or 
stakeholders as an 
external facilitator 
External 
Facilitators 
ENG-EF Engaging with EF Contacting, 
meeting with, or 
seeking input from 
external 
facilitators 
External 
Facilitators 
EST-REL-EF Establishing 
Relationships as EF 
Establishing 
individual 
relationships as 
external facilitator 
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External 
Facilitators 
EV-EF Evaluating EF Evaluating or 
setting criteria for 
external 
facilitators or 
consultants 
External 
Facilitators 
REJ-EF Rejecting EF Findings Reflecting external 
facilitator findings 
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External 
Facilitators 
SEL-EF Selecting EF Processes for 
selecting external 
facilitators 
Governance ADV-GO-STR Advocating 
Governance Structures 
Lobbying or 
advocating for 
creation, 
strengthening, or 
maintaining a 
governance 
structure to 
oversee 9-1-1 
operations 
Governance ADV-LE Advocating 
Legislation 
Participant 
advocates changes 
to legislation to 
change adopted 
standards, funding 
mechanisms, not 
limited to quality 
improvement 
Governance DEN-LO-GOV Denying Local 
Governance 
Local agency / 
municipal 
governance 
oversight not 
required or 
required at 
different level of 
government 
Governance DEN-NA-GOV Denying National 
Governance 
Federal 
governance 
oversight not 
required or 
required at 
different level of 
government 
Governance DEN-ST-GOV Denying State 
Governance 
State governance 
oversight not 
required or 
required at 
different level of 
government 
Governance EST-GO-STR Establishing 
Governance Structures 
Local agency / 
municipal 
governance 
oversight not 
required or 
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required at 
different level of 
government 
Governance FUN-STAND Funding Standards Tying standard 
compliance to 
funding, such as 9-
1-1 surcharge 
revenues 
Governance MAN-STA Mandating Standards Formal adoption 
of standards by 
law or regulation 
by local, state, or 
federal 
governments 
Governance REQ-LO-GOV Requiring Local 
Governance 
Requires local 
agency / municipal 
governance 
oversight, not 
mutually exclusive 
of other levels of 
government 
Governance REQ-NA-GOV Requiring National 
Governance 
Requires federal 
governance 
oversight, not 
mutually exclusive 
of other levels of 
government 
Governance REQ-ST-GOV Requiring State 
Governance 
Requires state 
governance 
oversight, not 
mutually exclusive 
of other levels of 
government 
Governance SHARE-CU-GOV Sharing Current 
Governance 
Participant 
describes current 
governance model 
with group 
Middle 
Management / 
Supervisors 
BE-MM Being MM-Sup Participant 
describes or relates 
experiences as a 
middle manager 
Middle 
Management / 
Supervisors 
CONV-MM Convincing MM-Sup Attempts to 
persuade middle 
managers 
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Middle 
Management / 
Supervisors 
CRIT-MM Criticizing MM-Sup Criticizing middle 
managers 
Middle 
Management / 
Supervisors 
DIS-MM Disobeying MM-Sup Disobeying or 
undermining 
middle managers 
Middle 
Management / 
Supervisors 
ENG-MM Engaging MM-Sup Contacting, 
meeting with, or 
seeking input from 
middle managers 
Middle 
Management / 
Supervisors 
FLW-MM Following MM-Sup Following 
decisions of 
middle managers 
Middle 
Management / 
Supervisors 
PRA-MM Praising MM-Sup Praising middle 
managers 
Organizational 
Culture 
ADV-CUL-CNG Advocating Culture 
Change 
Advocating 
change in 
organizational 
culture of PSAP 
agency 
Organizational 
Culture 
CRIT-CUL Criticizing PSAP 
Culture 
Criticizing 
organizational 
culture of PSAP 
agency 
Organizational 
Culture 
ID-CUL-SYM Identifying Cultural 
Symbols 
Identifying 
organizational 
culture symbols of 
PSAP agency 
(e.g., badge, 
uniform, headset, 
etc.) 
Organizational 
Culture 
PRA-CUL Praising PSAP Culture Praising 
organizational 
culture of PSAP 
agency 
Organizational 
Culture 
SET-CUL-EXP Setting Cultural 
Expectations 
Setting 
expectations of 
employees using 
organizational 
culture of PSAP 
agency 
Quality ADP-QI-PRO Adapting Quality 
Program 
Adapting quality 
improvement 
program to local 
agency needs 
 152 
Quality DEF-QUAL Defining Quality Describing what 
quality means to 
participant 
Quality ID-QUAL-EB Identifying Quality as 
EBM / EBP 
Participant making 
the connection 
between EBM or 
EBPO and quality 
improvement 
Quality MEA-QUAL Measuring Quality Instrumentation of 
quality, metrics, 
evaluation reports 
Quality REI-QUAL Reinforcing Quality Reinforcing 
quality through 
reward or 
emphasizing 
intrinsic value 
Quality RES-QUAL Researching Quality Researching 
quality 
improvement 
programs or 
evaluation 
methods 
Quality SET-QU-EXP Setting Quality 
Expectations 
Establishing 
criteria, publishing 
criteria 
Quality STAFF-QUAL Staffing Quality Creating or 
staffing quality 
improvement 
positions 
Research Access ACC-LIB Accessing Libraries / 
Higher Ed 
Accessing 
Libraries / Higher 
Ed 
Research Access ACC-OL Accessing other PSAP 
Leaders 
Accessing other 
PSAP Leaders 
Research Access ACC-RES-DB Accessing Research 
Databases 
Accessing 
Research 
Databases 
Research Access ATT-CONF Attending 
Conferences 
Attending 
Conferences 
Research Access JOIN-PRO Joining Professional 
Organizations 
Joining 
Professional 
Organizations 
Research Access SU-PRJ Subscribing to 
Professional Journals 
Subscribing to 
Professional 
Journals 
 153 
Research Skills BEN-OA Benchmarking Other 
Agencies 
Benchmarking 
using other agency 
standards, 
protocols, or 
programs as the 
example 
Research Skills LA-RES-SK Lacking Research 
Skills 
Lacking Research 
Skills 
Research Skills LEARN-RES-SK Learning Research 
Skills 
Learning Research 
Skills 
Research Skills PR-RES-SK Providing Research 
Skills 
Providing 
Research Skills 
Research Skills RES-L/R Researching Laws / 
Regulations 
Researching Laws 
/ Regulations 
Research Skills RES-PRJ Researching 
Professional Journals 
Researching 
Professional 
Journals 
Research Skills RES-SCJ Researching Scholarly 
Journals 
Researching 
Scholarly Journals 
Research Skills RES-WEB Researching Websites Researching 
Websites 
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Senior Leaders BE-SL Being SL Participant 
describes or relates 
experiences as a 
senior leader 
Senior Leaders CONV-SL Convincing SL Attempts to 
persuade senior 
leaders 
Senior Leaders CRIT-SL Criticizing SL Criticizing senior 
leaders 
Senior Leaders DIS-SL Disobeying SL Disobeying or 
undermining 
senior leaders 
Senior Leaders ENG-SL Engaging SL Contacting, 
meeting with, or 
seeking input from 
senior leaders 
Senior Leaders FLW-SL Following SL Following 
decisions of senior 
leaders 
Senior Leaders PRA-SL Praising SL Praising senior 
leaders 
Standards of 
Care 
ADP-STA Adapting Standards Adapting 
standards to local 
agency needs 
Standards of 
Care 
ADV-STA Advocating Standards Advocating for 
adoption or 
compliance to 
standards 
Standards of 
Care 
DEF-STA Defining Standards Defining standards 
or protocols 
Standards of 
Care 
DEN-ST-VAL Denying Standard 
Validity 
Stating a standard 
should not apply 
or is not feasible 
Standards of 
Care 
DEV-NEW-STA Developing New 
Standards 
Development or 
creation of 
standards or 
procedures 
Standards of 
Care 
EM-STA Emerging Standards Emerging, but not 
adopted or 
formally in 
development 
Standards of 
Care 
QUALIFY-STAN-
MAK 
Qualifying Standard 
Makers 
Mention of 
qualifications of 
standard makers or 
lack of 
qualifications 
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Time ADD-TIME Taking Additional 
Time 
Tasks, protocols, 
or programs take 
more time than 
prior to 
implementation 
(projected or after 
the fact) 
Time ADV-TIME Advocating Time 
Commitments 
Advocating that 
time commitments 
are worth benefit 
Time ID-TIME-COST Identifying Time as 
Cost 
Expressions that 
time costs money 
or expressions of 
time as a non-
renewable 
resource / 
commodity 
Time LA-TIME Lacking Time to Meet 
Standards 
Lacking time to 
meet standards, 
protocols, or 
program 
commitments 
Time REJ-TIME Rejecting / Devaluing 
Time Commitments 
Statements or 
feelings that time 
required to meet 
standards, 
protocols, or 
program is too 
high a cost or 
benefits are  not 
worth time 
investment 
Time SET-TIME-PRO Setting Programmatic 
Timeframes 
Setting timeframes 
to meet for 
standards, 
protocols, or 
programs 
including but not 
limited to time to 
answer calls, time 
from call to 
dispatch, 
timeframe for 
reviews to be 
completed, 
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timeframes to 
meet 
programmatic 
goals 
Training Factors ADP-TR Adapting Training Adapting Training 
Training Factors DEN-TR Denying Training 
Applicability 
Denying Training 
Applicability 
Training Factors FUN-TR Funding Training Funding Training 
Training Factors INT-PR-TR Internalizing Previous 
Training 
Internalizing 
Previous Training 
Training Factors LA-TR Lacking Training Lacking Training 
Training Factors PR-EX-TR Providing External 
Training 
Providing External 
Training 
Training Factors PR-IN-TR Providing In-Service 
Training 
Providing In-
Service Training 
Training Factors STAFF-TR Staffing Training Staffing Training 
Trusted Insiders BU-TR-TI Building Trust as TI Building trust with 
other insiders or 
within 
organizational 
culture 
Trusted Insiders FAIL-TI Failing as TI Failing to become 
a trusted insider or 
building trust 
Trusted Insiders ID-TI Identifying TI Participant 
identifying as a 
trusted insider 
Trusted Insiders NEG-EV-TI Negotiating Evidence 
as TI 
Negotiating the 
validity of 
evidence as a 
trusted insider 
Trusted Insiders PRES-EV-TI Presenting Evidence 
as TI 
Presenting 
evidence as a 
trusted insider 
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Appendix C 
Focus Group Opening 
Opening Remarks (Paraphrase): Thank you for joining me today.  I asked you all here 
today to discuss PSAP quality improvement from a NYS wireless PSAP leader 
perspective.  You were all selected based on your current job description as experts in the 
matter.  Your individual feelings, thoughts, and ideas on this topic are very important.  
You all filled out consent forms to participate in the study which included a promise by 
me to keep your information confidential.  My hope is that we all respect that 
confidentiality, so we can all speak freely and ensure what we hear today are people’s 
actual feelings, thoughts, or ideas and not necessarily the official policy of their agency.  I 
am recording these sessions, so we can transcribe what is said today into text for analysis.  
I may be contacting each of you later to ensure the transcription is correct.  Does anyone 
have any questions or concerns before we begin? (Answer any questions).  Alright, first 
question . . .  
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Appendix D 
Organizational Questionnaire 
1. What is your pseudonym? _______________ 
2. What is the population (to nearest 5,000) of your county? _______________ 
3. To nearest 1,000, how many 9-1-1 calls did your PSAP receive in 2016? _______ 
4. Please indicate which discipline(s) your PSAP serves as the primary calltaking 
entity in your county (check all that apply) 
a. Police 
b. Fire 
c. EMS 
5. Please indicate which discipline(s) your PSAP serves as the primary dispatch 
entity in your county (check all that apply) 
a. Police  
b. Fire 
c. EMS 
6. Please indicate which discipline(s) you perform routine randomized quality 
improvement reviews for calltaking (check all that apply) 
a. Police 
b. Fire 
c. EMS 
7. Please indicate which discipline(s) you perform routine randomized quality 
improvement reviews for CAD Entry (check all that apply) 
a. Police Calls for Service 
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b. Police Traffic Stops 
c. Fire  
d. EMS 
8. Please indicate which discipline(s) you perform routine randomized quality 
improvement reviews for compliance to dispatch policies (check all that apply) 
a. Police Calls for Service 
b. Police Traffic Stops 
c. Fire  
d. EMS 
9. Do you use vendor generated protocols / software / procedures? _________.  If so 
please indicate the vendor(s) next to each discipline. 
a. Police _______________ 
b. Fire _______________ 
c. EMS  _______________ 
10. Are you and accredited PSAP? _______________.  If so list your accreditations. 
a. Police _______________ 
b. Fire _______________ 
c. EMS  _______________ 
d. Other _______________ 
11. Do you have dedicated staff whose primary duties are quality improvement / 
quality assurance?  _________.   
a. If so, how many positions was your PSAP authorized in 2016? _________ 
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Appendix E 
Table of PSAP Quality Improvement Factors 
 
Table E1   
   
PSAP Quality Improvement Factors 
   
Positive Neutral Negative 
Training Organizational Culture Time 
Reviews Stakeholder Engagement Staffing 
Accreditation  Funding 
 
